



The Palestinian
Public's Perception
of Palestinian CSOs



### 7amleh - The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media The Palestinian Public's Perception of Palestinian CSOs

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#### **Executive Summary**

7amleh - The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media presents this instigative study, The Palestinian Public's Perception of Palestinian CSOs. To map this perception, the study wielded a set of indicators—including the Palestinian public's expectations of and satisfaction with Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs). The indicators were measured with three tools: polls, focus groups, and individual interviews. In addition to analyzing collected data and information, the study reviews the corpus of literature on Palestinian CSOs. The study was carried out between July and September 2021 and was informed by the inputs and insights of a poll completed by 1,203 people, focus groups consisting of 58 people, and five individual interviews. The sample of the study represented historic Palestine, i.e., the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and Israel. The study arrived at the following key findings;

- 63% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs do represent Palestinian society
- 47% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs do have a clear vision and objectives
- 46% of the respondents agreed that they do feel the impact of the Palestinian CSOs' work on society
- 40% of the respondents agreed that the labor and trade unions are directly involved in and engaged with Palestinian CSOs' endeavors
- 32.6% of the respondents agreed that they are satisfied or satisfied to a degree with the role played by Palestinian CSOs;
- 23% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs are more active in the field of gender and women's issues;
- 18% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs play an active role in the economic sector
- 3% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs play an active role in relation to transparency and integrity
- 2% of the respondents agreed that Palestinian CSOs play an active role in environmental issues.

Concerning the information about Palestinian CSOs and their mechanisms of information and news communication, the results were as follows;

• 68% of the respondents agreed that they access the news of Palestinian CSOs from their official websites

- 58% of the respondents agreed that they access the news of Palestinian CSOs through social media
- 32% of the respondents agreed that they learn the news of the Palestinian CSOs through relatives and friends.

Concerning the engagement with and benefiting from Palestinian CSOs' activities, the results were as follows;

- 74.8% of the respondents agreed that they have never engaged with or participated in Palestinian CSOs' activities.
- 82% of the respondents agreed that they have never benefited from Palestinian CSOs' activities and services.

The focus groups further asserted these results, highlighting that Palestinian CSOs should expand their communication with members of the public and initate active engagement with them. In a similar vein, the study puts forward several recommendations, including—

- Palestinian CSOs should clarify their vision and mission, communicate with the public in a clearer manner, and enhance the transparency of the way they announce their activities and events to help the public understand the specific role of each CSO.
- Palestinian CSOs should intensify their communication with the community and use social media channels to reach a larger audience.
- Palestinian CSOs should also intensify their activities to attract volunteers and partners in order to expand their public base.
- Acting upon the findings of the poll and interviews, which indicate that social media is the most important tool to access news and information on CSOs and their activities and events, Palestinian CSOs must place particular focus on their visibility on social media and their digital brand.
- Palestinian CSOs should ensure that their work is continuous, for interruption can create a void which may be filled by unframed non-organized youth popular initiatives; Therefore, CSOs are invited to embrace such initiatives under their umbrella and guide them to reach more sectors of the public.
- Despite the fact that the needs of individuals vary from one place to another, CSOs should respond to the needs of the localities they serve, provided they maintain their scope of work and not compete with CSOs that have a different niche focus.
- Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal is to protect and empower society, not

to compete with other CSOs, Palestinian CSOs are invited to think of out-ofthe-box ways to network with one other in order to have integrated efforts and serve the largest geographical area.

 Lastly, Palestinian CSOs should exert more effort to remove impediments to public access of their services due to the bureaucracy in some CSOs. It goes without saying that public access to CSOs is of paramount importance and bolsters public confidence in these organisations.

### Introduction

The past three decades witnessed the advent of thousands of Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and Israel across a wide spectrum of sectors-including society, human rights, politics, research, agriculture, and environment. Over the years, Palestinian CSOs have provided society with an array of services, which arose the need to understand the relationship between CSOs and members of the public. This investigative study sheds light on the Palestinian public's perception of Palestinian CSOs by measuring the positions of members of Palestinian society on these bodies. To that end, the study also analyzes therelationship and interaction between members of society and CSOs—including the public reactions to CSOs' activities—in order to identify the problems facing Palestinian civil society as represented by its organizations. To see Palestinian CSOs through the eyes of the public, the study devised a set of research tools including a questionnaire completed by a representative sample of Palestinians, representative focus groups in Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, in which the participants discussed their perceptions of CSOs. Additionally, one-to-one interviews were conducted with representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Israel and EastJerusalem to understand the Palestinian civil society in these areas.

Palestinian civil society has undergone tides of change and accordingly developed. At the beginning of the 1980s, Palestinian popular movements formed the nucleus of the Palestinian civil society, which became loci for social actors. With the start of the First Intifada, these movements took the helm of organizing the popular activities on the social landscape. Many of these popular initiatives became registered NGOs under the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords.

By and large, this investigative study explores how the various sections of Palestinian society perceived CSOs approximatelt 28 years following the Oslo Accords,. The study also examines the impressions Palestinians have about CSOs,

as a branch that has grown and expanded under the auspices of the Oslo Accords and its political context.

## The Civil Society: Definition and Development

Philosophers of the past held differing opinions about the concept of civil society. For example, Thomas Hobbes defined civil society as a society of absolute sovereignty, market, competition, and interests. The English philosopher considered society as a community that is politically governed by a state established upon a social contract among the members of that society. Under the contract, the members assemble and elect a sovereign. In pursuit of order and security, they also vest in that sovereign all the rights and powers they had in the state of nature.1 According to Hobbes, civil society is the politically organized community within the state.<sup>2</sup> For John Locke, civil society is an avenue that individuals enter into with their free will to safeguard the equitable rights they used to enjoy in the state of nature, which were threatened by the lack of power that could regulate the practice of these rights. Therefore, the individuals agree to create a society where their rights are protected. After that, they delegate their right to public management to a new source of power instituted with their consent, provided their basic rights to life, liberty, and property be safeguarded. Granting that the power complies with the agreed social contract, the members of the society shall submit to it.3

In modern times, "the term became popular in political and economic discussions, in the 1980s, when it started to be identified with non-state movements that were defying authoritarian regimes, especially in central and eastern Europe and Latin America." The World Bank Group defines civil society as "the wide array of nongovernmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations;" Hence the term non-governmental organizations, also known as NGOs. The United Nations (UN) defines "A civil society organization (CSO) or non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized on a local,

<sup>1</sup> Mohammad Barout, Al Mujtamaʻ al-Madany: Mafhuman wa-Ishkatyatan [Civil society: Concept and problem,] Dirasat Fikryya [Thought Studies], (Aleppo: Dar aṣ-Ṣadaqa, 1995): 14.

<sup>2</sup> Ali Abdulsadiq, Mafhum al-Mujtama' al-Madany: Qira>a Awaliyya [The civil society concept: First reading], (Cario: Mahrousa Center For Publishing, 2004): 21-22.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 21-22.

<sup>4 -</sup> World Economic Forum. Who and what is <civil society? Retrieved from: <a href="https://bit.ly/2V6rcmX">https://bit.ly/2V6rcmX</a>

<sup>5 -</sup>The World Bank Group. (N.D.). Overview on Civil Society - History. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3y4vppl

national or international level. "6 As the cited definitions indicate, the concept of CSOs and NGOs is broad and loose and does not specify the identity of the bodies that sit squarely within this concept, allowing CSOs and NGOs to work across various sectors.

This study only canvasses Palestinian CSOs and NGOs fitting the World Bank's and the UN's definitions. International NGOs (INGOs), which expand the concept of local NGOs to the international sphere and with headquarters in their countries of origin and regional chapters in line with their programs and policies, lie beyond the scope of this paper.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) enshrines the individual's right to assembly in article 21;

"the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

This international provision is in perfect harmony with the broad definition of CSOs and NGOs, particularly at the establishment phase. The state's parties to the ICCPR shall protect the right of any group of individuals to establish a local NGO according to the founding group's cultural, scientific, professional, philanthropic, or religious aims.

## **Palestinian CSOs and NGOs**

Speaking about Palestinian NGOs, one must bear in mind that such bodies work in contexts created by the waves of colonialism that hit Palestine. As a result, Palestine was divided into four enclaves: Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Approaching Palestinian civil society has several contexts accompanied by various political, economic, and social trajectories which results in Palestinian NGOs and CSOs'distinct structures and legal frameworks.

For the most part, Palestinian NGOs and CSOs in historic Palestine are a continuation of popular social initiatives that emerged at the beginning of the 1980s. In one way

<sup>6 -</sup> United Nations. (N.D.). The UN and Civil Society. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3kQhuzX

<sup>7</sup> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 49. Retrieved from: <a href="https://bit.ly/36Vh8Qf">https://bit.ly/36Vh8Qf</a>

or another, their efforts intersected and joined forces with Palestinian political parties and factions and could reclaim the civil rights of the Palestinians.

As the figures stand, the total number of NGOs was about 1,400 in 1994. This figure fell right after the establishment of the PA, according to the Palestine Economic Policy Research InstituteMAS, 800 Palestinian NGOs dissolved with the advent of a new generation of NGOs.8 A mapping study of the Palestinian NGOs argued that such a decline was driven by the PA's call upon CSOs and NGOs to merge with fledgling PA institutions. Against the novel political reality dictated by the Oslo Accords, Palestinian NGOs in Israel were isolated from their fellow NGOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Deriving information from previous reports by the International Platform of NGOs Working for Palestine, a position paper published by the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies - Masarat in 2020, estimated the total of Palestinian NGOs at 4,616 distributed as follows-42 percent in the West Bank, 31% in the Gaza Strip, 14% outside Palestine, 14% in East Jerusalem, and 2% in Israel. 60% of these bodies are classified as grassroots or self-sustaining organizations.10 The exact number of Palestinian NGOs cannot be asserted for a variety of reasons, which are explained in the following sections of this study.

### **NGOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**

The NGOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are governed by the NGOs Law of 2000. Establishing the legal framework of NGOs, the said law provides in its first article, "The Palestinian people shall be entitled to exercise their right to social, cultural, professional, and scientific activities—including the right to assemble and organize non-governmental organizations according to the provisions of this Law."11 Also, article 2 provides that the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the responsible authority over the NGOs' scope of work12 through its General NGOs Department. The latter assumes the responsibility of incorporating and monitoring NGOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The NGO Law defines an NGO as "an independent legal person established under an agreement between no less than seven persons

<sup>8</sup> Gianfrancesco Costantini and et al., Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Final Report, (Final Report of a Project Funded by the European Commission and Implemented by SOGES, May 2011), 21. Retrieved from: <a href="https://bit.ly/3zBjDnp">https://bit.ly/3zBjDnp</a>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.22,.

<sup>10</sup> Ashraf Sukar and ʿAhd Jaradat , Waraqt Ḥaqa'q: Mu'asasāt al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madany — Taḥadiyat ad-Dawr [Position paper: NGOs and Palestinian young people — role challenges], (Ramallah: The Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies - Masarat, 2020). Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3zwhxoH

<sup>11</sup> Law No. 1 of 2000 on Non-Governmental Organizations. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3kVjKFZ

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

to achieve legitimate goals of public interest without aiming to derive financial profit with a view of sharing it among the members of the NGO or making personal gains."<sup>13</sup>

Article 26(2) of the Palestinian Basic Law provides, <sup>14</sup> "Palestinians shall have the right to form and establish unions, associations, societies, clubs[,] and popular institutions in accordance with the law." <sup>15</sup> With this provision, the Basic Law, which is considered to be the PA constitution, enshrines the right of the members of the public to form unions, associations, societies, clubs, and popular institutions which, in one way or another, are part of the CSOs/NGOs.

Notably, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), on behalf of the 'State of Palestine', did accede to an array of international treaties, conventions, and covenants—including the ICCPR on June 1, 2014. Article 21 of ICCPR states that "The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." As a state party to this international covenant, the PA is expected to comply with the letter and spirit of the ICCPR. In simpler terms, the national laws and international covenants and treaties, which the PA signed, do safeguard the individuals' right to assemble and form CSOs and NGOs.

According to the figures and data provided by the MoI NGOs General Department, <sup>18</sup>the total number of registered NGOs in the West Bank—including East Jerusalem—and the Gaza Strip is 3,223 (See table 1).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> The Palestinian Amended Basic Law of 2003 sets the legal and constitutional framework of the political regime in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

<sup>15</sup> The Palestinian Amended Basic Law of 2003. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2Wepkcl

<sup>16 &</sup>quot;Al-Haq Turaḥib bi Qubūl al-'Umam al-Mutaḥidda wa-Hūlanda wal-Majlis al-Fidirāly as-Swaysry Inḍimām Dawlat Filasṭīn Ila al-Muʿahadāt ad-Dawliya [Al-Haq gladly receives the acceptance of the UN, the Netherlands, and the Swiss Federal Council of the accession of the State of Palestine to multilateral conventions,]" Al-Haq (April 14 2014), Retrieved from: <a href="https://bit.ly/3y5gEDi">https://bit.ly/3y5gEDi</a>

<sup>17</sup> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> The researcher obtained the information related to the registered NGOs through a written request to the competent department in the MoI and through correspondence dated June 12, 2021 with Abdel Nasser Sairafi, director general of the NGOs Department in MoI.

<sup>19</sup> This term refers to the environs of East Jerusalem, e.gBethany, in addition to the villages of the East government that are located behind the Separation Wall. Notwithstanding, this figure does not include the NGOs in East East Jerusalem.

**Table 1: Registered CSOs/NGOs by governorate** 

Governorate	# of CSOs/NGOs
Jericho	58
Hebron	121
Ar-Ram	228
Bethlehem	251
Jenin	194
Halhul	53
Dura—southwest of Hebron	51
Ramallah and al-Bireh	754
Salfit	55
Tubas	30
Tulkarm	120
Qalqilya	51
Nablus	240
East Jerusalem	228
Deir al-Balah	54
Gaza city	472
Rafah	58
Khan Younis	125
Jabalia	55
Unions, associations, and federations, and NGOs based in the Mol	25

As the table above shows, around 21% of registered NGOs are based in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate; this is attributable to political circumstances that turned Ramallah and al-Bireh into a hub of government institutions and NGOs. Noticeably, the percentage of registered NGOs in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate is higher than the percentage in the Gaza Strip, which stands for 22 % of the registered NGOs. The Tubas governorate ranked last with 1 percent of the registered NGOs.

Besides, a group of local central unions and associations accounts for 1%.<sup>20</sup> The environs of East Jerusalem have 7% of the registered NGOs. The reason for this low percentage is due to Israel's restrictions on Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem and its suburbs. In addition, not all NGOs in East Jerusalem are registered with the

<sup>20</sup> The registration of unions is called a 'central registration'. This also applies to the merged societies and associations, i.e., which have been merged, meaning that the registration documentation of these societies are not registered with the NGO's Department but directly with the MoI, and this also applies to international organizations.

MoI. Although ar-Ram village is located within the boundaries of East Jerusalem governorate, it is given a separate entry. Being located across the Separation Wall, ar-Ram provides an area where Palestinians from both sides of the Separation Wall can work and thus houses many registered NGOs. It is safe to conclude that the total percentage of registered NGOs in the East Jerusalem suburbs—including ar-Ram—is 14 percent of the total registered NGOs. There are NGOs in East Jerusalem, and in Israel registered with the MoI as foreign NGOs, because they are registered with the Israeli Ministry of Justice (IMOJ) at the Registrar of Associations.

According to the data collected from the General Administration of NGOs at the MoI, the work of registered NGOs covers most sectors (see table 2).

Table 2: Distribution of Palestinian NGOs by sector/sectoral ministry

Ministry/sector	# of CSOs/NGOs	
Mol	35	
Ministry of Labor (MoL)	4	
Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoW)	228	
Ministry of Detainees and Ex-detainees Affairs (MoDEA)	9	
Ministry of Transportation (MoT)	2	
Ministry of Finance (MoF)	1	
Ministry of Health (MoH)	158	
Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) (previously known as the Ministry of Social Affairs)	1,188	
Ministry Of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA)	29	
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)	153	
Higher Council for Youth and Sport (previously known as Ministry of Youth and Sports)	525	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	13	
Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG)	2	
Ministry of Culture (MoC)	371	
Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE)	198	
Ministry of Awqaf	12	
Ministry of National Economy (MoNE)	52	
Ministry of Telecom and Information Technology (MoTIT)	5	
Ministry of Environment	45	
Others	18	

Owing to the nature of their community services, NGOs operating in the sector of the MoSD rank first with 1,118 NGOs—or more than one-third (about 34.7 percent). Second comes the NGOs operating in the field of youth and sports, with 525 NGOs—including youth sports clubs across cities and villages. Third, the NGOs working in the sector are regulated by the MoC, with 371 NOGs, e.g., heritage and cultural organizations. As for the NGOs operating in the sector regulated by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, they make a total of 228 organizations, which is tantamount to 7% of total registered NGOs.

#### **Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem**

Israel uses policies to stifle Palestinian Jerusalemites in the public and private spheres. These policies cast a shadow over all the organizations, associations, clubs, and even shops that represent the Palestinian Jerusalemites. Palestinian CSOs and NGOs went through two phases before reaching the policy constraint stalemate. The first stage was before the Israeli occupation of the city in 1967; the city had been governed by the board of al-Quds Municipality under the Jordanian government.<sup>21</sup> The Palestinian Jerusalemite NGOs entered the second phase in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of the city. The board of al-Quds Municipality was henceforth replaced with the Jerusalem Municipality. In the same vein, all Palestinian Jerusalemite CSOs were brought to a close—including the Chamber of Commerce, the Arab Studies Centre, of which the Orient House Organization was part. The center was reopened in 1991 with the advent of Oslo talks to be closed a decade later following the outbreak of the Second intifada .<sup>22</sup>

NGOs are registered with the IMoJ Registrar of Associations. Without being registered with the Registrar of Associations, the service or work in East Jerusalem would be beyond the bounds of possibility, for such registration is sine qua non to obtain other required service licenses and permits.<sup>23</sup> As a matter of necessity, the Israeli government does not issue the required permits and licenses for every Palestinian organization, especially those that provide national services to the Palestinian Jerusalemites. Another mechanism is to register a Palestinian NGO with the Palestinian MoI in order to extend its reach to the West Bank; However, the NGO is to follow a series of procedures to figure out whether it would be granted registration.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Abu Eisheh, Media and Communication Coordinator at Burj Alluqluq Social Center Society, on July 28, 2021.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Abu Eisheh, op. cit.,footnote 21.

It is safe to say, that part of Palestinian CSOs and NGOs in East Jerusalem are an extension of voluntary grassroots movements that later became institutions.<sup>25</sup> National organizations in East Jerusalem are to be seen today as independent institutions.<sup>26</sup>

The interviews carried with active actors in Palestinian NGOs and CSOs in East Jerusalem revealed the lack of a comprehensive survey of Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem due to the lack of an active PA responsible for registering and monitoring this section of Palestinian NGOs. Even the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics lacks the exact count of Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem.<sup>27</sup> In addition to Palestinian trade and labor unions and federations, estimates indicate that some 45–50 NGOs are active in East Jerusalem across various sectors—including education, youth, sports, women, arts, culture, and tourism. It is beyond a shadow of a doubt that a number of Palestinian Jerusalemite NGOs is still unidentified, as well as their personnel.<sup>28</sup>

Palestinian CSOs and NGOs in East Jerusalem work in the service sector. Most of the work is in the cultural sector, which also includes youth centers and the health sector but not in abundance. Concerning agriculture, if Palestinian Jerusalemite NGOs are divided into two categories—inside and outside the Separation Wall those inside the Separation Wall do not have any significant activity in agriculture, <sup>29</sup>which echoes the Israeli control over land. If the light were to be shed on the work of NGOs and the nature of their activities, especially at the cultural front, they would be found engrossed in providing services related to combating genderbased violence and awareness-raising on similar issues. As for legal NGOs, they provide their services as humanitarian aid—not from a sustainable development perspective. Of course, the interventions of such NGOs are dependent on funded projects, and thus they come to an end along with the projects under which they are funded.30 NGOs active in the education sector in East Jerusalem are very few. For instance, Tamer Institute for Community Education carries activities in East Jerusalem, and Burj Al-Luqluq Social Center Society engages with educational institutions.31

<sup>25</sup> From an interview conducted with Naheel Bazbazat, Palestinian Jerusalemite civil society activist, on August 4, 2021.

<sup>26</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Daoudi, Palestinian NGO Network coordinator in East Jerusalem, on July 26, 2021.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Daoudi, op. cit., footnote no. 26.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

#### **Palestinian NGOs in Israel**

The context of Palestinian CSOs and NGOs in Israel is quite different from that of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and possibly East Jerusalem. However, it is similar to that of East Jerusalem in terms of registration and the Israeli constraints on Palestinian NGOs' action. Palestinian NGOs in Israel operate in a particularly complex context. For example, the amendment to the Israeli NGO Law concerning the funding of NGOs cast a shadow over the structure and work of Palestinian NGOs in Israel. Besides, the emergence of Palestinian NGOs in Israel was late compared to their fellow NGOs in other parts of Palestine. While the second phase of Palestinian Jerusalemite NGOs kicked off in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian NGOs in Israel started in the late 1980s. At that time, no more than four Palestinian NGOs were active in Israel and mostly funded by Palestinian sources. 32

In plain English, Palestinian NGOs in Israel are few and well known—not too many and widely spread as in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There are two types of Palestinian NGOs in Israel: regional NGOs, which are known and form a rather small community, and local NGOs, which often have a niche focus on service, relief, and quotidian issues and are fewer in number.<sup>33</sup>

According to another view, Palestinian NGOs in Israel should not be called 'civil society organizations' or 'CSOs' for short and prefer al-Ahly-based organizations (Ahly Arabic for indigenous community). Avoiding semantics such as 'CSO' and 'NGO' might be an attempt not to be construed as a recognition by these organizations that Israel is a normal situation just as any other that has public, private, and civil sectors. The latter tries to bridge gaps created by the state or to provide services not provided by the state or the private sector. This engenders cooperation and complementarity between the civil society and the state, which would be normal in a normal state. But, this is not the case for Palestinians in Israel, who are not part of this framework. Taking due account of the different political landscape, the semantics of 'civil' is limited and does not reflect the full role that civil society is supposed to play.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> From an interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, executive director and co-founder of 7amleh: The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, on July 08, 2021.

<sup>33</sup> From an interview conducted with Nida>a Nasser, director of Baladna Association for Arab Youth, on July 14, 2021.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

#### Historical background of Palestinian NGOs and CSOs in Israel

The 'Palestinian civil society' in Israel started in the late 1980s. Noted societies, associations, and organized bodies made the scene during the second half of the 1990s, such as Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Itijah, and the Galilee Society. With the start of the second intifada, the NGOs' role gained further gravitas. A gap filled with alienation and estrangement widened between Palestinian educated young women, men and the Israeli institution. Against this situation, Palestinians in Israel looked for new loci where they could find their sense of belonging and organize their activism into distinct action. Along the same lines, the young generation's need to volunteer and reclaim their stake in the change grew. Al-Ahly-based action further increased after 2000.35 The Oslo Accords unfolded a key turning point that increased al-Ahaly activism across Israel. The Palestinian community started to turn to internalization and reclaim its role with utmost seriousness after being cast out with the signing of the Oslo Accords by the PLO. Amid these twists and turns, the Palestinian NGOs were being whipped into shape—of course, there were Palestinian NGOs and CSOs in Israel, but the active actors today were created toward the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.36

Political parties and movements, i.e., the Communist Party, the National Democratic Assembly (Balad), Abnaa el-Balad, and the Islamic Movement, played a decisive direct or indirect role in establishing several NGOs and CSOs, marshaled by their prominent wigs and members.<sup>37</sup>

However, the situation is quite different today, and this trend has become limited in some associations and people. For the most part, the NGOs established in the 1990s were extensions to the political parties.<sup>38</sup>

As indicated earlier, all CSOs are to be registered with the IMoJ Registrar of Associations. Israeli legislation provides that all NGOs furnish annual reports on their activities together with detailed financial reports to the Registrar of Associations.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>35</sup> From an interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, op. cit., footnote no. 32.

<sup>36</sup> From an interview conducted with Nida>a Nasser, op. cit., footnote no. 33.

<sup>37</sup> From an interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, op. cit., footnote no. 32.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> From an interview conducted with Nida>a Nasser, op. cit., footnote no. 33.

Palestinian NGOs are registered with the Registrar of Associations as 'Israeli' NGOs—neither Palestinian nor Arab. This classification keeps the information and data of these organizations blurred—including their count, personnel, and services. The personnel count of the Palestinian NGOs, which operated in Israel and sampled in this study, does not exceed 300 workers. For example, the staff headcount of the Baladna Association for Arab Youth is no more than ten. For this study, table 3 below lists key Palestinian NGOs in Israel.

**Table 3: Key Palestinian NGOs in Israel** 

Al-Zahra Society	The Social Development Committee Haifa	Women Against Violence	
Arab Center for Alternative Planning	The Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education	Tishreen Association	
The Regional Council of the Unrecognized Villages	Assiwar The Feminist Arab Movement	The Mossawa Center, the Advocacy Center for Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel	
Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel	Al Mezan Center for Human Rights	7amleh - The Arab Center for Social Media Advancement	
Hewar - The Arab Association for Alternative Education	Jamʻiyat Ḥimāyat al-Muhajarīn (lit. The association for the protection of forcibly displaced people)	The Arab Culture Association	
Elhawakeer Association for Society Development, Agriculture, and Environment	Sanad	Masira	
Al-Qaws	Aswat - Palestinian Feminist Center for Gender and Sexual Freedoms	Altufula Center	
Baladna Association for Arab Youth	Mada al-Carmel - The Arab Center for Applied Social Research	Kayan - Palestinian Feminist Organization	
Naʿm (lit. yes)	Amanina Association	Aman Center - The Arab Center for Safe Society	
Injaz Center	Nasijona	The Committee for Educational Guidance for Arab Students	
"Intimā" wa "AṬā" (lit. benevolence and devotion society)	The Galilee Society	Masar Institute for Education	

For the most part, the NGOs in Israel do not provide the same services provided by the NGOs and CSOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Quite a few Palestinian NGOs in Israel provide such services because—

- 1. NGOs do not have enough resources, nor do they assume such a role; if any, they might provide food packages and seasonal events for this purpose; and
- 2. Unlike the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, service provision rests with the state, and needs for basic services are not similar to those across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>40</sup>

It is difficult to dissect the NGO landscape in Israel due to the lack of data. However, a distinction can be drawn between institutions of a political nature and others. Tapping into the information collected for this study, we could arrive that some Palestinian NGOs in Israel are active in the field of women's issues, such as Kayan - Palestinian Feminist Organization, Awan, Women's Against Violence, and Altufula Center. Other NGOs are active in the legal advocacy sphere, e.g., Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Mossawa Center - the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, and Al Mezan Center for Human Rights. Others are human rights NGOs, including the Committee for Educational Guidance for Arab Students, the Arab Center for Alternative Planning, and the Regional Council of the Unrecognized Villages. Besides, some are active in the cultural sector, e.g., the Arab Culture Association.<sup>41</sup>

## **Geopolitical Impact on Palestinian NGOs**

Palestinians in Palestine live in four sui generis administrative divisions, namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and Israel. Each enclave has its constellation of local NGOs that endeavors to bridge the gaps left by the ruling authorities and underscore Palestinian identity against the slew of policies set to erase Palestinian nationalism. Depending on where they are ,geographically within historic Palestine, these NGOs are governed by different legal frameworks, policies, and economic circumstances. Against such a fragmented status quo, Palestinian NGOs barely coordinate their actions or network with one another despite a great deal of effort severally devoted by some NGOs. The relationships of these NGOs are often limited to unsustainable in-kind projects due to their intense involvement in their local issues.<sup>42</sup> Obviously, relationships among NGOs are heavily influenced by

<sup>40</sup> From an interview conducted with Nida>a Nasser, op. cit., footnote no. 33.

<sup>41</sup> From an interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, op. cit., footnote no. 32.

<sup>42</sup> From an interview conducted with Nida>a Nasser, op. cit., footnote no. 32.

surrounding conditions, especially funding terms, which often shape the nature of joint activities by NGOs. For example, relationships among Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip face a clear-cut attempt of framing that limits any forms of networking beyond those dictated by the funding terms.<sup>43</sup>

Against all the odds, Palestinian NGOs do attempt to piece the four enclaves of historic Palestine together. Youth initiatives also strive afresh to surmount the political compounding situation (i.e., Israeli occupation and internal political division) as well as the funding terms that limit their collaborative consolidated actions to achieve projects of common objectives. This pursuit is particularly manifested in youth and women's NGOs, e.g., the joint project by the Palestinian Vision Organization (based in East Jerusalem and the West Bank) and the Association for Arab Youth – Baladna (based in Israel). In addition there are movements that broke across the limitation of 'borders'. The Palestinian feminist movement Tala'at provides a case in point. This also points to Palestinian NGOs with missions that go beyond a specific locality, such as Muntada Jensaneya, which is active throughout historic Palestine.

#### Israeli Restrictions on Palestinian CSOs and NGOs

Israeli authorities wage a direct and indirect war against Palestinian CSOs and NGOs, devising a slew of tools to shrink the space in which they serve. Israel exerts enormous effort against Palestinian NGOs—either by monitoring their activities, controlling and restricting them, or through diplomatic work through which it promotes that CSOs are linked to Palestinian organizations it classifies as terrorists.

In June 2021, Adalah produced a short film titled 'Shrinking Space for CSOs and Means to Challenge it'. The eight-minute film explores the shirking space in which the Palestinian CSOs work and the shadow such situation casts over the nature and quality of CSOs' work. As the film unfolds, the avenue of Palestinian CSOs is subject to a mélange of policies, laws, and restrictions imposed by government institutions, international donors, and the Israeli authorities to tighten the control over Palestinian civil society.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>43</sup> From an interview conducted with Naheel Bazbazat, op. cit., footnote no. 25.

<sup>44</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Abu Eisheh, op. cit., footnote 21

<sup>45</sup> The interviewee did not mention the project name.

<sup>46</sup> From an interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, op. cit., footnote no. 32.

<sup>47</sup> Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, (June 30, 2021), Shrinking Space for CSOs and Means to Challenge it, (film). Facebook. Retrieved from: <a href="https://bit.ly/3zoLSVy">https://bit.ly/3zoLSVy</a>

The Israeli effort to minimize the work of all Palestinian NGOs is not spur-of-the-moment but part of a larger plan to restrict any organized form of Palestinian effort in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or Israel. To have this mission complete, Israel spares no effort. First, Israeli authorities attempt to close Palestinian NGOs. In 2014, Israeli authorities closed the Shuaa organization which was once active in Israel. Second comes legislation to cause Palestinian NGOs to yield to difficult funding terms. Rounding this tool off, Israel also brings pressure to bear upon donors as well.<sup>48</sup>

In 2021, the Israeli military commander addressed two notifications to the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) and the Health Work Committees, ordering them to stop working. The closure was not enough; it seems; the Israeli occupation forces arrested the director of UAWC and seized some properties that belonged to UAWC and the director (e.g., her car). Over and above, Israeli occupation forces broke into the office of the Bisan Center for Research & Development as well as the premises of the Defense for Children International - Palestine. These cases are but a few of the systematic restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation upon Palestinian CSOs and NGOs.

All Palestinian NGOs subject to Israeli legislation, i.e., Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem and Israel, are exposed to vicious attacks and to take tighter firm on them with a view of erasing any Palestinian dimension to them. For this purpose, Israel closes some, pursues the personnel of these organizations under security pretexts, and imposes constraints on their movement and funding.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, Israel established an ad hoc body called the NGO Monitor. As the name suggests, this NGO watchdog is set to monitor Palestinian CSOs and NGOs. It also sends reports to donors, indicating that a donor-funded Palestinian NGO is affiliated with Palestinian political parties and factions, and thus donors often suspend the funding. With these means, Israeli authorities attempt to shape the scope of Palestinian NGOs' works and activities. This sparked off the conditional funding crisis, which allows the donors to set political conditions on funding Palestinian NGOs. Refusing political conditions, many Palestinian NGOs had to bring their work to an end. A campaign called the Palestinian National Campaign to Reject Conditional Funding is still spearheaded—at the time of writing in October 2021—by a coalition of Palestinian NGOs that refuse to yield to conditional funding.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> From an interview conducted with Naheel Bazbazat, op. cit., footnote no. 25..

<sup>49</sup> From an interview conducted with Samer Abu Eisheh, op. cit., footnote 21

<sup>50</sup> From the official page of the campaign. Facebook. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3lld5hr

From a legal point of view, more than 62 Israeli laws aim to limit the space for Palestinians and their organizations regardless of their location, not to mention the attempts to restrict banking transactions and cut off funding for many of them under the pretext of supporting terrorism. Above all, these restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities upon Palestinian NGOs and CSOs, whether through the Registrar of Associations or the NGO Monitor, spares no effort to preclude these organizations from obtaining the required approvals and licenses, and thus be able to bring their effort into fruition. Against such a slew of challenges, Palestinian NGOs' activities are often restricted and prevented from achieving their envisaged bottom-line results.<sup>51</sup>

## Methodology

This investigative study provides an analysis based on information and data collected through three methods—The first was quantitative, where a questionnaire (see appendix1) was developed and completed by a random sample of 1,203 respondents, distributed as follows—

West Bank	Gaza Strip	1948 IoPl	East Jerusalem	Total
525	378	205	95	1203

The data was collected between August 25 and September 10, 2021. Considering the four different regions where the targeted NGOs and CSOs are based, the questionnaire was completed over the phone in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and via electronic means in Israel. The questionnaire was piloted with an initial sample of 20 people to check the questions for clarity and relevance before being completed by the respondents.

The second method was qualitative. Information was collected with the prism of five focus groups representing the regions covert in the study with a focus group from each region (i.e., East Jerusalem, Israel, and the Gaza Strip) except the West Bank two focus groups were met. The total of participants in the focus groups was 58 people. The focus group meetings were held between August 17 and September 8, 2021, via video conference with all the participants present. The participants were asked a group of the questions that were prepared for this purpose (see Appendix 2)

The third tool was also qualitative. With the prism of this tool, in-depth one-on-one interviews were held with active members of CSOs; specifically, three interviews
51 From an interview conducted with Samer Daoudi, op. cit., footnote no. 26.

with active members of CSOs in East Jerusalem and two interviews with active members of CSOs in 1948 IoPl. These interviews were devised to bridge the gap caused by the lack of information and data on CSOs in East Jerusalem and Israel.

The three research tools were used to explore the following aspects with a view of examining the perception of Palestinians of CSOs: The Palestinians' (1) knowledge of; (2) satisfaction with; (3) participation in and engagement with; and (4) expectations from Palestinian CSOs.

#### **Survey Results**

The sample size that answered the questionnaire was 1,203 males and females of the age of 18 years and over, where the proportion of males was 51%, and the proportion of females was 49%, their ages were distributed as shown in the figure: 1. The age group (2535- years) most participated in the questionnaire, which was 32.7% of the sample, followed by the age group (3645- years) with 23%, and the lowest participation rate was for the young age group (1824- years) with 10.5%. In presenting the results of the survey, we will shed light on three main elements: knowledge of CSOs, satisfaction with their activities, and expectations from CSOs. Each of these elements includes several indicators through which we will reveal the Palestinians' perceptions of CSOs.

## Palestinians' Knowledge of and Familiarity with CSOs

This section was given over to measure Palestinians' knowledge of CSOs and the nature of this knowledge.

The first indicator: measured was whether CSOs represent Palestinian society and their needs. About 63% of the respondents agreed that CSOs express the needs of society, while about 25% of them did not agree.

The second indicator: moved to the definition of CSOs as non-profit and not-for-profit. The respondents were divided between agreeing and disagreeing with this definition, as their percentage reached 42.2% in each section, while about 15% of the respondents answered that they do not know whether CSOs were non-profit or not-for-profit.

The third indicator: tackled the direct involvement of labor and workers' rights unions in CSOs. About 34% of the respondents do not agree with this statement, while about 40% of them agree with it.

The fourth indicator: measured the clarity of the vision and objectives of CSOs.

About 47% of the respondents see that the vision and objectives of civil society institutions are clear, while about 33.8% of them do not see them as clear, and about 19% answered that they do not know.




Figure 2: Palestinians' knowledge of CSOs: Selected indicators


The fifth indicator: The clarity of the institutions' discourse. About 45% of the respondents expressed that the discourse of CSOs is understandable and clear, and 36% said that the discourse is not clear.

The sixth indicator: The impact of the work and activities of CSOs. 46% of the respondents answered that they could feel the impact of CSOs and their activities on their communities. In contrast, 40% of them do not notice any impact.

The seventh indicator: Sources of knowledge of the news of CSOs. About 68% indicated that they derive the news of institutions from their official websites, while about 58% of the respondents stated that their main source for accessing the news of CSOs is social media, and 32% of the respondents answered that their source is relatives and friends (Fig. 3).

Considering the results of the indicators (see figure 2) selected to infer the extent to which Palestinian society is familiar with CSOs that provide services to them, the people who have some knowledge of CSOs do not reach 50% of them. On the one hand, this may be because CSOs failed to introduce themselves and their mission to the public. On the other hand, the society to which CSOs' services are provided

may not be interested in a profound knowledge of the CSOs that serve them. According to these figures, CSOs' have a pressing need to cement their relationship with the public.



**Figure 3: Sources of knowing CSOs** 

#### Palestinians' satisfaction with CSOs' activities and interventions

The data (figure 4) that we collected to measure the public satisfaction with the services it receives from CSOs indicates two prominent results. The first is at the personal level. More than 50% of the respondents are satisfied with the activities and services they personally receive (humanitarian services 57% and awareness-raising 51%). Second, at the public level, we see that, on average, less than 40% of the respondents are satisfied with the work of CSOs. For example, the CSOs' role in monitoring official institutions, only one-third of the respondents are satisfied. And, in advocating human rights issues, the percentage of those who are satisfied with the work of CSOs is only about 40%.

Having the results carefully noted, it can be concluded that— 1. CSOs are not adequately active in public affairs. 2. CSOs may be very active in public affairs, but they do not have a solid satisfactory impact on society. These results indicate that CSOs have ample room to improve their performance, particularly in relation to public affairs.




Figure 4: The satisfaction with the CSO performance

#### CSOs' activities

This section tried to identify the respondents' opinions about the sectors in which CSOs are active (Fig. 5) and their expectations from CSOs (Fig. 6), in addition to identifying the extent of benefit from these activities (Fig. 7).

The results indicate that about 22% of the respondents think that CSOs are more active in the sector of women and gender roles, followed by the economic empowerment sector, where about 18% of the respondents think that CSOs are active on this front. At the same time, the majority of respondents think that CSOs are not active in the environmental sector (1.7% think they are active in this sector), integrity, and transparency (2.9% think they are active in this sector). According to the results that appear in figure 5, it can be concluded that the respondents are familiar with the active CSOs in the sectors that provide services at the personal level, while their knowledge of the activities of CSOs decreases the more impact their activity had at the public level.




Figure 5: The sectors in which CSOs are active according to the respondents' opinion

### **Expectations from CSOs**

The respondents' expectations of CSOs and their role (figure 6) do not differ from their vision of the sectors of these CSOs. About 47% of the respondents believe that the role of CSOs should focus on emergency interventions related to humanitarian issues, and about 19% of them believe that the role of institutions should focus on raising awareness and building knowledge, and a similar percentage of respondents believe that the work of CSOs should focus on monitoring and accountability of government institutions, while only 7.5% believe that CSOs should work on advocacy and lobbying to change policies.

These results reinforce our conclusions from the previous data that the respondents deal with CSOs from the perspective of the services they receive from them at a personal level, and they confirm this through their emphasis on the role of CSOs in providing humanitarian services.





Figure 6: The envisaged role of CSOs according to the respondents

Figure 7: The extent to which Palestinians benefit from the activities and services of CSOs



## **Participation in CSOs' activities**

The most prominent results in this survey were about the respondents' participation in the CSOs' activities and the extent to which they benefit from these activities. About 75% of the respondents stated that they had never engaged in any CSOs' activity. And about 82% said that they did not benefit at all from CSOs' (figure 7).

These dramatic results warrant careful due consideration by CSOs, as they reflect a dire reality experienced by CSOs. CSOs stand out in the areas that government institutions are absent, and the goal of their work in these areas is to serve society at both the personal and public levels. If these results are read with the prism of the said, a defect and imbalance in the work of CSOs could be clearly identified. According to our reading of all the results, the reasons for lack of participation in and benefit from the CSOs' activities may be as follows—

- Lack of partnership and cooperation with the members of society. This
  partnership and cooperation may be voluntary in the work of CSOs or in
  the form of material and intellectual contributions to reinforce and expand
  their public base.
- Inadequate communication between CSOs and the members of the public;
   The means adopted by these organizations to communicate may be ineffective and do not reach all members of society. Consequently, their objectives and activities are limited to a very limited audience.
- Inadequate activities for all sections of the public. This may be due to not keeping pace with the needs of society and may be caused by targeting groups that are not suitable for their activities.

But we must not forget that the contexts differ according to the geographical areas, as participation in and benefit from activities in the West Bank cannot be compared with East Jerusalem or with Israel, because the space available to Palestinians and their work in CSOs in the West Bank much broader. However, this does not mean that we ignore this gap.

## **Focus Group Results**

The focus group meetings were held by 58 participants between August 17 and September 8, 2021. The groups were divided into the four areas covert by the study—including two groups representing the West Bank, a group representing the Gaza Strip, a group representing East Jerusalem, and a group representing Israel. The meetings were arranged via Zoom. The groups were asked the same set of questions (see Appendix 2). The results of the meetings are presented according to the regions represented by the groups, and then the section moves to the similarities and differences among the groups.

### **The West Bank**

Two groups from the West Bank were selected due to the large number of CSOs compared to the rest of the areas covered by the study. The two groups were met on August 17 and September 8, 2021.

#### The focus group's knowledge of CSOs' work

When discussing this topic, the participants demonstrated familiarity with the nature and objectives of the work of CSOs. Participants indicated that the goal of CSOs is to serve and develop society and that they are independent, non-governmental, and non-profit. They also mentioned that voluntary work and social responsibility come to their minds when talking about the work of CSOs. Regarding the activities of CSOs, they said CSOs endeavor to create or amend laws in addition to the pressure and advocacy campaigns they spearhead to advance society socially, culturally, and intellectually. It is noteworthy that the participants thought that CSOs started in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, and this may be due to the increase in their number immediately after the signing of the accords. In addition, the participants indicated that naming CSOs by their Arabic name, Ahaly-based organizations, for example, has a positive impact, unlike the English name NGO.

#### Sectors in which civil CSOs are active in the West Bank:

Most participants indicated that the sector in which CSOs are particularly active in the West Bank is the sector of women and youth. The participants believe that the CSOs are directed toward certain sectors, and this is what they derive from CSOs' projects, which largely focus on women and youth, especially in relation to entrepreneurship and preparation for work. In addition, the participants indicated that the activities in the women's sector are related to pressure, advocacy, and defense of women's rights and some legal interventions. As they put it, this does not necessarily have a clear impact. In one group, there was criticism of the exhaustion of activities targeting the young people, e.g., such as training in communication, job interview skills, while there is a lack of activities that meet the real needs of this group.

# Governmental institutions and private companies are more visible than CSOs.

The activity and nature of institutions (governmental, private, civil) differ according to the geographical area in the West Bank. For example, those who live in the northern West Bank expressed CSOs are under-represented in their areas despite the presence of CSOs' activities. Still, CSOs as bodies are absent. While the participants perceive an extensive presence of government institutions in the northern West Bank. The participants also indicated that individuals turn to official and governmental institutions for employment because of the guarantees they offer. And, they indicated that public service jobs are the dominant option.

In Hebron, the participants said that the private sector is the most prominent and visible among the different sectors. The participants agreed that CSOs abound in the central region (i.e., Ramallah and Bethlehem) and even Nablus city, but not in other cities and governorates. Group members have indicated that activities are available in the countryside, but institutions do not exist. Besides, a schism between CSOs and society often prevails once the CSOs' activities come to an end in a certain area. Meaning that CSOs lack post-activity follow-up mechanisms.

## **Participants' expectations of CSOs**

Considering the deteriorating situation across sectors, the participants stressed that it is not acceptable to exclude one sector in favor of another; One of the participants highlighted that CSOs need to work per an integrated plan, provided they maintain their specializations, each in their field. "We do not have a comprehensive national plan for all sectors to achieve integration," he added. "Only recently has there been regulation of institutional work through sectors, and we have come to note the formation of coalitions. Such an umbrella body might help the members CSOs achieve their objectives in their respective scopes of work and positions. The lack of coordination, however, leads to a problem of delivery, given that consolidation and coordination with other CSOs cannot be imposed. The solution lies in specialization and mapping of the trajectories. This path can lead to development, yet it warrants plenty of efforts." Nevertheless, some believe that priority should be given to the health sector because it is marginalized and is heading toward privatization. After that comes the educational sector. There is a need to update education curricula and methods. Some participants in the two groups also believe that it is very necessary to focus on human rights issues, especially with regard to health rights. In addition, the participants believe that it is necessary to work in the economic sector because it is one of the most important sectors, and according to their opinion, it is necessary to focus on the productive orientation to develop Palestinian society and market, especially among marginalized groups.

# The Gaza Strip Focus Group Conclusions: Considerable Challenges and Limited Space for Action

The participants in this group stressed the central role played by CSOs in the Gaza Strip due to the inability of government institutions to duly perform their role and responsibilities due to the Israeli siege and the Palestinian political division.

#### The focus group's knowledge of CSOs' work

Gazans see that CSOs are non-governmental organizations that have a great role in society and fill the void created by the government and its institutions. In light of the complex political reality and the absence of the Legislative Council and the government, especially in Gaza, the role assigned to CSOs has gained further seriousness. CSOs compensate for the government's failure in providing services, even though its primary role is to monitor and advocate the public's rights. According to their opinion, 'civil society organizations have become synonymous with the institutions that serve society. Although CSOs are not decision-makers, their primary role is to assist the government. CSOs play an effective role in advocacy, lobbying, campaigning, community awareness, social and economic empowerment, and relief aid.

### The inverse equation in the Gaza Strip

Due to the lack of international recognition of the Gaza government, international funding and aid have been pumped into CSOs, and thus I. CSOs play the role of the government in providing basic services that are originally the responsibility of the government; and II. the government to interfere in the work of CSOs. Still and all, Gazan CSOs still suffer from restrictions on the licenses to work in the Gaza Strip; According to one of the participants, this violates the basic responsibility of CSOs that is to monitor government institutions and hold them accountable.

#### Sectors in which Gazan CSOs are active and their interventions

The activities of CSOs depend on the amount of funding they receive and their capabilities to implement these activities. CSOs provide many forms of activities; for example, they hold workshops, meetings, and training programs. As for the main sectors in which CSOs are active, they are the women's issues, and gender roles, gender-based violence, the youth sector, and they are also active in areas related to people with special needs or persons with physical disabilities. One of the participants praised the contributions of women's CSOs in empowering Gazan women and raising their awareness.

## On limited space for action

The participants believe that despite the many activities provided by CSOs in the Gaza Strip, they are simple and, in some cases, incomplete and do not fit with the priorities and needs of their beneficiaries. They are also considered limited to

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narrow work spaces. However, the participants see that many CSOs' initiatives had a tangible impact, but there are initiatives that do not have what it take to achieve the envisaged goal. According to the participants, CSO's initiatives usually benefit projects related to municipal work or infrastructure development, while they fail to provide projects that are compatible with the burning needs, such as the areas of employment, unemployment, and health.

#### Gazans' expectations of CSOs: Youth, Youth, and Youth

The lion's share of the focus group's expectations was related to young people. According to their opinion, CSOs should work to empower young people in the following areas: (I) Politics by strengthening the role of young people and qualifying them as future decision-makers; and (ii) economics through training and rehabilitation them to create job opportunities for the young people. Additionally, the participants said that the child and childhood care sector should occupy a larger share of the CSO work. In the final analysis, they unanimously agreed that the section of society the CSOs should target is the most marginalized and downtrodden groups of workers in the field of agriculture and food processing.

# East Jerusalem Focus Group's Conclusions: A War Raged Against Palestinian Jerusalemite NGOs

The participants indicated that there is a problem with the representation of Palestinian CSOs in East Jerusalem and that a distinction must be made between Palestinian CSOs registered with the Israeli Registrar of Associations partially funded by Jerusalem Municipality; others registered in the West Bank. It is safe to say that municipal institutions provide more services because they have more support, unlike CSOs that receive less support and therefore offer fewer projects. Young people face challenges in terms of participating in the work and activities of CSOs in East Jerusalem, especially activists and volunteers. They stay away from CSOs they regard as playing a normalizing role or that are affiliated with the Jerusalem Municipality.

# Palestinian Jerusalemites are targeted by Jerusalem Municipality

The Palestinian NGOs affiliated with the Jerusalem Municipality receive huge funding to attract Palestinian Jerusalemite youth. The participants, however, believe that this funding does not aim to serve the Palestinians but rather to control Palestinian CSOs' activities and trajectories. Once receive municipal licenses, CSOs are granted

concessions and funds. In parallel, their objectives and activities become governed by the standards set by the Municipality. But, it is easy to obtain an Israeli license to establish a CSO compared to the Palestinian license. Participants reported that it is undeniable that there are strong Palestinian CSOs supporting the Palestinian young people in the city, but they are prosecuted by the Municipality, which had led some institutions to obtain Israeli permits to maintain their business continuity. In general, chaos prevails in the landscape of CSOs in East Jerusalem, and it is dominated by the activities of the institutions affiliated with the Jerusalem Municipality. Against all odds, the Palestinian work hard as well.

## Participants' impression about Palestinian CSOs in East Jerusalem

The participants believe that CSOs' activities in East Jerusalem lack diversity. The lion's share of CSOs' activities targets youth empowerment (e.g., young leadership projects) because this is what the Israeli authorities allow for funding. Some CSOs also operate in other sectors, such as health, law, and rights sectors. These CSOs provided training, workshops, and lectures, despite the scarcity of financial and human resources. Of note, such CSOs suffer from a shortage of qualified trainers. In addition, the participants believe that the conditional funding besieged most of the national institutions in East Jerusalem. Refusing funding terms that contradict their national principles and goals, some Palestinian CSOs had to stop working. The focus group criticized the lack of continuity of CSOs' work, as work ends with the completion of projects. In addition, they said that Palestinian CSOs in East Jerusalem 'does not go to the streets' and do not communicate with the public. Instead, they rely on social media for communication purposes. As a result, these CSOs lack public grassroots support. Some believe that individuals have exhausted their energies in temporary projects, and it has become difficult to obtain financing for new projects. Having that noted, there is an urgent need to reconsider the strategies of these CSOs.

## Palestinian Jerusalemites' expectations.

What the participants in the focus group stressed the most is the issue of awareness, as they believe that CSOs and NGOs should raise awareness about the issues of Palestinian Jerusalemites' reality on a large scale. Awareness, as they put it, is the element with which all other issues intersect. In other words, most of the problems that Jerusalemites face are caused by the absence of awareness. They also pointed out the need to focus work on legal awareness so that Jerusalemites have the ability to deal with violations of their rights by the Israeli authorities, as

happened recently in the Sheikh Jarrah uprising (April-May 2021). Moreover, some of them believe that a strong focus should be placed on the education sector. One of the participants says, "We are amid an internal war between the (Israeli) curricula promoted by the Jerusalem Municipality and our (Palestinian) special dead and gone educational curricula. The majority of our Palestinian school graduates go to Israeli universities and institutes, which have innovative curricula and teaching methods. On the other hand, if we look at the Palestinian curricula and the Palestinian MoEHE, the curricula need a lot of work on them. After 12 years of school, our graduates learn too little about reality. Therefore, CSOs must work on and advance education content."

The Jerusalemites also believe that the Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs should support the presence of Palestinian CSOs in East Jerusalem. The offered effort is not sufficient at all, especially in light of the incursion of Zionist institutions at the expense of Palestinian CSOs in East Jerusalem.

# Israel Focus Group's Conclusions Palestinian CSOs and the Challenge of 'Israelization'

Speaking about Palestinian CSOs in Israel beams us to a completely different context from East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, despite similarities in terms of restrictions and practices that thread through and wrap around the Palestinian CSOs there, and the constant effort to shrink their space of action.

## The perception of Palestinians in Israel of CSOs

The participants in the focus group in Israel indicated that they have several perceptions of CSOs. According to them, theseCSOs are voluntary, charitable, non-profit, and work to create cultural, political, or voluntary loci to present ideas carried by individuals and transform them into projects. However, they feel that the CSOs funded by the Israeli authorities, whether governmental or non-governmental, are the most effective in Palestinian society across Israel. They believe that it is related to the place and the nature of individuals. In addition, the reason may be that Palestinian youth are more involved in it because they get to know such NGOs in school years through the programs and bodies that the Israeli government allows working in public schools. Moreover, the participants indicated the lack of effort to persuade the young people to engage in CSOs' activities. There are attempts, but they do not have a clear impact. It seems that the competition between the institutions that receive Israeli funding and those that refuse it is fierce. The latter does not have sufficient tools and resources to convince the young generation.

They added that that part of civil society institutions is an extension of political parties and movements, and that is why people are subjected to persecution and restrictions like their parties. The CSO may not be an extension of a particular party, but all individuals working in the institution belong to the same party, and the result is similar in this case as well.

Tapping to the information and data collected from the focus group, we can say that the participants did not think of the names of CSOs operating in Israel. The reason may be that the number of CSOs is already few or that the CSOs are not active nationwide throughout the year.

#### The sectors in which Palestinian CSOs are active in Israel

The participants believe that the sector of women's issues is the front CSOs are particularly active. One of the participants explained that women's issues attract the attention of individuals more than the issues of youth and identity. Still and all, Palestinian CSOs in Israel is also active in promoting national identity. Along with Palestinian CSOs, Arab-Jewish institutions are active in the field, for example, the Sikkui Society, which works in the sphere of civil equality, and Itaj-You, which works in the area of social justice for women. One of the participants stated, "At a time when femicide spread to the extent that we hear about the killing of one or two women every week, there has been a pressing need for impactful action. As for national activities, they are the associations that we know and that encourage us to relate to our Palestinian roots." Certainly, there are no Palestinian CSOs working in the health field, for example, or agriculture. These sectors are governed by the state, and they do not allow Palestinians to work in them, nor with the slightest degree of freedom, as they put it. They mentioned that there are attempts in the field of health, such as the Merriam Foundation, which spreads awareness about breast cancer, but the activities and events do not go beyond that.

## The expectations of Palestinians in Israel of CSOs

There is a percentage of satisfaction with the services and activities of Palestinian CSOs in Israel. The participants realized that despite the imposed political conditions, this is the most that these institutions can offer. The participants expressed that there is a need to expand the activities and activities of the CSOs in more parts of Israel. They stressed that the reality needs improvement, as the Palestinians often feel that they fall into a vicious circle because they are accustomed to their lives as if they are surrounded by something that they cannot break or overcome. After the last uprising (May 2021), new movements were established but without a clear organization. These are issues that need follow-up and networking on a broader level.

Palestinians across Israel very much hope that a niche focus will be on the field of Palestinian culture and arts. The participants believe that the CSOs do not focus on this field and focus on meetings instead of cultural activities, such as murals and other forms of Palestinian art. In a similar vein, they hope that the activities will also be directed to include contexts that simulate liberating education that focuses on cultural and social issues such as religion, sexuality, guidance to expand thinking, change in the pattern of rote education, and the development of thinking and education systems.

#### **Common Conclusions across the Focus Groups**

All the focus group participants mentioned that CSOs face many challenges represented in prosecution and restrictions, starting with conditional funding and ending with direct prosecution by the Israeli authorities. In addition, we came out with a set of common points that were repeated and reiterated by the participants across the focus groups.

- The best way to learn about the news and activities of Palestinian CSOs is through social media. The participants mentioned the most widely used WhatsApp application and the Facebook pages of various organizations and activist groups.
- The discourse of SCOs is unclear. The majority of the participants stated that the lack of clarity of the CSOs' discourse undermines the interaction with the CSOs' activities and events. According to them, there is a need to simplify the discourse so that individuals do not hesitate to participate and cooperate with CSOs. The absence of CSOs on the public scene opens the way for individual initiatives. This phenomenon has recently emerged, especially in Israel, in light of the absence of civil institutions in certain sectors, which pushes popular youth movements to fill this void. According to their opinion, CSOs should embrace and institutionalize these movements because they stem from reflecting societal needs.
- There is a divergence between the public base and the workers in CSOs. Since CSOs represent this public and come to meet its needs that have been neglected by the government authorities, there is an urgent need for permanent communication with this public.
- Short-lived projects and activities The majority of CSOs lack sustainable projects. Therein lies the gap between CSOs and the public, and sometimes the result is the disappearance of these CSOs from the scene, according to the opinion of the participants.

# **Discussion: Findings and Recommendations**

With the prism of this investigative study, we attempted to land an answer to the question: How do Palestinians perceive the Palestinian CSOs? This was done by measuring their positions on CSOs, by understanding the relationship between CSOs and the members of the public, and their interaction with them, and through their reactions to the activities of CSOs in order to identify the "problems" facing Palestinian civil society represented by its organizations. Before discussing the problems, it should be noted the impact of the geographical area and the political situation on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals of CSOs, regardless of the identity of the CSO and the sector in which it is active (Annex 5). Through a careful analysis of the results of the survey, focus groups, and the in-depth interviews, we arrived at the following problems—

I. The Public knowledge of and familiarity with the CSO work and active CSOs We found that there is a discrepancy in the extent to which the participants know what the CSO work is. The majority, i.e., 75%, know that CSOs express the needs of Palestinian society, while about 42% of them do not know that CSOs are not-forprofit and non-profit institutions. About 33% do not agree that labor and human rights unions are directly involved in the work of CSOs, and about 27% do not know whether these unions are directly involved in the work of CSOs. According to our reading of these results and in light of what was stated in the focus group meetings, the reasons for the lack of knowledge, at the institutional level, are (i) the lack of clarity in the CSOs' discourse (31.5% of those involved in CSOs and 37.5% of those not involved said that the discourse is unclear and incomprehensible), (ii) the absence of continuity in terms of the CSOs' activities; and (iii) a defect in direct and permanent communication with members of the community; on the level of individuals, according to the results, individuals are interested in issues that relate to their personal affairs and are more aware of them than issues that deal with public affairs.

II. The satisfaction with CSOs' performance based on the analyzed data, we found that the level of satisfaction with CSOs and their work is related to the type of services they provide and the geographical area in which they operate. The more services related to the personal needs of individuals, the greater their satisfaction is. And we found that in CSOs that provide humanitarian services in areas under direct Israeli control (in Israel and East Jerusalem), the degree of individuals' satisfaction with the institutions reached about 71%. While when asked about the work of CSOs pertaining to human rights issues and the monitoring of government institutions in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the level of satisfaction did not

exceed 20%. The reasons for this, and as we found in our conversations with the participants in the focus group meetings, maybe the direct intervention of the government in the Gaza Strip with the work of CSOs, and the fear that the Israeli political and security authorities will pursue active CSOs in East Jerusalem, despite their small number, In addition, we found that there is a direct relationship between the level of satisfaction with CSOs and the public engagement in CSOs' activities and interventions. Remarkably, about 82% of the respondents did not benefit from the work of the CSOs. This result is of utmost seriousness because about 75% of the respondents said that they were not involved at all with the work of the CSOs. All this data is a clear indication of the need to intensify communication between CSOs and their public base.

II.Palestinians' Expectation of CSOs Based on the analyses of the results of the survey and group meetings, we found that the participants expect the CSOs to intensify their work at the personal and societal levels. According to the survey, about 47% of the respondents believe that CSOs should intensify their activities at the level of emergency humanitarian interventions. This insight reiterates what was said by the participants in the group meetings that CSOs should strengthen their relationship with their public through activities that benefit that public. In addition, they think that CSOs should intensify their activity in promoting public awareness (19%) and monitoring and holding government institutions accountable (19%). While only about 7.5% believe that CSOs should focus their activities on advocacy and lobbying. Furthermore, the participants believe that CSOs in the various regions of Palestine should intensify their network and provide joint projects in partnership and cooperation among them.

In the final analysis, this investigative study revealed that the majority of Palestinians do not participate in the work and activities of the CSOs and do not benefit from them. It also underlined the public call upon CSOs to align their discourse and activities with the needs of the public. In the same vein, CSOs are to intensify and sustain their communication with the public. Last but not least, this study showcased that Palestinians expect from the CSOs activities that related to them at the personal level rather than public affairs.

#### **Interviews**

- Interview conducted with Nadim Nashif, executive director and co-founder of 7amleh: The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, on July 08, 2021.
- Interview conducted with Nida'a Nasser, director of Baladna Association for Arab Youth, on July 14, 2021.
- Interview conducted with Samer Daoudi, Palestinian NGO Network coordinator in East Jerusalem, on July 26, 2021.
- Interview conducted with Samer Abu Eisheh, Media and Communication Coordinator at Burj Alluqluq Social Center Society, July 28, 2021.
- Interview conducted with Naheel Bazbazat, Palestinian Jerusalemite civil society activist, on August 4, 2021.

## **Focus groups**

- The first focus group from the West Bank was held on August 17, 2021.
- The second focus group from the West Bank was held on September 8, 2021.
- The focus group from East Jerusalem was held on September 1, 2021.
- The focus group from Israel was held on August 31, 2021.
- The focus group from the Gaza Strip was held on September 2, 2021.

## **Appendix 1: Questionnaire**

### Dear respondent,

7amleh - The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media is carrying an investigative study about the perception of Palestinians in historic Palestine of Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). This questionnaire is used to collect information and data to arrive at the most accurate findings and conclusions. Having that kindly noted, we would greatly appreciate it if you may respond to the questions in this questionnaire. On our part, we ensure confidentiality and that the information kindly shared by you in response to the questionnaire will exclusively be used for research and analysis purposes.

#### **General Information**

Mobile:				
Questionnair	e no.:	Rese	archer no.:	
Region:				
1) West Bank	2) Ga	za Strip	3) Israel	4) East Jerusalem
Place of resid	lence			
1. City	2. Village	3. Town	4. Palestini	an refugee camp
Gender				
1. Male	2. Female			

# S1 Information and knowledge about CSOs

Please let us know to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements—

	1) Strongly agree	2) Agree	3) Disagree	4) Strongly disagree	5) Do not know/no opinion
S1_1 CSOs are not-for-profit organizations and do not seek profit;					
S1_2 CSOs represent Palestinian society and their needs;					
S1_3 Trade unions are directly involved in the work of CSOs					
1_4 In your opinion, CSOs have a clear vision and mission					
S1_5 I can feel the impact of CSOs' work					
S1_6 The discourse of CSOs is clear and accessible					

# **S2 Satisfaction with the CSO performance**

Please let us know to what degree you are satisfied or unstaffed with the CSO performance in relation to the following—

	1) Very satisfied	2) Satisfied	3) Unsatisfied	4) Very unsatisfied	5) do not know/no opinion
S2_1 CSOs professionally deliver					
their performance;					
S2_2 Some CSOs provide					
services as humanitarian					
interventions;					
S2_3 Some CSOs raised my					
awareness about several social					
issues;					
S2_4 Some CSOs play a key					
role in monitoring government					
institutions;					
S2_5 Some CSOs have advocated					
human rights cases I know of;					

# S2\_6 Based on your observations and in your opinion, in which sector CSOs are most active

- 1) Security and democracy 2) Transparency and integrity 3) Law and human rights
- 4) Economic empowerment 5) Women and gender roles 6) Agriculture 7) Health
- 9) Environment 10) Youth 11) Media

# S2\_7 How would you describe your engagement with CSOs' work and activities

- 1) Always
- 2) Often
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Rarely
- 5) Never

# S2\_8 Have you ever benefited from CSOs' activities and services

- 1) Always
- 2) Often
- 3) Sometimes
- 4) Rarely
- 5) Never

# S2\_9 Which source do you access the most to learn about the CSOs' news, activities, and events

	1) Yes	2) No
S2_91 Media outlets		
S2_92 Social media		
S2_93 CSOs' websites		
S2_94 Relatives and friends		
S2_95 Other		

## S3 What do you expect from the civil society

#### S3\_1 Where do you think the role of CSOs shroud essentially be?

- 1. Emergency interventions at the humanitarian level (assistance for the poor, empowerment programs, health services, etc.)
- 2. Monitoring corruption and social accountability (by activating accountability tools for transparency and integrity in the performance of various institutions)
- 3. Raising the community and public awareness and knowledge (about various social issues)
- 4. Advocacy and lobbying to make policy changes (i.e., making changes in the policies adopted by the government and other international actors)
- 5. Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

# **Demographic Information:**

#### Age:

1. 24 - 18

2. 35- 25

3. 45- 36

4. 55- 46

5. Over 55

### **Qualification:**

1. Elementary

2. Middle school

3. Secondary

4. College/institute 5. Bachelor's degree

6. Master's degree or higher.

#### Work:

1. Employed 2. Unemployed

## Average household income (ILS/month):

1) Less than 1,500

2) 1,500–2,500

3) 2501–3500

4) 3501-4500

5) 4500-5500

6) more than 5500

### **Appendix 2: Focus groups: Sections and questions**

#### **Knowledge section:**

- How would respondents define CSOs? Can you provide examples of CSOs?
- What are the active organizations/institutions in your community? How would you classify these organizations/institutions (i.e., governmental, private, non-governmental)?
- How do you perceive the role of CSOs in the public life?
- What are sectors in which CSOs are active?
- How would you describe the mechanism of communication with the CSOs' in your community?

#### The Respondent's Satisfaction with the CSO performance

- How would you evaluate the CSO performance in your community? Can you provide examples?
- Are there concrete interventions implemented by CSOs in your community? What are these interventions? How would you describe such interventions?
- How would you evaluate CSOs' activities and events? Do you feel the impact of these activities and events on your community?
- In your opinion, how could CSOs reach out to the largest section of society?
- How would you evaluate the CSOs' discourse and communication with the members of your community?
- How do you learn about the news of civil society? How would you describe such news?

#### **Expectations**

- If you had the chance to guide the work of CSOs, what would be the expectations they should meet?
- If you had the chance to get involved in the work of CSOs, what role would you take?
- What are the sectors that may be of greater benefit in civil society?

Appendix 3: The respondents' satisfaction with the CSO performance by gender

		Gender		Group Total
		Male	Female	Col %
		Col %	Col %	
	Very satisfied	6.5 %	9.2 %	7.8 %
	Satisfied	33.8 %	37.2 %	35.4 %
S2_1 CSOs professionally deliver	Unsatisfied	31.6 %	25.8 %	28.8 %
their performance;	Very unsatisfied	12.1 %	7.3 %	9.7 %
	Do not know/no opinion	16.0 %	20.5 %	18.2 %
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
	Very satisfied	6.0 %	10.0 %	8.0 %
	satisfied	47.9 %	51.7 %	49.8 %
S2_2 Some CSOs provide services	Unsatisfied	21.7 %	15.1 %	18.5 %
as humanitarian interventions;	Very unsatisfied	9.2 %	5.3 %	7.2 %
	Do not know/no opinion	15.2 %	18.0 %	16.6 %
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
	Very satisfied	8.5 %	10.7 %	9.6 %
S2_3 Some CSOs raised my awareness about several social	satisfied	40.7 %	42.5 %	41.6 %
issues;	Unsatisfied	21.2 %	14.7 %	18.1 %
,	Very unsatisfied	12.4 %	8.8 %	10.6 %
	Do not know/no opinion	17.2 %	23.2 %	20.1 %
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
	Very satisfied	5.4 %	9.3 %	7.3 %
S2_4 Some CSOs play a key	satisfied	26.5 %	24.1 %	25.3 %
role in monitoring government	Unsatisfied	16.2 %	14.1 %	15.1 %
institutions;	Very unsatisfied	28.3 %	21.9 %	25.1 %
	Do not know/no opinion	23.7 %	30.7 %	27.1 %
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
	Very satisfied	8.0 %	9.3 %	8.6 %
	satisfied	31.0 %	32.2 %	31.6 %
S2_5 Some CSOs have advocated	Unsatisfied	20.4 %	17.6 %	19.0 %
human rights cases I know of;	Very unsatisfied	18.4 %	13.1 %	15.8 %
	Do not know/no opinion	22.2 %	27.8 %	24.9 %
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Appendix 4: The Satisfaction of Respondents with the CSO Performance by Participation, Activity, and Engagement

Participation, Activity, and Engagement							
	S2_7 How would						
	your participatio	Group Total					
				Group rotat			
		activities and wo	rk				
		Participate in	Do not				
			participate in				
		and engage	and engage	Col %			
		with the CSOs'	with the CSOs'				
		activities	activities				
		Col %	Col %				
	Strongly agree	11.6 %	4.8 %	6.5 %			
	Agree	47.9 %	31.6 %	35.7 %			
S1_1 CSOs are not-for-profit organizations	Disagree	23.8 %	32.5 %	30.3 %			
and do not seek profit;	Strongly disagree	11.9 %	12.0 %	12.0 %			
, ·	Do not know/no						
	opinion	5.0 %	19.0 %	15.5 %			
Group Total	оринон	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			
Group rotat	Strongly agree	14.5 %	5.5 %	7.7 %			
	Agree	61.1 %	53.0 %	55.0 %			
S1 2 CSOs represent Palactinian aggists		<del></del>					
S1_2 CSOs represent Palestinian society	Disagree	14.5 %	20.2 %	18.7 %			
and their needs;	Strongly disagree	6.6 %	6.9 %	6.8 %			
	Do not know/no opinion	3.3 %	14.5 %	11.7 %			
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			
·	Strongly agree	11.2 %	4.1 %	5.9 %			
	Agree	47.2 %	28.1 %	32.9 %			
S1_3 Trade unions are directly involved in	Disagree	20.5 %	22.7 %	22.1 %			
the work of CSOs	Strongly Disagree	11.6 %	11.9 %	11.8 %			
	Do not know/no						
	opinion	9.6 %	33.2 %	27.2 %			
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			
o.oup rotat	Strongly agree	13.9 %	4.8 %	7.1 %			
	Agree	54.6 %	35.1 %	40.0 %			
1_4 In your opinion ,CSOs have a clear	Disagree	18.2 %	24.2 %	22.7 %			
vision and mission	Strongly disagree	1	12.0 %				
VISIOII dilu IIIISSIOII		8.6 %	12.0 %	11.1 %			
	Do not know/no opinion	4.6 %	24.0 %	19.1 %			
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			
	Strongly agree	11.0 %	4.0 %	5.8 %			
	Agree	52.8 %	35.9 %	40.2 %			
	Disagree	22.3 %	26.1 %	25.1 %			
S1_5 I can feel the impact of CSOs 'work	Strongly disagree	8.3 %	17.0 %	14.8 %			
	Do not know/no						
	opinion	5.6 %	17.0 %	14.1 %			
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			
3.34p.1044	Strongly agree	16.6 %	5.6 %	8.4 %			
	Agree	46.4 %	33.6 %	36.8 %			
\$1.6 The discourse of CSOs is clear and	Disagree	i e	24.9 %				
accessible		21.2 %	i e	24.0 %			
	Strongly disagree	10.3 %	12.6 %	12.0 %			
	Do not know/no opinion	5.6 %	23.3 %	18.8 %			
Group Total		100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %			

Appendix 5: Knowledge about CSOs and Their Interventions and Activities by Region (Strongly agree + agree)

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	1948 IoPl	East Jerusalem	Total
CSOs) NGOs (represent Palestinian society and their needs	64.8 %	51.6 %	64.9 %	91.6 %	63 %
In my opinion ,CSOs have a clear vision and mission	56.5 %	37.0 %	50.2 %	29.5 %	47 %
I can feel the impact of CSOs' work on society	47.4 %	38.1 %	51.2 %	57.9 %	46 %
CSOs 'discourse and communication are clear and accessible	57.9 %	28.8 %	53.2 %	22.1 %	45 %
CSOs are not-for-profit organizations and do not seek profit	44 %	34 %	48 %	53 %	42 %
In your opinion ,trade and labor rights unions are directly involved in the CSOs's work	43.4 %	37.0 %	40.0 %	20.0 %	40 %

**Appendix 6: The Satisfaction with CSO Performance by Region** 

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	1948 IoPl	East Jerusalem	Total
Some CSOs provide services as humanitarian interventions	58.8 %	46.0 %	70.2 %	71.6 %	57.7 %
Some CSOs raised my awareness about several social issues	57.8 %	40.2 %	56.1 %	47.4 %	51.2 %
CSOs professionally deliver their performance	51.8 %	30.5 %	50.2 %	31.6 %	43.3 %
Some CSOs have advocated human rights cases I know of	47.2 %	27.2 %	56.6 %	17.9 %	40.2 %
Some CSOs play a key role in monitoring government institutions	35.1 %	22.5 %	51.7 %	17.9 %	32.6 %

Appendix 7: Sectors citizens perceive CSOs to be active in by region

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	1948 IoPl	East Jerusalem	Total
Women and gender role	23.1 %	23.6 %	18.5 %	23.8 %	22.5 %
Economic empowerment	16.8 %	12.7 %	24.9 %	34.5 %	18.3 %
Agriculture	13.7 %	11.2 %	15.1 %	22.6 %	13.9 %
Health	21.7 %	11.8 %	3.4 %	0.0 %	13.7 %
Law and rights	6.7 %	17.0 %	14.6 %	2.4 %	11.0 %
Youth	7.4 %	10.4 %	6.3 %	14.3 %	8.6 %
Media	4.3 %	3.7 %	4.9 %	0.0 %	3.9 %
Security and democracy	3.3 %	4.0 %	3.9 %	1.2 %	3.5 %
Transparency and integrity	1.4 %	4.9 %	4.4 %	0.0 %	2.9 %
Environment	1.6 %	0.6 %	3.9 %	1.2 %	1.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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