BISAN CENTER
for Research & Development

مــركــز بيســـــان
للبحــــوث والإنمـــــــاء

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CIVICUS- CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX RESEARCH PROJECT

Country Report- Palestine

MARCH 2006

Ramalla, Palestine

Acknowledgement

Overview

There is an immense quantity of literature available on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. The task of the overview report is to evaluate where the gaps are in the literature that pertain to civil society and that can be closed through research in the context of the CSI project methodologies. Ultimately in the final country report, directions for future research on the role of civil society in Palestine will be suggested. The overview report is a working document as it will be updated and enhanced throughout the course of the project as there is a plethora of available secondary data. The paper investigates the literature on Palestinian civil society produced in and outside of Palestine through an exploration of the structure of the four dimensions and associated guiding indicators defined by CIVICUS for this project.

There has been much attention given to certain aspects of the work of Palestinian civil society. The history of the women's movement in Palestine[1] and the first Intifada as a popular uprising[2] have been much discussed in academic circles as well as political ones. The women's movement is traced to origins in the 1920s, organized labour to the early 1900s; the history of political parties, press, and charitable institutions has also been examined to a certain extent, and there is a recent and growing literature on the role of non-governmental organizations.

It is worth emphasizing in the Palestinian case that civil society is being discussed in the context of a society in the process of uncertain state-building as well as resistance, so the literature and available itself is partially forward-looking and prescriptive rather than descriptive or analytical of the current situation. A great deal of the existing literature is produced within the context of specifically funded programs and projects which can run the risk of narrowing not only the readership of these works but their usefulness in examining the society as a whole. For example studies and research on 'impact' for the most part are generally limited to assessments, audits, and evaluations of particular programs or projects rather than civil society, NGOs, or social movements. And many of these appraisals remain confidential or in the hands of those in charge of the project with no intention for dissemination. Islamic institutions have largely been left out of research on civil society and NGOs in Palestine and this oversight has serious ramifications as they play a significant role in a number of sectors of society.

Structure of Civil

Given the concurrent situation of the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and state-building processes it is necessary to understand both the participation of citizens independently and in the context of civil society organizations, as well as the extent of this participation in order to understand potential for effective mobilization and participation of Palestinians in all levels and types of political processes and actions.

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[1] See for example English resources in the "Bibliography on Palestinian Women" by Saliba Sarsar available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/mideast/cuvlm/palwomen.html.
[2]

Non- partisan political action is difficult to assess in Palestine, partially because of the individual and under or undocumented nature of some actions, and partially because such actions like attending demonstrations are ambiguously partisan. More research has to be conducted on non-partisan political action in the case of boycotts, participation in public discourse, demonstrations, and advocacy, the types of organizations and bodies that foster such work, and with what kind of support and motivations.

Voluntarism has increasingly been mobilized by professional non-governmental organizations – often specific and short-term programs within these organizations – rather than grassroots organizations and popular committees or local government, and in some cases 'voluntarism' is being remunerated. Research needs to be conducted not only on the current nature as well as frequency of voluntarism across all sectors. Charitable giving is difficult to gauge as such monetary support is distributed within families or without structural frameworks, in addition to through philanthropic societies and organizations. Contemporary collective community actions are important to understand in the context of the Intifada especially as they are largely associated with localized efforts and it is difficult to recognize and identify them across the society.

Current membership in civil society organizations in Palestine is difficult to measure especially when many of these organizations have suffered from a decrease of membership and ability to provide services due to the dire economic situation, and the organizations themselves have been weakened. The funding of Palestinian NGOs is markedly uneven with a small proportion of NGOs receiving the majority of donor funding. The trends of this distribution are in need of further of study especially in the recent era of more bureaucratic and 'transparent' and accountable funding procedures from donors as a result of the anti-terrorist financing measures which require a higher level of 'organizational capacity' than most organizations are able to demonstrate and an increase of dependency upon external funds which is reaching even the grassroots and local community organizations. Resources, including human, and their distribution within the society in general and the CS sector in particular have also only minimally been studied. Because of the lack of general studies about the impact of CSOs, it is difficult to assess whether CSOs are indeed reaching and representing the most marginalized sectors of the population.

Actual cooperation and partnership between CSOs is limited in terms of service delivery, but collective advocacy and policy initiatives are gaining some effective momentum. There is little research on the impact of the umbrella bodies for CSOs and there is not comprehensive documentation of the relationship between Palestinian CSOs and their international counterparts. As Palestine is in the process of state-building, process-documentation of the development of CSO regulations and policies within the sector and as well as the government should be conducted.

Environment:

Issues of the political rights of Palestinians have and are generating significant research especially in light of the coming elections. The relationship between political parties and CSOs has not been investigated rigourously. There are a host of opinion polls about trust in the Palestinian Authority, but little information about the current status of legal conformity, enforcement and operations of alternative justice. As part of the efforts to reform the PA, much literature has been generated on the issue of corruption. While the CIVICUS indicators were developed with a sovereign state in mind, in the Palestinian case, Israeli government impositions also have to be incorporated and brought to light in detail, though the general effects of the occupation are well documented. Violations of basic freedoms and rights within the PA are tracked by both international and local organizations, but the issue of the implementation of policies to protect citizens' rights is tricky to assess as it is as of yet

unclear the extent to which these exist or will exist by virtue of the lack of governmental law and order or by governmental sanction.

The socio-economic conditions in the country are well documented as worsening to the present moment, and this negatively affects civil society in general. But these conditions affect different aspects of civil society, its organizations and actors in different ways. These nuances need to be explored. The society is in transition and also host to a large number of varying influences. Socio-cultural norms vary between locales, as do the roles, influence, and positions of CSOs. The question is not only how, but also how do these different CSOs interact, and where does decision-making occur. Levels of tolerance of members of society vary greatly. Attitudes towards women and those of different religions are documented, but more appropriate indicators need to be developed and explored to apply to Palestinian society. Indicators for public-spiritedness in the Palestinian context must also be created and investigated.

The legal environment for CSOs is under significant scrutiny as it is still under development, and in this process civil society exercises a degree of independence which it is hoped will be maintained. While the state is involved in specific projects with CSOs, possibilities for institutionalized relations must be explored. With significant external funding and a poor economic situation, few organizations have explored options of corporate or private sector funding whether locally or internationally.

Values:

Can unified values of CS in Palestine be defined? How are or aren't these values in keeping with standard indicators internationally, and why? While a great number of CSOs promote democracy both locally and nationally, it remains to be seen how democratic and responsive these organizations are internally in actual practice. Understanding whether there is a difference between actual or perceived corruption in the CSO sector will be important for strengthening popular support of CSO work. Is tolerance exercised and promoted by CSOs? How effectively is CS in its initiatives to combat poverty, sustain the environment, and successfully promote gender equality in a context where resistance is everyone's priority? In this context to what extent is peace building and non-violence a manifested value across the different aspects of civil society?

Impact:

As mentioned in the introduction, there are as of yet are no broad studies of the impact of civil society actors nationally or locally. Civil society is still weak in reaching the populace and ascertaining impact is a long-term commitment. Internal advocacy to Palestinian decision making bodies and other stakeholders has only become a recent focus of civil society work. There are no bodies dedicated to monitoring civil society itself within the country and civil society does not often target the private sector. The use and effectiveness of participatory approaches to program design, implementation, and evaluation among some CSOs must be assessed and their responsiveness to community needs and priorities deserves extensive study as does comparative work to ascertain CSO performance in relation to PA and private sector service delivery. In a situation of increased donor dependency, how do CS actors insure sustainability of their efforts? How can CS go about assessing its impact? How can CS make this assessment a meaningful process?

Research Methodology

During the past year BISAN Center for research and Development has undertaken a research of to assess Civil Society in Palestine using a methodology developed by CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

Four different methodologies were used:

Literature review: summary of existing research on Civil Society in Palestine

Media review: monitoring of national and local television, radio and print media for four months Nov.2004 -March 2005

Community sampling: survey to 400 households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Regional stakeholder consultations: survey with stakeholders from 200 civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza strip, five meetings with stakeholders three in the West Bank and two in the Gaza Strip.

Fact finding: review of statistics, media, unpublished reports related to civil society.

The research was based on a set of indicators classified within four dimensions:
1. Structure of Civil Society
2. Environment of Civil Society
3. Values of Civil Society
4. Impact of Civil Society

Data for indicators was collected through the five methodologies mentioned above depending on the type of indicator.

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Research Results

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STRUCTURE

1.1 Citizen Participation in Civil Society.

This subdimension examines the extent of citizen involvement in civil society.

The proportion of people that participate in civil society is[3]:

0	1	2	3
Extremely limited	*Limited*	*Medium*	*Large*

1.1.1. Non-partisan political action	What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, or attended a demonstration)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A very small minority (less than 10%).	**A minority (10% to 30%).**	**A significant proportion (31% to 65%).**	**A large majority (more than 65%).**

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action.

Around 30% of OPT respondents indicated that they have at one point written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition or taken part in a protest. The percentage of respondents in GS who took part in such activities was 14%. (Community Sampling Survey)

1.1.2 Charitable giving	What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
(less than 10%).	ority (10% to 30%).	**A significant proportion (31% to 65%).**	**A large majority (more than 65%).**

1.1.2. Charitable giving.

Almost half of the respondents indicated that they donate to charity on a regular basis 48.7%.

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[3] NAG members should score the sub-dimension in order to cross check the averaged score of the indicators scores for each sub-dimension.

Of all the 402 respondents, only two indicated that they have donated any money to an organization, one of which was to a health organization and the other to a religious one. (Community Sampling Survey)

1.1.3 CSO membership	What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
A small minority (less than 30%).	A minority (30% to 50%).	A majority (51% to 65%).	A large majority (more than 65%).

1.1.3. CSO membership.

Membership in at Least One CSO:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Over half of the respondents said that they belong to at least one CSO. However there is a considerable difference between the level of membership in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.
Of those who indicated that they were members of an organization, the types of organizations that they were members of were as follows:

Occupied Palestinian Territories		
Organization Type	Member	Percent of Total
Political Group/Movement	68	15.11%
Trade Union	64	14.22%
Women	42	9.33%
Professional Association	36	8.00%
Family Based	32	7.11%
Sport/Youth	38	8.44%
Student	23	5.11%
Political Issues	23	5.11%
Education	21	4.67%
NGO	17	3.78%
Farmer Group	16	3.56%
Business Organization	14	3.11%
Cultural Organization	13	2.89%
Cooperative	12	2.67%
Hobby	11	2.44%
Health	10	2.22%
Other	10	2.22%

Total	**450**	**100%**

Respondents are members of a variety of CSOs, and no one type received an overwhelming majority. However, political groups and trade unions had somewhat higher proportions of respondents than other types. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many workers in Gaza who formerly worked in Israel have joined trade unions in order to receive unemployment benefits. This may account for the relatively high number of respondents that indicated that they are union members.

West Bank		
Organization Type	**Member**	**Percent**
Political Group/Movement	54	14.29%
Trade Union	41	10.85%
Women	39	10.32%
Professional Association	31	8.20%
Family Based	30	7.94%
Sport/Youth	31	8.20%
Education	21	5.56%
Student	21	5.56%
Political Issues	21	5.56%
Farmer	14	3.70%
Business	14	3.70%
NGOs	14	3.70%
Other	47	12.43%
Total	**378**	

Gaza Strip		
Organization Type	**Member**	**Percent**
Trade Union	23	31.94%
Political Group/Movement	14	19.44%
Sport/Youth	7	9.72%
Professional Association	5	6.94%
Cultural Organization	4	5.56%
Women	3	4.17%
NGOs	3	4.17%
Other	14	19.44%
Total	**72**	

In terms of the differences among the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in both cases respondents indicated that Trade Unions and Political groups/movements were the organizations they were most frequently members of. (Community Sampling Survey)

"…the concept of non-governmental work is still vague in the minds of the Palestinian society and is connected with different degrees of thoughts, mainly thoughts related to the connection with the West and its values, and its connection with the funding bodies, in addition to the thoughts about corruption, favoritism and political factionalism, and many other thoughts that were further confirmed due to the weak relationship between civil society organizations and the popular recourse during the past years."[4]

1.1.4 Volunteering	What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A very small minority (less than 10%).	A small minority (10% to 30%).	A minority (31% to 50%).	A majority (more than 50%).

1.1.4. Volunteering.

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[4] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.39

Do You Volunteer for a CSO?:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	Yes	No
OPT	8.96%	91.04%
WB	9.93%	90.07%
GS	6.00%	94.00%

More than 90% of respondents indicated that they do not volunteer for a CSO, with little difference between the WB and GS.

Organization Type	# of Volunteers	% of Volunteers
NGO	12	24%
Health	9	18%
Sport/Youth	6	12%
Student	3	6%
Political Issues	3	6%
Education	3	6%
Women	2	4%
Family Based	2	4%
Farmer	2	4%
Cultural Organization	2	4%
Religious or Spiritual Group	2	4%
Other	4	8%
Total	**50**	**100%**

A quarter of all volunteers indicated that the type of organization that they volunteered with was an NGO. (Community Sampling Survey)

Do You Provide Unpaid Support to Non-Family Members?:

Only 42% of GS respondents indicated they provide some sort of support to non family members, unpaid, and individually (not though an organization, or association). This is compared with 83.7% of WB respondents who do provide this type of support. (Community Sampling Survey)

er within or outside a CSO:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

When combining both figures for voluntary work within and outside a CSO. The same results can be noted with a considerable difference between the GS and the WB. Overall only a quarter of respondents indicated that they do not do any type of voluntary work whether within or outside a CSO. (Community Sampling Survey)

1.1.5 Collective community action	What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A ority (less an 30%).	**A minority (30% to 50%)**	**A majority (51% to 65%).**	**A large majority (more than 65%)**

1.1.5. Community action.

Only 24% of GS respondents indicated that there were any meetings held on community issues in the past year, vs 55% of the WB (47%). Forty five percent of all respondents indicated that there have been no meetings held.

Number of Meetings on Community Issues Attended in Past Year: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Category	OPT	WB	GS
None	43.53%	43.14%	46.43%
One	17.67%	18.14%	14.29%
2 to 5	32.33%	31.86%	35.71%
More than 5	6.47%	6.86%	3.57%

Majority of respondents (43.5%) did not attend any meetings held on community issues. The next highest category: (32.3%) were those that attended two to five meetings, with no difference between the WB and GS. (Community Sampling Survey)

Number of Community Volunteer Activities Participated in during the Past Year: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Category	OPT	WB	GS
None	53.33%	50.22%	70.73%
One	18.89%	20.52%	9.76%
2 to 5	20.00%	20.52%	17.07%
More than 5	7.78%	8.78%	2.44%

Most of the respondents have not taken part in any community organized activities for the benefit of the community. With 39% of the OPT respondents indicating that they participated in at least one to five activities. Only 7.8% of respondents (8.7% in WB and 2.4% in GS) indicated that they participated in more than five of these community organized activities.

Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents Who Participated in Either a Community Meeting or Volunteer Activity in Past Year

OPT	WB	GS
43.53%	50.33%	23.00%

Overall 50.3% of WB and 23% of GS respondents (43.35% overall) indicated that they participated in either a community meeting or volunteer activity during the past year. (Community Sampling Survey)

"Community action assumes greater importance for people who are stateless or under occupation, for the simple reason that they are deprived of the protection of their own government. In addition, occupation…creates an overwhelming demand for services of all kind."[5]

"…civil society has also assumed the role of opposition, by continuing to press the Palestinian Authority and hold it accountable for everything from corruption to not holding elections…the rationale of civic leaders is simple: whatever structures emerge in Palestine from the current chaos, they will need to adhere to certain fundamental standards and respect the rule of law."[6]

"The unusual circumstances of this Intifada, where economic and infrastructure problems predominated, contributed to the lack of fully active civil society organizations. Lack of funds, lack of mobility, and lack of access to outside sources of support were important reasons for types and range of local organization."[7]

1.1.6 Profile of CSOs	How well are membership in CSOs well distributed in terms of geography and sector?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Membership in CSOs is concentrated in a couple of sect areas.	**Membership in CSOs is limited to certain**	**Membership in CSO is somewhat spread among geographic areas**	**Membership in CSOs is to a large extent ross sectors, and**

1.1.6 Profile of CSOs
Examine CSOs in terms of sectors, geographical as well as sectoral distribution, numbers, characteristics, membership, and activities

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[5] "Palestinian Civil Society Under Siege; From Resistance to Empowerment." 2001. p.3
[6] "Palestinian Civil Society Under Siege; From Resistance to Empowerment." 2001. p.8
[7] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.68

CSO membership by region by type						
Locality	**OPT**	**OPT**	**West**	WB	**Strip**	WB
Trade Unions	133	24%	97	20%	36	46%
Professional Association		17%	80	17%	13	16%
Political group / party	83	15%	77	16%	6	8%
Business Association	59	11%	55	11%	4	5%
Farmer/Fishermen group	42	8%	39	8%	3	4%
Women's group/ organizations	31	6%	28	6%	3	4%
Other associations	119	21%	105	22%	14	18%
Grand Total	**560**		**481**		**79**	

Membership in CSOs
Average number of CSO per person per location

Gaza- Daraj, 0.65
Bethlehem- Dheisheh RC, 1.93
Gaza- Beit Hanoun, 1.34
Hebron- Old City, 1.84
Rafah- Rafah RC., 0.35
Tulkarem- Rural, 1.14
Hebron- Samou', 1.26
Ramallah- Tireh Neigh., 2.13
Jenin- Rural, 1.37
Jericho- Rural, 0.55
Jenin- Jenin RC, 2.50

The highest membership of CSOs per person is in Ramallah, with an average of 2.13 per respondent. The lowest is in Rafah refugee camp with only one person in every three is a member of any CSO. (Community Sampling Survey)

NGOs Pre-Oslo
- Types of NGOs (pre-Oslo)[8]
  - Charitable & cooperative societies
    - Oldest form
    - "remained constrained by the traditional structure of society."
  - Popular Organizations

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[8] Barghouthi, Mustafa M.D.

- - Women's groups, labor unions, voluntary work movement
    - Worked against occupation
    - "Factional politics dominate their activities, which has sometimes led to the preference of factional interests over general public interests."
  - Developmental orgs
    - Agriculture, health committees
    - "Their principle achievement was in building the infrastructure of resistance to occupation in several ways."
  - Research, media and human rights orgs
    - Limited membership
  - Special interest groups
    - Disabled etc.

NGOs After Oslo
- In the period 1995-1998[9]
  - Education and health most important sectors of interest to NGOs
  - Lack of NGO action on economic sector

NGOs in 1998
- In 1998, there were 1,150 CSOs including:[10]
  - Political groups (18)
  - Unions (252)
  - Charitable Organizations (450)
  - Development groups (80)
  - Human rights/democracy (30)
  - Independent research groups (53)
  - Cultural groups (150)

NGOS in 2000/2001
- In 2001, there were 71 organizations in the WB and GS devoted to women's issues. This represented 12% of CS orgs (39 in WB and 32 in GS)[11]
- There has been a change in civil society over 10 years from charitable to nationalistic to development oriented[12]
- Based on 2000 survey of NGOs[13]
  - 27.5% work in relief and charity
  - 12% work within specialized professional development field
  - 27.5% worked in civil, democratic and human rights education
  - 66% worked in protecting social and economic rights for women

Role of Religion
- "The current role of religion as a form of civil society is evident in the increasing strength of Hamas in Palestinian communities, the increase in religious practices (and affiliation with mosques), and the development of mosques as centers for support and activity."[14]

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[9] Hanafi, Sari. 1999.
[10] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.14
[11] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.19
[12] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.14
[13] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.32
[14] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.13

- "Some see civil society as eroding under the PA, although the existence of vibrant Islamic militant groups is also seen as a different version of civil society."[15]

Internet presence
- "The West Bank and Gaza still hosts a richer variety of professional, research, welfare, charitable, and human rights organizations than most of its neighbors. At least thirty-six NGOs and sixteen research centers have active presences on the Internet."[16]

1.1.7 Partisan Political Action	What percentage of people who participate are members of political parties? What Percentage of people who are members of a political group or movement. Percentage of people who take part in elections (PLC elections)		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A small minority (less than 30%).	**A minority (30% to 50%)**	**A majority (51% to 65%).**	**A large majority (more than 65%)**

1.1.7 Partisan Political Action

Membership in a political group or movement:

West Bank		Gaza Strip		OPT	
Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
54	14.29%	14	19.44%	68	15.11%

According to the community survey conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Around 14% of respondents who indicated that they were members of a civil society organization were a member of a political group or movement. The percentage was around 19.4% of Gaza Strip respondents who are members of a CSO, with 15% for the OPT.
During the last Palestinian Legislative Council elections the percentage of voters was 77.18% of registered voters, with an average of 80.7% for Gaza Strip and 76.7% for the West Bank. Around 80% of the estimated total eligible voters were registered[17].

1.2. Depth of citizen participation
This sub-dimension examines how deep/meaningful is citizen participation in CS, and how frequently/extensively do people engage in CS activities.

The level of people's engagement in CS activities:

0	1	2	3
A small minority (less than 30%).	*A minority (30% to 50%)*	*A majority (51% to 65%)*	*A large majority (more than 65%)*

1.2.1 Charitable giving	How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average per year? What forms of charity do people offer? In kind contributions? Donations of money? Donations of goods? Donations of expertise? Resources?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Less than 1%	**1% to 2%**	**2.1% to 3%**	

[15] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.14
[16] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[17] PLC elections results http://www.elections.ps/

1.2.1 Charitable giving

Amounts in NIS	Income per month	Annual Income	Donations per year	% of annual income
OPT	644,000	7,728,000	73,704	0.95%
Gaza	122,750	1,473,000	10,297	0.70%
WB	521,500	6,258,000	63,407	1.01%

In the Gaza Strip respondents indicated that they donate the equivalent of 0.7% of their income to charity. Whereas respondents in the West Bank indicated that their percentage of donation is higher by a quarter of a percent.
The differences between the WB and GS are a result of the lower levels of income and higher unemployment rates in the Gaza Strip. (Community Sampling Survey)

1.2.2 Volunteering	How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?		
	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
Less than 2 hours	2 to 5 hours	5.1 to 8 hours	More than 8 hours.

1.2.2 Volunteering

Thirty percent of responses on the types of community volunteering people undertake was tutoring students. In general the level of community volunteering in the West Bank exceeded that in the GS, on average the level of respondents' participation in at least one method of community volunteering in the WB was 15% vs. 6.5% in the GS. (Community Sampling Survey)

Number of Volunteering hours in the last month.	
Mean	11.5
Median	6
Mode	2
Std. Deviation	17.2

The average number of volunteer hours spent by respondents during the past month was 11.5 hours with a standard deviation of 17.2. The median number of hours was 6. (Community Sampling Survey)

1.2.3 CSO membership	What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO? What types of membership and priveleges do they enjoy and practice? (Active? Inactive? Paid?)		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A small minority (less th	**A minority (30% to 50%)**	**A majority (51% to 65%).**	**A large majority (more than 65%)**

1.2.3 CSO membership

Most of GS respondents are not members of any CSOs. A further quarter of respondents are members of one CSO, 16% of respondents are members of more than one CSO. Twenty one percent of WB respondents are member of one CSO, while 36% are members of two or more CSOs.
(Community Sampling Survey)

Level of membership	OPT	OPT	WB	WB	GS	GS
Not members of any CSO	188	46.77%	128	42.38%	60	60.00%
Members of at least one CSO	214	53.10%	174	57.62%	40	40.00%

1.3. Diversity of civil society participants
This sub-dimension examines how diverse/representative is the civil society arena, whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society, and whether there are any groups that are dominant or excluded.

The level of diversity among civil society participants:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Marginalized groups ar excluded	*Marginalized groups are absent*	*Marginalized groups are under-represented*	*Marginalized groups are equitably represented*

1.3.1 CSO membership	To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, minorities)? Which groups dominate? Which are absent/excluded?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs	Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.

1.3.1 CSO membership

Only 35% of female respondents indicated that they are members of a CSO, compared with a national average of 53%, indicating that women are underrepresented as CSO members. Furthermore, there is a regional difference between the WB and GS, with the gap between female and male membership being larger by 15 percentage points in the GS. (Community Sampling Survey)

There's no difference between the WB and GS in terms of the proportion of poor respondents who are members of CSOs. (Community Sampling Survey)

Level of Representation of Women as Members of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Absent/Excluded	4.17%	5.59%	1.37%
Severly Under-represented	2.31%	3.50%	0.00%
Somewhat Under-represented	73.61%	73.43%	73.97%
Equitably Represented	19.44%	17.48%	23.29%
Don't know	0.46%	0.00%	1.37%

Women: Almost three quarters of respondents in OPT said that women were somewhat underrepresented. The second highest category with nearly 20% stated that women were equitably represented as members of CSOs. There was little difference between respondents from the WB and GS. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Representation of Farmers as Members of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Absent/Excluded	14.88%	12.68%	19.18%
Severly Under-represented	15.35%	20.42%	5.48%
Somewhat Under-represented	46.51%	49.30%	41.10%
Equitably Represented	10.23%	5.63%	19.18%
Don't know	13.02%	11.97%	15.07%

Farmers: 46.51% of respondents in the OPT stated that farmers were somewhat underrepresented as members of CSOs. The rest of the responses were relatively equally distributed between the other categories ranging from 10% to 15% of OPT respondents.A regional difference can be noticed with 20% of GS respondents reporting that farmers were equitably represented as compared to 5% of WB respondents. In GS nearly 20% said that farmers were absent or excluded from CSOs. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Representation of Youth as Members of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Absent/Excluded	1.85%	2.80%	0.00%
Severly Under-represented	3.70%	4.20%	2.74%
Somewhat Under-represented	53.24%	56.64%	46.58%
Equitably Represented	40.28%	34.97%	50.68%
Don't know	0.93%	1.40%	0.00%

Youth: Almost an equal proportion of respondents stated that youth were either somewhat underrepresented or equitably represented. 50% of GS respondents regarded that youth were equally represented vs. only 35% in the WB. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Representation of Workers as Members of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Absent/Excluded	16.82%	14.08%	22.22%
Severly Under-represented	14.49%	19.72%	4.17%
Somewhat Under-represented	45.79%	47.18%	43.06%
Equitably Represented	17.76%	14.08%	25.00%
Don't know	5.14%	4.93%	5.56%

Workers: 46% of OPT respondents said that workers were somewhat underrepresented. 16.8% of OPT respondents said that workers were absent or excluded which included 22% of GS respondents. At the same time a quarter of GS respondents reported that workers were equitably represented. This shows a lack of consensus about the extent of worker representation in CSOs. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Trade Union Membership
- Most unions belong to the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU)
  - Has estimated 95-100,000 workers in WB and 46,500 in GS
  - "The PGFTU estimated that actual organized membership of dues-paying members, included approximately 75% of all Palestinian workers."[18]

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[18] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.2

Level of Representation of Poor as Members of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Absent/Excluded	44.34%	48.20%	36.99%
Severly Under-represented	18.40%	21.58%	12.33%
Somewhat Under-represented	23.58%	22.30%	26.03%
Equitably Represented	11.79%	7.19%	20.55%
Don't know	1.89%	0.72%	4.11%

Poor: The poor had the highest percentage of any group that were absent or excluded from CSO memberships with a total of 44% of OPT respondents. Including 48.2% of WB respondents, and 37% of GS respondents. At the same time one fifth of GS respondents stated that the poor were equitably represented. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

In the 'other category' responses were grouped into three reoccurring categories : intellectuals, children and persons with special needs. Of respondents who added one or more of these categories, most stated that members of these three categories were somewhat underrepresented in CSO membership with 50%, 66.7% and 57.1% respectively, however since only a small number of respondents indicated these categories these percentages may not be representative

Nearly 95% of all responses in the OPT indicated that their organizations' were membership based. There is very little difference between the GS and WB.
Of responses in the OPT 68.5% indicated that their organizations had paid staff including 63.4% of WB responses and 77.2% of GS responses.

1.3.2 CSO decision making	To what extent do various significant groups influence decision making within CSOs?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	ficant social groups are largely absent from	Significant social groups are under-represented in	Social groups have significant influence CSOs.

Level of Members' Influence in Decision-Making: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend:
- Absent/Excluded
- (blank)
- Somewhat Under-represented
- Equitably Represented
- Don't know

|	Women	Farmers	Youth	Workers	Poor
Absent/Excluded	4.17%	14.88%	1.85%	16.82%	44.34%
	2.31%	15.35%	3.70%	14.49%	18.40%
Somewhat Under-represented	73.61%	46.51%	53.24%	45.79%	23.58%
Equitably Represented	19.44%	10.23%	40.28%	17.76%	11.79%
Don't know	0.46%	13.02%	0.93%	5.14%	1.89%

Most respondents indicated that marginal groups such as women, farmers, youth and workers are somewhat underrepresented when it comes to decision making in CSOs. Almost half the respondents indicated that the poor were infact severely underrepresented in CSO decision-making. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

The majority of OPT responses (63%) indicated that members had substantial influence on decision making, within this category there is a considerable regional difference with 72% of WB responses indicating that members' influence was substantial vs. 47% of GS responses.
The second highest category for OPT was moderate influence with 23%, (18.7% WB and 29.8% GS)

1.3.3 CSO leadership	To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, minorities)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	**Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles**	**Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.**	**CSO leadership** **all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.**

1.3.3 CSO leadership

Level of Participation of Women as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Women: Just over 70% of respondents in OPT said that women were somewhat underrepresented in CSO leadership positions. The second highest category with nearly 14% stated that women were equitably represented at leadership level in CSOs. Its interesting to note that a smaller proportion of GS respondents thought that women were absent/excluded or severely underrepresented in CSO leadership. WB and GS. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Participation of Farmers as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Farmers: 41.06% of respondents in the OPT stated that farmers were somewhat underrepresented as leaders of CSOs. A regional difference can be noticed with 9.6% of GS respondents reporting that farmers were severely under represented as compared to 29.8% of WB respondents. In OPT 16.4% said that farmers were absent or excluded from CSOs. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Participation of Youth as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Absent/Excluded	Severly Under-represented	Somewhat Under-represented	Equitably Represented	Don't know
OPT	3.40%	6.31%	54.37%	34.95%	0.97%
WB	4.51%	9.02%	59.40%	25.56%	1.50%
GS	1.37%	1.37%	45.21%	52.05%	0.00%

Youth: 97.3% of respondents in the GS thought that youth were either equitably represented or somewhat under represented in CSO leadership. Twice as many respondents in GS as the WB thought that youth were equitably represented (52.0% and 25.6% respectively). 54.4% of all respondents in the OPT thought that youth were somewhat under represented. (Figure 4.A.3.8)


Level of Participation of Workers as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Absent/Excluded	Severly Under-represented	Somewhat Under-represented	Equitably Represented	Don't know
OPT	22.06%	23.53%	35.78%	14.71%	3.92%
WB	22.56%	29.32%	33.83%	10.53%	3.76%
GS	21.13%	12.68%	39.44%	22.54%	4.23%

Workers: 35.8 of OPT respondents said that workers were somewhat underrepresented. 22.1% of OPT respondents said that workers were absent or excluded. In the WB 29.3% of respondents thought that workers were severly under represented vs. 12.7% only of GS respondents. IN general GS respondents thought that workers were either equitably or somewhat underrepresented vs a much smaller proportion in the WB that thought that workers were generally somewhat or severly under represented in CSO leadership. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Participation of Poor as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Absent/Excluded	Severly Under-represented	Somewhat Under-represented	Equitably Represented	Don't know
OPT	52.48%	15.35%	19.31%	7.43%	5.45%
WB	61.07%	13.74%	15.27%	4.58%	5.34%
GS	36.62%	18.31%	26.76%	12.68%	5.63%

Poor: The poor had the highest percentage of any group that were absent or excluded from CSO memberships with a total of 52.5% of OPT respondents. Including 61.1% of WB respondents, and 36.6% of GS respondents.26.8% of GS respondents thought that the poor were somewhat underrepresented. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Participation of Groups as Leaders of CS Orgs: Percentage of All OPT Respondents

Legend: Absent/Excluded, Severly Under-represented, □

	Women	Farmers	Youth	Workers	Poor
	8.02%	16.43%	3.40%	22.06%	52.48%
	5.66%	22.71%	6.31%	23.53%	15.35%
	71.70%	41.06%	54.37%	35.78%	19.31%
	13.68%	8.70%	34.95%	14.71%	7.43%
	0.94%	11.1%	0.97%	3.92%	5.45%

The largest proportion of respondents 35% thought that youth were equitably represented. Women were overwhelmingly thought to be underrepresented by 71.1% of respondents. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

How Organization Selects its Members: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Self-Selection	6.60%	7.80%	4.23%
Appointment	22.17%	19.15%	28.17%
Election by Members	69.34%	71.63%	64.79%
Other	1.89%	1.42%	2.82%
Don't Know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

69.3% of OPT respondents indicated that their organization elected its leadership19 by members. The proportion of WB respondents was slightly higher than the GS respondents 71.6% vs. 64.8%. The second highest category was selection through appointment with 22.2% of OPT respondents, 19.1% of WB respondents and 28.2% of GS respondents. Self selection was indicated by only 6.6% of all respondents. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

1.3.4 Distribution of CSOs	How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CSO concentrated in the major urban centres.	re largely areas.	**CSOs are present in all areas of the country.**	**CSOs are present in country.**

1.3.4 Distribution of CSOs

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[19] The questionnaire did not specify who was meant by the leadership of a CSO it could have been understood as either the executive director or members of the board. The high percentage of elected leadership indicates that interviewees interpreted the question as meaning boards of directors.

Geographical Distribution of CSOs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Largely Concentrated in Major Cities	Largely Limited to Urban Areas	Present in All Except Most Remote Areas	Present in All Even Most Remote Areas	Don't Know
	41.12%	18.22%	21.96%	17.29%	1.40%
	46.81%	21.99%	20.57%	10.64%	0.00%
	30.14%	10.96%	24.66%	30.14%	4.11%

For 68.8% of WB respondents CSOs are mainly located in Major cities or urban areas, while only 10.6% of respondents think that they are located in all areas.
Of GS respondents 42% said that CSOs were either largely concentrated in major cities or urban areas, as opposed to 30.1% who thought that CSOs were present in all including remote areas. The large proportion of GS respondents indicating that CSOs are present in all areas might be a reflection of the geographical and population density differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

1.4. Level of organisation

This sub-dimension examines how well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society

The level of organization among civil society actors is:

0	1	2	3
Non existent	*Weak level of organization*	*Moderate level of organization*	*High level of organization*

1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A small than 30%	**A minority (30% to 50%)**	**A jority (51% t 70**	**A large majority (more than 70%)**

1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Existence of umbrella bodies according to respondents	OPT	WB	GS
Less than 20%	12.04%	13.99%	8.22%
Between 20%-40%	40.74%	38.46%	45.21%
Between 40%-60%	19.44%	22.38%	13.70%
More than 60%	16.67%	16.08%	17.81%
Do Not Know	11.11%	9.09%	15.07%

Around 40% of OPT respondents indicated that they believed that between 20-40% of CSOs belonged to a federation or umbrella body. An additional 20% thought that 40-60% of CSOs belonged to a federation or umbrella body. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Completely ineffective (or non-existent).	Largely ineffective.	Somewhat effective.	Effective.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Effectiveness of umbrella organizations according to respondents	OPT	WB	GS
Completely Ineffective	6.05%	5.63%	6.85%
Largely Ineffective	23.72%	25.35%	20.55%
Mixed	42.33%	43.66%	39.73%
Generally Effective	19.07%	17.61%	21.92%
Do Not Know	8.84%	7.75%	10.96%

Only one fifth of OPT respondents consider umbrella organizations to be generally effective. Around a quarter of OPT respondents consider umbrella organizations to be largely infective. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

1.4.3 Self-regulation	Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?		
Score 0	**Sc**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
here are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Preliminary efforts have a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is limited.	Some mechanisms for place but only some sectors of CSOs are effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Mechanisms for CSO are in place and function quite effectively. A CSO behaviour can be detected.

1.4.3 Self-regulation

Self Regulation Efforts made by CSOs	OPT	WB	GS
No Efforts Made	25.46%	32.87%	10.96%
Preliminary Efforts Made	44.91%	40.56%	53.42%
Mechanisms for Self-Regulation exist, CSO Involvement Limited	12.50%	11.89%	13.70%
Mechanisms for Self-Regulation exist and Function Effectively.	2.31%	0.70%	5.48%
Do Not Know	14.81%	13.99%	16.44%

Less than 3% of respondents believe that mechanisms for self regulation are in place and are functioning quite effectively. Furthermore, a quarter of respondents believe that no efforts have been made by CSOs to self regulate. (WB 33%, GS 11%). The majority of respondents 45% believed that preliminary efforts have been made but impact has been extremely limited as of yet. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CSO abides by Internal by laws	OPT	WB	GS
Yes	94.10%	91.60%	98.20%
No	5.90%	8.40%	1.80%

A large majority of respondents[20] in the OPT (94.1%), believe that CSOs abide by a set of internal by laws and regulations. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

PNGO membership
▪ The entry criteria of PNGO work towards self-regulation of the NGO sector—e.g., to enter, an NGO must have a clear strategy goals, by-laws etc. It must have financial reports completed professionally audited by a chartered auditor and endorsed by authoritative bodies.[21]

1.4.4 Support infrastructure	What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	developed support infrastructure for civil

1.4.4 Support infrastructure

Existence of a support infrastructure	OPT	WB	GS
No such infrastructure exists	14.81%	18.18%	8.22%
Very limited infrastructure exits	45.37%	53.15%	30.14%
Moderate infrastructure exits	33.33%	23.78%	52.05%
Well-developled infrastructure exits	3.24%	2.10%	5.48%
Do Not Know	3.24%	2.80%	4.11%

Less than 4% believe that a well developed support infrastructure[22] for civil society exists in the OPT. Most respondents believe that support infrastructure is either very limited or moderately available. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ PNGO engages in capacity building of its members[23]

---

[20] Arabic version of the question in the RSC questionnaire did not specify a collective code of conduct but was rather understood by respondents as internal bylaws and regulations. There is an going attempt by PNGO to develop an internal code of practice and a code of ethics for the NGO sector.
[21] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. 1997.
[22] Support infrastructure includes capacity building, institutions, research centers, support program, and activities, that provide technical, administrative and knowledge support for the CS sector in Palestine.
[23] "PNGO Narrative Report 2003" http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2003.htm

1.4.5 International linkages	What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?		
Sco	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Onl "elite" CSOs have international linkages.	ber of (mainly	A moderate number of nal-level) ternational linkages.	A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.

1.4.5 International linkages

Proportion of CSOs with intenational linkages	OPT	WB	GS
None	2.78%	3.50%	1.37%
Very Few	47.22%	45.45%	50.68%
Some	20.37%	20.28%	20.55%
Numerous	11.57%	11.19%	12.33%
Do Not Know	18.06%	19.58%	15.07%

Nearly half of OPT respondents believe that very few CSOs are members of international networks. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

International cooperation
- "Cooperation between national and international organizations, such as UNICEF, WHO, and ICRC, or Israeli organizations like Physicians for Human Rights, has increased around Wall affected areas in order to facilitate drug distribution to rural clinics when Palestinian medical teams are denied access by Israeli soldiers."[24]

1.5. Inter-relations
This sub-dimension examines how strong / productive are relations among civil society actors

Relations among CS actors are:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Non-existent	*Weak*	*Moderate*	*Strong*

- "Around 23 non-governmental organizations which is around (11.1%) of the sample indicated that they adopt the networking, coordination and cooperation strategy. This is relatively small percentage and is an indicator to the 'newly concept' and to the recentness of the durability of this element in most of the important projects and programs.

1.5.1 Communication[i]	What is the extent of communication between CS actors?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Ver	Limited	Moderate	Significant

1.5.1 Communication

Level of Communication between CS actors	OPT	WB	GS

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[24] Jubran, Joan. August, 2005.

Insignificant	15.35%	20.28%	5.56%
Limited	35.81%	36.36%	34.72%
Moderate	41.40%	37.06%	50.00%
Significant	6.05%	5.59%	6.94%
Do Not Know	1.40%	0.70%	2.78%

More than 40% of OPT stated that communication between CSOs was moderate, and 36% indicated that it was moderate. Only 6% of OPT respondents indicated that the communication level was significant, and 20% of WB respondents stated that it was insignificant. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

1.5.2 Cooperation	How much do CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?		
Sco	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CS a coop othe com exam sectoral CSO allia be i	cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / detected.	cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO be identified / detected.	cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.

1.5.2 Co-operation

There does not seem to be considerable consensus about the extent of alliances, networks, and coalition formation between CSOs. Of total respondents the categories of none, very few and some received approximately a quarter of responses. Overall only 10% of respondents thought that there were numerous examples with a large regional difference between GS and WB, (19.4% and 5.2% respectively). (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- PNGO & other NGOs drafted a memorandum of principles proposing amendments to the 1995 Palestinian election law dealing with the threshold percentage, women and elections as well as the structure and integrity of elections.[25]
- "…the stand taken by Palestinian civil society on this issue [USAID Terror Certification] is testament to its strength[26]
- To address the Terror Certificate [USAID], PNGO held brainstorming sessions with its members and other networks, held awareness-raising campaign & negotiated with USAID[27]
- The Jerusalem Committee, a PNGO subcommittee organized emergency committees to meet needs including:

Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights, International Solidarity, Media, Emergency Fund[28]

1.5.3 Consultation	What is the extent of consultation between CS actors in relation to their work? What are the mechanisms of this consultation?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
CS actors do not consult with each other on issues of common concern.	consult with each other on issues of common concern.	consult with each other on issues of common concern.	consult with each other on issues of common concern.

1.5.3 Consultation

- "…competitive values are present among non-governmental organizations rather than cooperation, consulting and coordination values. This is due to the history of non-governmental work, which is closely related to political factionalism or families and resulted to a certain extent in eliminating the possibilities of coordination and networking…"[29]

1.5.4 Networking	To what extent do CSOs actively build networks among themselves and with other relevant bodies?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
CS actors do not actively build networks among themselves and w odies. No examples of CSO networks can be identified / detected.	It is very rare that CS actors consult with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / litions can be identified /	CS actors on occasion consult with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can	CS actors regularly consult with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances identified / detected.

1.5.4 Networking

Specific Examples of CSO networks/coalitions

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[25] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004.

[26] "'Terror Certification' An Obstacle to Development of Palestinian Civil Society." 2004.

[27] "PNGO Narrative Report 2003" http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2003.htm

[28] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004

[29] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.39

Out of 216 CSO stakeholders 129 identified 20 different types/examples of networks coalitions. Those most frequently cited network was PNGO (Palestinian NGO Network) followed by the Union of Charitable societies. Several unions were mentioned such as the Women's General Union, and health and agricultural committees. Several coalitions related to youth issues were also mentioned by respondents. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Type/Name	Frequency	Percent of total
PNGO	40	18.96%
Women Groups	25	11.85%
Agriculture and health committees	24	11.37%
Union of charitable societies	13	6.16%
Youth	13	6.16%
Special needs	11	5.21%
Cultural centers	9	4.27%
Human rights	7	3.32%
Child	6	2.84%
Labor units	6	2.84%
Elections	5	2.37%
Education	4	1.90%
Environment	4	1.90%
Forum against violence	4	1.90%
Refugees	4	1.90%
Farmers	3	1.42%
Ma'an TV	2	0.95%
Other	31	14.69%
	Total	211

- Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) formed as a coordinating committee of over 60 NGOs in 1993[30]
- The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON) is a coordination body between different Palestinian NGOs working in the field of the environment. Has 21 member organizations.[31]

1.5.5 Partnership	To what extent do CSOs engage in joint programming and activities?		
Score 0		**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Completely ineffective (or non-existent).		Somewhat effective.	Effective.

1.5.5 Partnership
- Social and Psychological Support Committee—made up of governmental and NGOs and INGOs[32]
- Child Rights Coalition[33]

[30] "Palestinian Civil Society Under Siege; From Resistance to Empowerment." 2001. p.7
[31] "About Pengon, The Palestinian Environmental NGO Network." http://www.pengon.org/about/about.html. Accessed 7-20-2004.
[32] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004
[33] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004

- "…there are alliances and networking for implementing joint programs in a single developmental sector. Also, Palestinian non-governmental organizations—working within the same sector—began directing their efforts towards networking and cooperation. During the past several years, we witnessed the establishment of many sectoral networks, such as the educational network, the Palestinian Network for institutional development, the Non-Governmental Organizations Network working within the field of culture and others."[34]

1.6. Resources

This sub-dimension examines To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals

Resources available to CSOs are:

0	1	2	3
Inadequate	*Somewhat inadequate*	*Somewhat adequate*	*Adequate and secure*

1.6.1 Financial Resources	What is the level of financial, resources for CSOs? How adequate do CS stakeholders judge them to be?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource prob	goals.	On average, CSOs have cial achieve their defined goals.	On average, CSOs have an adequate and resource base.

1.6.1 Financial Resources

Percentage of CSOs by Number of Funding Sources

- 6 Sources 4%
- 5 Sources 11%
- 7 Sources 3%
- 4 Sources 14%
- 1 Source 23%
- 3 Sources 21%
- 2 Sources 24%

Only a quarter of CSOs indicated that they had one type of substantial source of funding. On average CSOs indicated that they had 3 types of substantial sources of funding. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

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[34] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.47

Distribution of CSO Sources of Substantial Funding (More than 10% of Overall Funding)

The largest source of substantial funding ie. more than 10% of overall funding is foreign funding. Member fees, services fees, and individual sources of funding were each indicated by almost half of the respondents.

Its interesting to note that 30% of respondents have indicated that Governmental sources of funding were substantial. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Financial Resources	OPT	WB	GS
Adequate	44.85%	42.33%	49.11%
Rather Adequate	8.64%	6.35%	12.50%
Inadequate	38.21%	43.39%	29.46%
Completely Inadequate	7.31%	6.35%	8.93%
Do Not Know	1.00%	1.59%	0.00%

It seems that respondents regard financial resources as either adequate or in adequate with 45% and 38% respectively. It is interesting to note that almost half of the respondents are satisfied with their financial resources. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ "Ever since the Palestinian uprising began in September 2000, Western governments have shrunk from confronting Israel over the strangulation of Palestinian civilian areas and the expansion of settlements. Many Western diplomats are convinced that Israel's violent response to Palestinian extremism has only encouraged the suicide bombers. But instead of taking Israel to task, their governments have chosen the soft option and poured money into the Palestinian territories. **Palestinian NGOs have been one of the main beneficiaries. They now number well over a thousand, and their income from the West has increased from about $35 million annually in 1994 to $120 million in 2002."[35]**

▪ "Increased donor support has been one of the main factors responsible for this ability to cope [with the consequences of the wall on the health sector], helping to cushion the effect of the humanitarian needs created by the Wall and contributing to the continued provision of services and relief activities."[36]

▪ In 1999, 200 donors gave assistance to Palestinian NGOs[37]

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[35] "Palestinian Territories: Palestinian Civil Society." April 2003.
[36] Jubran, Joan. August, 2005.
[37] Hanafi, Sari. 1999.

- o Mostly through local contact in Palestine
- o More than $60 million annually to the NGO sector
- o $240 million 1995-1998
- o 10-20% of total international donor assistance to Palestine
- 1995-1998[38]
  - o Education: 23.3% of donor funds ($56 mil)
  - o Health: 19.6% of donor funds ($50 mil)
  - o Agriculture: 7.4% of donor funds ($7.4 mil)- despite the fact that this is the largest Palestinian economic sector
  - o Culture & Social Services: 8% of donor funds ($20 mil) each
  - o Microcredit & private sector: 3.9% of donor funds ($10 mil)
  - o Tourism: .4% of donor funds ($1 mil)
  - o Relief: 1% of donor funds ($2 mil)
  - o Environment: 2.9% of donor funds ($7 mil)
  - o Infrastructure: 2.8% of donor funds ($7 mil)
  - o Human Rights & Democracy: 9.5% of donor funds ($5 mil) in 1998 alone, but over the 4 years, the average was 4.4%
  - o Research: 1.9% of donor funds ($4.6 mil)
- Donor funding ('95-'98) was lopsided in terms of the West Bank (81% and $111.5 million) vs. GS (19% and $26.4 million). This is disproportionate both in terms of population and in terms of need.[39]
  - o Jerusalem = 25% of WB funding
  - o Ramallah = 7% of WB funding
  - o Bethlehem = 6% of WB funding (disproportionately large vis-à-vis its population)
  - o Nablus = 4.8% of WB funding
  - o Hebron = 4.8% of WB funding
  - o Jenin = 3.8% of WB funding
  - o Tulkarem & Qalqilya = marginalized
  - o Gaza City = 30% of Gaza Strip funding
- "The most important obstacle facing Palestinian non-governmental organizations is financial in nature. Around 184 non-governmental organizations which is a percentage of (92.2%) of the total sample pointed to the fact that they suffer from major financial difficulties ranging in its intensity from one organization to the other. It was also noted throughout the research that charitable organizations and sport clubs are among the ones that suffer most from financial crisis on one hand, and professional organizations suffering the least. After the creation of the Palestinian National Authority, it undertook many responsibilities that were executed by non-governmental organizations, hence, weakening the funding for such organizations."[40]
- "The World Bank's statistics state that the extent of total funding for the non-governmental sector **prior to the Oslo Agreement in 1993 ranged between 120-180 million US dollars** per year, whereas this number **decreased to around 60 million US dollars per year** after the inception of the Palestinian National Authority…This crisis becomes worse in the midst of the developing demand on social services, mainly the primary sectors of health, education, early education, agriculture, loans and training and others. A study conducted by the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network revealed that the non-governmental sector is still offering basic services in different development sectors specifically first aid, early education, water, agriculture and training, etc. The non-governmental sector is still offering basic services in Jerusalem areas that are not under the Palestinian National

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[38] Hanafi, Sari, 1999.

[39] Hanafi, Sari, 1999.

[40] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.37

Authority's administration despite the severe lack of funding among the Palestinian non-governmental organizations."[41]

- Funding peaked (before the establishment of the PA) between 1990-1992 when the NGO sector received $250 million per year[42]
- "Thus, the incursions of winter/spring 2002, the road closures and the limited access to he outside had a debilitating effect on the Awata community both in terms of income and social services, but also on social outreach and community-building. Informal organizations that existed before the Intafada were largely inactive. The fact that few civic organizations or activities existed was attributed by some informants to the fact that they were concerned they would be required to donate money that they didn't have. For example, one of the nursery schools had a leaky roof during the winter of 2002/2003 but parents didn't organize a committee to repair it because they didn't have the money to contribute."[43]
- "Constraints on the operation, and on the establishment of other similar [CSO] groups seemed to be largely financial as locals could not afford to share their severely limited projects. Alienation from the larger community, depression, and anxiety were also cited as common with the understandable consequence that participation in civic groups was not sought out as much as before the Intifada. Many of the problems in the villages (checkpoints, closures, inadequate electricity grids and sewage disposal) also required power or resources unavailable to local groups."[44]

1.6.2. Human Resources	What is the level of human resources for CSOs? How adequate do CS stakeholders judge them to be?		
Sco	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
On suffer m ource problem.	inadequate human resources to achieve their goals.	average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to goals.	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.

1.6.2. Human Resources

Human Resources	OPT	WB	GS
Adequate	59.20%	58.51%	60.36%
Rather Adequate	34.78%	35.64%	33.33%
Inadequate	5.69%	5.32%	6.31%
Completely Inadequate	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Do Not Know	0.33%	0.53%	0.00%

Sixty percent of the respondents believe that their human resources were adequate and only 6% indicated that their staff skills were inadequate.

Of responses in the OPT 68.5% indicated that their organizations had paid staff including 63.4% of WB responses and 77.2% of GS responses. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

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[41] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.37
[42] "Palestinian Civil Society Under Siege; From Resistance to Empowerment." 2001. p.7
[43] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.52
[44] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.68

1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources	How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?		
Sco	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
On suff tech infra prob	inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined	have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.

1.6.3. Technological and infrastructural resources

Equipment and infrastructure	OPT	WB	GS
Adequate	50.00%	46.03%	56.76%
Rather Adequate	17.67%	16.93%	18.92%
Inadequate	28.33%	32.28%	21.62%
Completely Inadequate	3.67%	4.23%	2.70%
Do Not Know	0.33%	0.53%	0.00%

Half of the respondents recorded that their organization's equipment and infrastructure was adequate. Whereas 28% indicated that it was inadequate. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

ENVIRONMENT

2.1. Political context
This sub-dimension examines the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society

The political context in which civil society exists and functions is:

0	1	2	3
Disabling	*Somewhat disabling*	*Somewhat enabling*	*Enabling*

2.1.1. Political rights	How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?		
Sco	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
The restr poli citiz cann in p processes.	restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.

2.1.1. Political rights

Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are living under military occupation since 1967. For the past 38 years are living under strong restrictions on their political rights' as citizens.

Since 1995 Palestinians have been able to take part in legislative and presidential elections. Political party activity and membership is restricted to parties that have indicated their support of the peace process and Oslo agreements.

Hamas has been allowed to take part in the legislative coucil elections undertaken on January 25, 2006.

However Palestinians' basic human rights remain violated such as access to education, health, housing as well restrictions on movement. Violations of international laws continue such as killings, house demolitions, confiscation of lands.

There is practically no movement between the Gaza strip and the West Bank. A Wall is being built in the West Bank that will enclose most of its residents behind 8 meter walls, while keeping agricultural land, water resources and villages outside the wall in certain areas.

2.1.2 Political competition	What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Single party system.	Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction	Robust, multi-party competition with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.

2.1.2. Political Competition

- Types of political parties[45]
    - Secular and Marxist vs. Islamic
    - Destroy Israel vs. Interim 2 state solution vs. permanent 2 state solution
    - Support vs. rejection of Oslo and/or the PNA
    - Reliance on neighboring countries (eg: Syria or Iran) vs. independence
    - Based in the OPT or not
    - Widely-based popular political movements vs. small factions
- In the last legislative council elections held on Januray 25, 2006, 11 political parties were competing for seats.

2.1.3. Rule of law	To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country? Is there confidence in the law?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
here is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	There is low confidence in law by citizens and the state.	There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which d by.

2.1.3. Rule of law
- Palestinian Judicial Higher Council was created in 2000[46]
- PA appointed judicial positions including

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[45] "Palestinian Organizations and Parties." MidEast Web: http://www.mideastweb.org/palestineparties.htm Accessed 12-12-2004

[46] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.4

- o Attorney General
- o Supreme Judge
- o Chief justice for the Higher Court in Gaza[47]
- There has been an increase in the number of judges trying cases[48]
- Many Palestinian laws have been passed (43 by 2001)[49]
- Difficult ratification process for laws[50]
- Remaining problems:
  - o Failure of execution of endorsed laws
  - o Numerous presidential decrees
  - o Creation of military and national security courts[51]
- "Lack of sovereignty in the judicial context means multiple laws and legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza, causing withering complexity in legal procedures and interpretations." There is a challenge to unify laws. Laws include:
  - o Jordanian laws written between '48-'67 in the West Bank
  - o Egyptian laws written between '48-'67 in the Gaza Strip
  - o British Emergency Laws '45-'48[52]
- The PLC is overloaded[53]
- "The refusal of the executive authority to implement the decisions of the courts especially the decisions taken by the court of higher justice concerning freeing political prisoners. The Rights of Handicapped Law and the Civil Service Law have also not been executed. This is justified in some cases by the claim that these laws need bylaws explaining methods to implement them like the law concerning the right of the handicapped, they say also that financial resources are needed in order to implement other laws like the civil service law.[54]
- Judicial authority lacks human and financial resources
  - o In 2000, there was 1 judge for population of 99,430 in WB
  - o 1 judge for population of 72,471 in GS[55]
- "In general in Palestinian society, both men and women, have a negative attitude toward the law. Laws are characterized as a means of oppression used for creating tensions due to the political turmoil that exists."[56]
- "Some criticisms have also been directed at the refusal of PA officials to accept all court orders. The problem has been most acute with extremely sensitive political cases—for example, those in which PA security forces have arrested members of organizations involved

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[47] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.8
[48] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.4
[49] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.7
[50] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.7
[51] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.4
[52] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.7
[53] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.9
[54] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.9
[55] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.10
[56] Najjab, Selwa M.D. 22 June 1999.

in violence against Israel. The Palestinian High Court has jurisdiction in cases against official actions and regularly receives complaints filed on behalf of those detained without charge. The court routinely orders the release of those whom security officials have made clear that they answer only to the president, not to the courts, on such issues."[57]

2.1.4. Corruption	What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?		
Sco	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
Hig	Substantial	Moderate	Low

2.1.4. Corruption

- "Increasing levels of institutionalization in the process of governance in 2000 point to improved levels of accountability on micro-level matters in the PA…"[58]
- Higher Council for Development was created in 2000 to follow up on PA economic policies[59]
- Palestinian Investment Fund created in 2000 to manage PA economic activities[60]
- Increased regulation of employment in the public sector[61]
- Increased financial transparency relating to investment and trade[62]
- "Corruption is still largely limited in terms of type, shape or extent. It is also limited to some individual cases in the upper echelon, and does not include everybody at that level. Corruption has not spread vertically to the lower levels."[63]
- During a press conference held in Gaza City on Feb. 5, 2006, the Palestinian attorney general Ahmed al-Meghani indicated that a total of 700 million US$ were missing from the PA accounts.

2.1.5. State effectiveness	To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?		
Sco	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
The has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	bureaucracy is extremely	functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.

2.1.5. State effectiveness

2.1.6. Decentralisation	To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3

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[57] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.31
[58] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.6
[59] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.6
[60] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.6
[61] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.6
[62] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.6
[63] Abu Arafeh 2002. p.8

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.

2.1.6. Decentralisation

2.1.7 Separation of powers within the government	To what extent is there a system of checks and balances between the powers of the state?		
Score 0		**Score 2**	**Score 3**
There is of p gove	There is very limited separation of powers within the government	There is to some extent a separation of powers within the government	There is a total separation of powers within the government

2.1.7 Separation of powers within the government

- Financing of the Judicial Higher Council is independent of the legislative and executive branches of the PA[64]
- "The main shortcomings of 2000 include…lack of clarity between the different branches of government…"[65]
- Lack of balance between legislative, judicial and executive authorities—weakness in principle of separating them in terms of legal concepts and practice[66]
- The executive authority made changes in laws ratified by the legislative council[67]
- Many presidential decrees have legislative significance
    - Demolish or modify current laws or expand their mandate from the WB to GS or vice-versa
    - This is interference from the executive authority in affairs of the legislative authority[68]
- The Basic Law guarantees the independence of the judiciary—it states that Palestine is a Parliamentary democracy built on a separation of powers.[69]
- "The Palestinian Authority institutions exercise their influence, and at times actively intervene in the work of the legislature. This is one symptom of the more general case of the absence of the separation of powers in Palestine. The (former) Chairman of the PLC has very close ties with the executive authority, and therefore he is unable (or unwilling) to resist pressures from the government or presidency. Add to this the fact that the majority of PLC members are associated with the executive authority. This situation undermines the spirit of the separation of powers, and it paves the way for unwarranted interventions. Many drafts get altered and delayed because of calculations outside the walls of the PLC, and beyond the reach of the pertinent committee." (Dr. Azmi Shuaibi)[70]

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[64] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.4

[65] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.4

[66] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.9

[67] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.10

[68] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.10

[69] "Palestine in Brief." 2004. p.2

[70] Awad, Sameer. January 2004.

2.1.8 State Sovereignty	To what extent is the state sovereign? Is the state territorially contiguous? Is there freedom of movement and access? Is the territory of the state threatened? Does the state have control of its borders? Is the state subject to foreign occupation? Does the state control its own natural resources?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
There is a military occupation.	There is state however, it lacks any sort of sovereignty.	There is a state and to sovereignty to some extent.	The state has full sovereignty over its land.

2.1.8 State Sovereignty
- "The PA is not a state government with legal power over a specific territory or a defined people."[71]
- "It is worth noting here that the actual presence of the Israeli occupation contradicts with the idea of establishing a free and effective civil democratic society. His is true due to the Israeli occupation's policies in the past and present time, and due to the geographical separation that is currently imposed, which in turn prevents Palestinians from forming joint visions and goals to enhance their national and cultural identity."[72]
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2.1.9 International Law	Is international law applied in and to the country?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
There is no international law applied to the country.	however they are not applied.	applied to some extent in and to the country.	applied in and to the country.

2.1.9 International Law
- "It is clear that the role to be performed by non-governmental organizations is based on the political facts: The continued Israeli occupation of wide-spread areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 2. The creation of the first Palestinian National Authority on Palestinian lands; 3. The transfer of all civil authorities to the ministries and bodies of the Palestinian National Authority, even in areas that are yet under the Israeli occupation] and these roles may differ and vary according to the peace process developments. What we mean here is that transforming from survival, resistance, steadfastness and relief strategies to a durable development strategy; in addition to transforming from the Palestinian society's nature (tribal, familial, political factionalism and individualism, and so on) into civil condition, that is into further democracy, professionalism, accountability and transparency, is dialectically and strictly associated with the extent of the political settlement between the Palestinian National Authority and the State of Israel."[73]
- "… in 1996, under Prime Minister Netanyahu's government, and the deterioration in security, and the hindering of the political negotiations; non-governmental organizations directed their work towards relief. However, during the early years of the Oslo Agreement, their work combined both relief and durable development, and so on. In any case, it is clear that there is a connection between both visions; the resistance relief vision and the democratic development vision among he Palestinian non-governmental organizations' practice, in that

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[71] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.2
[72] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.39
[73] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.31

some may work in relief fields at the same time work in democracy and development fields, and so on."[74]

- "Around 84 non-governmental organizations, which is around (42%) of the sample, pointed out serious obstacles as a result of the Israeli occupation. These obstacles included continued closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and whatever falls between those two areas, and areas in the West Bank itself."[75]

2.1.10 Human Rights	Are human rights respected in the state and on its citizens?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Human rights are systematically violated.	Human rights are rarely respected.	Human rights are respected in most cases.	Human rights are respected.

2.1.10 Human Rights

- No laws exist protecting rights of striking workers[76]
- "In the six years since its establishment the Palestinian Authority (PA) has detained dozens of human rights defenders, journalists, religious figures, writers, governmental officials, trade unionists and academics solely for exercising their legitimate right to freedom of expression. In the past year alone, Amnesty International has documented the arrest and detention of at least 13 prisoners of conscious. Many have been detained after criticizing the policies of the PA or the conduct of the peace negotiations with Israel. Some were arrested in connection with events happening elsewhere in the world, such as the 1998 air strikes by the United States of America and the United Kingdom on Iraq. Most were held outside any legal framework, often incommunicado, and released without charge after a few days or weeks, and, in some cases, months."[77]
- "In November 1998 the PA issues Presidential Decree No. 3 concerning the Strengthening of National Unity and the Prohibition of Incitement. Even thought this decree has the force of law, it was never passed by the Palestinian Legislative Council. The Wye Memorandum, signed the previous month by Israel an the PLO, had stated that the Palestinian side would 'issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror.' The passing of the decree was one of the conditions which the PLO had to meet in order to secure Israel's further redeployment from West Bank territory and the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. The decree goes far beyond prohibiting 'violence or terror' and punishes a broad range of speech, including incitement to 'strife' (*fitna)* which is not defined further and could be used to prohibit forms of expression which would be protected under international human rights law, as could the prohibition of incitement to breach agreements signed between the PLO and foreign states."[78]
- "Many other laws in fore in the areas under PA jurisdiction, inherited from the British Mandate Period as well as the periods of Jordanian and Egyptian administration, curtail the right to freedom of expression. However, one of the hallmarks of human rights violations by the PA, including violations of the right to freedom of expression, is that such violations usually routinely occur outside any legal framework whatsoever."[79]

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[74] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.32
[75] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38
[76] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.2
[77] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.
[78] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.
[79] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.

2.1.11 International Political Environment	What international factors influence the environment for civil society? Donors? Diplomatic agreements? Aid policy?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
The international political environment negatively influences civil society.	The international political environment is not	The international political environment is to some civil society.	The international political environment is supportive

2.1.11 International Political Environment
- Change in donor priorities towards public policy, civic education and democracy diminished role of NGO emergency & relief work. "This effect was clear among charitable organizations that did not respond adequately to the new developments…This policy resulted in ignoring the urgent and relief programs aimed at resisting the occupation, which in turn negatively reflected on meeting the basic needs of the Palestinian society and on the level of funding among non-governmental organizations."[80]
- Discontinuation of Arab support after second Gulf War led to financial crisis[81]
- "…Palestinian non-governmental organizations' gradual dissociation from their popular recourse, and rather becoming further allied with donors, ceasing to develop financial plans for the sake of existence and self-reliance by means of local sources."[82]
- "Palestine is a political region of interest for the United States The sad conclusion that must be drawn from USAID's renewed interest in tightening the conditionality screw is that there is a political imperative to reduce support to the Palestinians. It is hard to imagine USAID believing that their previous donations have been spent in the cause of violence, and hard to believe that USAID is confident that a signature will prevent this in the future. The 'not limited' clause reduces the significance of the lists in question to symbolism, and the symbol is clear: Palestinian civil society is under clear suspicion of links to political movements that the United States government disagrees with."[83]
- Donors note the tension between long-term development programming and emergency programming[84]

2.2. Basic freedoms & rights
This sub-dimension examines to what extent basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice.

Basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practice:

0	1	2	3
Not ensured	*Mostly not ensured*	*Somewhat ensured*	*Fully ensured*

2.2.1. Civil liberties	To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
systematically violated.	There are frequent violations of c es.	There are isolated or civil liberties.	Civil liberties are fully ensu and in practice.

2.2.1. Civil liberties

[80] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38
[81] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38
[82] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38
[83] "'Terror Certification' An Obstacle to Development of Palestinian Civil Society." 2004.
[84] "The Impact of the Palestinian Intifada on International Funding; Reality and Prospects." 2000. p.20

2.2.2. Information rights	To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
No laws guarantee in Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	documents is limited but expanding.	public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is

government documents. | broadly and easily accessible to the public. |

2.2.2. Information rights

2.2.3. Press freedoms	To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice*?*		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
Press freedoms are systematically violated.	There of pre	The violations of press free	Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in pract

2.2.3. Press freedoms
- "Many privately owned media also survive, despite efforts of the Authority to clamp down on them."[85]
- 1995 Press Law
  - "no security agency has any right to question, interrogate, detain, incarcerate or arrest a journalist on matters pertaining to his work."
  - Does not provide for formal censorship, but Art. 37 prohibits the publication of articles that cause harm to national unity[86]
- Ministry of Information licenses the media and the General Intelligence Directorate has established a Bureau of Press Information to accredit and monitor foreign media[87]
- "…PA security forces have sometimes shut down broadcasters for political reasons. The incident receiving the most international attention involved Al-Quds Educational Television, which was broadcasting a session of the PLC. The remarkably frank and sometimes heated tone of the PLC discussion was apparently too much for PA leaders to bear, and in May 1997 the director was detained in Ramallah until the broadcasts ceased. Attracting much less attention was the closure of a radio station after it broadcast caustic comments by Umar Assaf, a leader of a wildcat teachers' strike and member of the Central Committee for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. On none of the occasions when broadcasters or journalists ere detained o shut down did the authorities cite any legal basis for their actions. They simply proceeded on their interpretation of presidential will or national interest."[88]
- "One of the first laws to be adopted by the PA was the Press and Publications Law of 1995. It did not benefit from scrutiny by the Palestinian Legislative Council, which had not yet been elected. This law regulated every publication produced or imported into areas under PA jurisdiction and gives the PA very wide powers to regulate the media as well as research centers, news agencies, libraries and other institutions which process and disseminate information. While Article 2 reaffirms the principles of "freedom of the press and printing" and freedom of opinion and expression "in the form of speech, writing, photographs or drawing for the purposes of expression and information", other articles of the same law

[85] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[86] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[87] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[88] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.30

undermine these freedoms. For example, article 37 prohibits the publication of a whole range of information, including any information considered harmful to religion or morality, or which may harm national unity, or which shakes confidence in the national currency. Such broadly defined provisions are open to abuse. The fact that virtually all violations of the Press Publications Law are punishable by imprisonment means that the law could be used to detain prisoners of conscience."[89]

- "Amnesty International is not aware of a single case where a prisoner of conscious has been arrested and his detention justified on the basis of the Press and Publications Law or the Anti-Incitement Decree. The various Palestinian security forces arrest and detain most political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, without any apparent reference to local Palestinian law."[90]

- "To avoid the kinds of abuses described above, some Palestinian journalists now admit that they practice self-censorship, either by modifying the manner in which they report a story or not reporting or commenting on certain topics at all. Even if a journalist is prepared to take risks, his or her editor may not be willing to carry the responsibility of authorizing publication of a critical article. This is not just a dilemma for journalists, but also for other activists in civil society as well, some of whom have nevertheless continued to speak out on controversial issues knowing that they may face arrest or other forms of harassment as a result."[91]

2.3. Socio-economic context

This sub-dimension examines the socio- economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society

The socio-cultural context in which civil society exists and functions is:

0	1	2	3
Disabling	*Somewhat disabling*	*Somewhat enabling*	*Enabling*

2.3.1. Socio-economic context	How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Social & economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present:	Social & economic condit ficantly limit the eff civil s five of indicated are present.	Social & economic cond at limit the e of c two nditions indicated are present.	Social & economic conditi t represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None o s indicated is present.
re than 40% of people live on $2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)			

2.3.1. Socio-economic context

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[89] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.
[90] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.
[91] "Palestinian Authority Silencing Dissent." Amnesty International. 5 September 2000.

2.4. Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society.

The socio-cultural context in which civil society exists and functions is:

0	1	2	3
Disabling	*Somewhat disabling*	*Somewhat enabling*	*Enabling*

2.4.1. Trust	How much do members of society trust one another?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	There is widespread mistrust among members of society. (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	There is a moderate level of trust among members of society. (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).

2.4.1. Trust.

WB respondents had a slightly higher level of trust in other members of society, however overall three quarters of the respondents were quite distrustful of one another. (Community Sampling Survey)

2.4.2. Tolerance	How tolerant are members of society?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS-derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).

2.4.2. Tolerance.

Groups Respondents Would Not Want as Neighbors: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Responses

Group	OPT	WB	GS
Of a Different Nationality	26.62%	30.46%	15.00%
Of a Different Religion	39.55%	47.35%	16.00%
Refugees	4.98%	3.31%	10.00%
Peasants	2.49%	1.32%	6.00%
Returnees	8.21%	9.27%	5.00%
Of a Lower Social Class	5.47%	2.98%	13.00%

Almost half of the respondents in the WB did not want people from a different religion to be their neighbors. Whereas only 16% of Gazans indicated that this would be a reason for not wanting someone to be their neighbor. GS respondents were also more tolerant towards people from a different nationality than WB respondents.

GS respondents were more discriminatory towards peasants and refugees and people of a lower social class than WB residents. (Community Sampling Survey)

2.4.3. Public spiritedness[92]	How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS-derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5)	Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5)	Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5)	High level of public spiritedness. (e.g. indicator less than 1.5)

2.4.3. Public spiritedness.

The following responses were given by regional stakeholders when asked whether they thought claiming government benefits that one was not entitled to or cheating on taxes justified:

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[92] The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport, 3. cheating on taxes).

Can claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled be justified:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	Always	Sometimes	Never
OPT	14.91%	10.80%	74.29%
WB	17.81%	9.59%	72.60%
GS	6.19%	14.43%	79.38%

Cheating on Taxes

Can cheating on taxes if you have the chance be justified:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	Always	Sometimes	Never
OPT	12.89%	14.69%	72.42%
WB	15.86%	14.48%	69.66%
GS	4.08%	15.31%	80.61%

According to respondents, cannot justify cheating on taxes or claiming government benefits.

Public Spiritedness Index		
OPT	WB	GS
2.54	2.52	2.62

On a scale of 1 to 3, 1 being always willing to cheat, and 3 being never willing to cheat, respondents received an overall index of 2.54, with Gazans being slightly more honest. (Community Sampling Survey)

- "Around 62 non-governmental organizations, which is around (315) of the sample stated that there are crucial social obstacles before the non-governmental organizations' practices, most importantly the prevailing culture, several traditions that make up the local culture especially

the dominance of familial, tribal and individual values at the expense of civil culture, rule of law and democratic values."[93]

2.5. Legal environment
This sub-dimension examines to what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society

The legal context in which civil society exists and functions is:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Disabling	*Somewhat disabling*	*Somewhat enabling*	*Enabling*

2.5.1. CSO registration	How simple, quick, inexpensive, consistently applied is the procedure of registering CSOs? Are the procedures following the legal provisions?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	The CSO registration is not very supportive Two or three quality characteristics are absent	The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.

2.5.1. CSO registration

Procedures for Registering CSOs: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

According to respondents a large proportion 66% indicated that the CSO registration process was inexpensive, however, only 20% indicated that it was quick, and between 28-35% indicated that it was simple or non-discriminatory or following legal procedure. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

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[93] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.39

CSO Registration Index:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Index	OPT	WB	GS
0	9.93%	8.60%	12.50%
1	31.91%	36.56%	22.92%
2	21.28%	20.43%	22.92%
3	19.15%	16.13%	25.00%
4	9.93%	11.83%	6.25%
5	7.80%	6.45%	10.42%

An index of CSO registration has been calculated by the number of criteria checked by each respondent. An index of five indicates an effective registration process, while a zero indicates that none of the criteria are applied.

Nearly 10% of respondents indicated that none of the criteria are present., 32% of the respondents indicated that only one of the criteria was present, while only 7.8% of respondents indicated that the registration process is effective. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- Art 3 of NGO Law "the competent ministry will set up a department responsible for the registration of the associations and organizations in coordination with the competent ministry."[94]

2.5.2. Allowable advocacy activities	To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy/criticize government?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.

2.5.2. Allowable advocacy activities

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[94] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1

Do Restrictions on CSO Lobbying/Advocacy Exist?
Percentage of OPT Respondents

Sixty percent of respondents in the OPT indicated that there were no restrictions on lobbying and advocacy activities. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ "Research organizations have been shut down only to reappear as strong as ever under new names."[95]

2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs	How favourable is the tax system to CSOs ? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g., grants or donations).	The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions or preferences and/or. Exemptions or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.

2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs

2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy	How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.

2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy

2.5.5 Existence of Laws	Are there laws that protect the work of CSOs? Are there laws that regulate the

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[95] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1

	work of CSOs?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No Laws exist to protect or regulate the work of CSOs	Laws are available however they are not implemented.	Laws are available but are implemented to a limited extent.	Laws effectively protect and regulate the work of CSOs

2.5.5 Existence of Laws

- The Law of Charitable Societies and Civil Commissions was ratified 16 January 2000[96]
- PLC passed the Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations in December 1998
  - Passed amendment in May 1999 transferring responsibility of administration of NGOs to Ministry of Interior[97]
- "Associations or organizations may collect contributions from the public and carry out any social services provided these services are compatible with the developmental priorities of Palestinian society. Foreign organizations that want to establish ties with Palestinian NGOs must apply to the competent ministry, which, in turn, consults with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation regarding the application. It is not possible to confiscate the funds of associations or organizations, or close them, or conduct a search in their main and branch offices without an order issued by the competent judicial part."[98]
- "Civil society organizations such as the Palestinian Center for Human Rights have been quick to criticize the new [NGO] law, yet most of them have learned to work their way around the cumbersome regulations, and many enjoy external financing from Western donors."[99]
- Unions that want to strike must submit to arbitration by Ministry of Labor. Can appeal to tribunal of senior judges appointed by PA[100]

2.5.6 Conformity to Laws	Is there general conformity to the laws?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Very low level of conformity to laws.	Low level of conformity to laws.	Moderate level of conformity to laws.	High level of conformity to laws.

2.5.6 Conformity to Laws

2.5.7 CSO Registration and Monitoring	How easy is it for organizations and CS networks to register? How are they monitored in their work?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CSO registration is not possible.	CSO registration is complicated and only a limited number of CSOs are able to do so.	CSO registration is possible for some CSOs.	CSO registration is clear and straightforward.

2.5.7 CSO Registration and Monitoring

2.5.8 Intellectual Property Rights	Are their laws or mechanisms to protect intellectual property rights in the country?

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[96] "Social Development under Siege; The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Work of the Palestinian Authority." 2001. p.18
[97] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[98] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[99] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.1
[100] "State-Civil Society Relations: Palestine." 2004. p.2

Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
No Laws exist to protect intellectual property.	Laws are available however they are not implemented.	Laws are available but are implemented to a limited extent.	Laws effectively protect intellectual property.

2.5.8 Intellectual Property Rights

2.6. State-civil society relations
This sub- dimension examines to what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society

Relations between State and Civil society are:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Disabling	*Somewhat disabling*	*Somewhat enabling*	*Enabling*

2.6.1. Autonomy	To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
The state controls civil society.	CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.

2.6.1. Autonomy

There is a lack of consensus about the level of state interference in CS activities. Of overall respondents in the OPT 37.2% indicated that the government sometimes unduly interferes in CSO activities. With a large percentage of GS respondents (33%) indicating that the state rarely interferes vs. 22% who think that the interferences is frequent. It is important to note that 20%, (26% WB, 8.22% GS) believe that the state never unduly interferes in CS activities. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Areas of state interference in CS	Frequency	Percentage

General monitoring of CSOs by PA and security forces	25	18.21%
General interference in CSO activities	24	17.92%
NGO law (MoI instead of MoJ)	13	9.70%
CSO registration	13	9.70%
Creation of NGO affairs group	11	8.21%
PA uses Fateh to control orgs	8	5.97%
Censorship of PA. criticism	7	5.22%
No internal monitoring at Ministry of Interior	6	4.48%
Monitoring of CSO internal elections	6	4.48%
Monitoring of CSO Accounts	5	3.73%
Favoritism for PA-related NGOs	4	2.99%
PA tries to control Islamic orgs	4	2.99%
Co-opting of CSOs	3	2.24%
Interference in Human Rights orgs activities	3	2.24%
Anti-Terrorism Certificate	2	1.49%
Total	**134**	

- CSOs were monitored by the PA and by security forces according to 25% of respondents: one charitable organization was asked to send a copy of its annual budget to the intelligence forces. This is illegal since the law states that the responsible institution is the Ministry of Interior. In a second example, security forces obstructed CSO activities by directly requesting financial or administrative files.
- Interference in elections: Security forces interfere in the internal elections of CSOs.
- CSO registration: The PA assigned the ministry of Interior the duty of registering NGOs rather than the ministry of Justice as originally proposed by Civil Society members when the NGO law was first drafted. Certain CSOs were required to obtain approval from additional ministries or public authorities such as the Ministry of Communication before getting registration. For some of the CSOs interviewed the registration process took 2 to 3 years.
- The NGO Forum Group was created by the PA as a monitoring body for Civil society and specifically NGOs.
- Monitoring of CSO accounts: external funding received by certain NGOs was frozen by the PA for several months.

(Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- The Ministry of Non-Governmental Organizations Affairs is housed in the executive branch[101]
- "…local areas of conflict in the PA currently include legitimacy, as some organizations represent themselves as political alternative to the PA; competition, as some organizations overlap with PA organs, including the trade union federation, while others are seen as undermining the role of new ministries; and autonomy, as the PA has moved toward restrictive legislation of independent organizations."[102]
- "Today, the PNA finds itself in the driving seat and one of the problems is that many Palestinians regard the PNA not only as authoritarian in its own rights but also in a sense authoritarian at the biding of the Israeli government and so the PNA has to try to maintain a position which is doubly-authoritarian. In other words, the PNA is authoritarian in its own

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[101] "Palestine in Brief." 2004. p.3
[102] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.15

view of how patronage works, how you don' cross the particular powerful figures of the PNA, at the same time they are authoritarian because they know they've got the Israeli government breathing down their neck and that puts them in many situations in a kind of confrontation with civil society organizations. It is clear that the PA wants to bend the rules. They want o use coercion, torture, imprisonment, various human rights abuses have been associated with them. Even beyond that, the notion of controlling the education system, controlling the medical infrastructure and all these areas where the state begins to crystallize—regardless of people's ambitions within the PA—there is a notion that these should be the state's responsibilities but until now they have been run by CSOs and so the state tries to encroach upon them. One has to deal with a number of levels, one is the natural logic of state creation that wants to gobble up CSOs because many of those service organizations were the kind of services the state should provide. Secondly, you got this desire to extend patronage with the notion of political control by people at the top. Thirdly, you have the notion of being in awareness of the Israeli view behind you as you watch Palestinian civil society emerging—not always in friendly ways, understandably, towards the Israelis or towards those who are seen as doing their biddings."[103]

2.6.2. Dialogue	To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalised are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.

2.6.2. Dialogue

Level of Dialogue between State and CS: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

More than half of respondents indicated that the level of dialogue between state and civil society was limited. A further third believed that it was moderate. There was no difference between the WB and GS, and only 11.7% believed that no dialogue existed.

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[103] "Interview with Charles Tripp." *Civil Society; Democratization in the Middle East.* Vol. 8, Issue 85. January 1999.

2.6.3 Co-operation/ support	How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)? How significant are these resources (e.g. compared to CSOs' other sources of income)?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.

2.6.3 Co-operation/ support

Respondents indicated that around 30% of CSOs receive substantial funding i.e. more than 10% of their overall funding from governmental resources. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ "This group alienation related not only to the Intifada's enforced separation of families and the constraints of limited incomes, but also to the uneasy relationship with the public sector. The popular ethic of voluntary participation, evident in the voluntary groups and committees organized by local residents prior to the Intifada and existing a limited degree during, was being replaced by entrepreneurship and group alienation. That ethic manifested itself not only in voluntary groups, but also in residents' perceptions of political organs. Thus, the decline of voluntary groups was to a large degree indicative of a changing relationship between state/PA and society as much as an Intifada-enforced withdrawal from public life.[104]

2.6.4 State-Civil Society Partnership	Is their partnership between state and CS bodies in programming and activities?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
No partnership exists between state and CS bodies.	Cooperation in programming and activities is very limited.	A moderate number of partnerships exist between state and CS bodies.	Partnerships between CS and state exist in major sectors.

2.6.4 State-Civil Society Partnership

▪ "Those concerned with health care conditions in Palestine view the health sector as one of the best examples of cooperation between the public sector, NGOs, international organizations and donors in managing the crisis, especially as regards coping with the isolation of communities, clinics, hospitals and prevention of access for patients and medical teams."[105]
▪ "The second obstacle is related to the absence of a regulated and institutionalized consulting medium with the Palestinian National Authority and its different ministries…This absence resulted in being unable to formulate a professional framework for development cooperation with the National Authority's ministries and the inability to formulate a clear framework for joint ventures that is expected to advance the general development work and to formulate a joint development outlook. It is important to note here the non-governmental organizations' weak participation in preparing development programs and plans for the Palestinian National Authority as a result of the organizations' weak coordination and consulting mechanisms. The lack of a clear and agreed upon development outlook among the non-governmental sector itself and between the non-governmental sector and the private sector results in obvious negative effects on he national development process and on the outlook and strategies and performance among the Palestinian non-governmental organizations."[106]

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[104] "Community Organizing in the West Bank: Opportunities and Obstacles in Civil Society." 2004. p.38
[105] Jubran, Joan. August, 2005.
[106] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.41

2.6.5 Participation in Decision-making	How does the state include CS in decision-making processes?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
State does not involve CS in decision making.	State involves CS in decision making to a limited extent.	State involves CS in decision making to a moderate extent.	State systematically involves CS in decision making processes.

2.6.5 Participation in Decision-making

2.7. Private sector-civil society relations
This sub-dimension examines the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector.

Relations between State and Civil society are:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Generally hostile	*Generally indifferent*	*Generally positive*	*Generally supportive*

2.7.1. Private sector attitude	What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Generally hostile	Generally indifferent	Generally positive	Generally supportive

2.7.1. Private sector attitude

Private Sector Attitude	**OPT**	**WB**	**GS**
Hostile	4.19%	4.20%	4.17%
Suspicious	60.93%	62.24%	58.33%
Indifferent	19.07%	20.28%	16.67%
Favorable	9.77%	9.09%	11.11%
Supportive	6.05%	4.20%	9.72%

Only 6 percent of respondents in the OPT indicated that the private sector had a supportive attitude towards civil society. In fact 61% of all respondents indicated that the Private sector is suspicious of civil society. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ "…there is not yet any form of institutionalized and organized relationship between the non-governmental sector and the private sector, also between the non-governmental sector…"[107]

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility	How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.

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[107] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility	OPT		GS
Insignificant	43.19%	49.30%	30.99%
Limited	31.46%	27.46%	39.44%
Moderate	23.00%	19.72%	29.58%
Significant	0.94%	1.41%	0.00%
Do Not Know	1.41%	2.11%	0.00%

Less than 1% of OPT respondents believe that the private sector has any social responsibility. While most respondents (43%) believe that the level of corporate social responsibility is insignificant. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ "The private sector stressed its support to the Palestinian reform process, and emphasized the importance of implementing the pillars of good governance as a basis for a competitive environment which is capable of attracting investment. Very high priority was given to the issue of separation of powers, and reforming the judiciary system and enhancing its capacities to safeguard the rule of law. The private sector also stressed the need for the government to develop the legal and regulatory framework, necessary to promoting and attracting investment. The Government was urged to speed up the privatization process and to offer preferential treatment to Palestinian products in public procurement policies."[108]
▪ "…the private sector has participated in the discussions on economic legislation. For example, prior to adopting the Labor Law there were public hearings and we witnessed significant lobbying activity on behalf of the interest groups within the private sector." (Dr. Azmi Shuaibi)[109]

2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy	How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.

2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy

Private sector participation in CS	OPT	WB	GS
Never	31.16%	35.66%	22.22%
Rarely	27.91%	25.87%	31.94%
Sometimes	22.79%	23.08%	22.22%
Frequently	3.72%	4.20%	2.78%
Do Not Know	14.42%	11.19%	20.83%

Similarly only 3.7% of all respondents believe that the private sector frequently participates and/or contributes to civil society initiatives. With the larger group of respondents indicating that they either never or rarely provide support to CSOs.

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[108] El-Khairy, Rania. January 2004.
[109] Awad, Sameer. January 2004.

This contradicts with results from another question regarding substantial sources of funding, in which respondents indicated that 38% of CSO receive more than 10% of their overall funding from corporate sources. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

VALUES

3.1. Democracy

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote democracy.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes democracy is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characte nepotism	more than 50%) do not democracy (e.g. members have little/no making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	more than 50%) practice members have significant control over decision- selected through democratic elections).	more than 75%) practice y (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs

Method of Selecting Leaders	OPT	WB	
Self-Selection	6.60%	7.80%	4.23%
Appointment	22.17%	19.15%	28.17%
Election by Members	69.34%	71.63%	64.79%
Other	1.89%	1.42%	2.82%
Don't Know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

A large percentage of respondents indicated that CSOs select their leaders through democratic elections by members (69%).(Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Membership based	OPT	WB	GS
Yes	94.37%	95.77%	92.04%
No	5.63%	4.23%	7.96%
Do Not Know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Nearly 95% of all responses in the OPT indicated that their organizations' were membership based. There is very little difference between the GS and WB. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- "…there are not yet any transparent democratic Palestinian civil organizations that represent citizen's interests before the Authority/State, and the tribal, familial, and patrimonial infrastructures remain as intermediary institutions between individuals and the state, which truly prevent the establishment of a democratic civil society."[110]
- 25.5% of respondents indicated administrative obstacles. "Obstacles include several issues and matters such as; weakness in good governance principles especially the absence of a clear and agreed upon vision within the organization, the absence of a clear and agreed upon vision within the organization, the absence of clear administrative and financial regulations, the absence of a clear organizational and administrative structure for decision making process, the weak relationship between the governing recourses (general assemblies, board of trustees and board of directors) and the executive administration, and finally the absence of clear and transparent working rules and regulations."[111]
- Weak human resources, particularly in administration, monitoring and evaluation, managing and financial issues leads to problems in democratic practices and accountability in some NGOs[112]

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy	How much does CS actively promote democracy at a societal level?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Only a few CS activities in Their visibility is low and these iss t attributed much importance by CS as a w	A number of CS activities based support and / or publ of such initiatives, however, are	CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this are d-based support and / or strong public

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy

[110] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.40
[111] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.40
[112] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.40

A vast majority of respondents stated that there were one or two examples of campaigns, actions or programs undertaken by Civil society to promote democracy in the past year.
An additional twenty percent indicated that there were many examples of these actions during the past year. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Activity	Frequency	Percentage
Demonstrations	55	27.36%
Campaigns	47	23.38%
Workshops	27	13.43%
Lobbying	15	7.46%
Meetings	14	6.97%
Committees	10	4.98%
Civic Education	9	4.48%
Sit-in	9	4.48%
Other	15	7.46%
Total	**201**	**100.00%**

Of the 216 stakeholders interviewed, there were 201 examples of Civil Society actions to promote democracy. The main activities included demonstrations, campaigns, workshops and lobbying. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Issue Area	Frequency	Percentage
Separation Wall	59	39.07%
Democracy	18	11.92%
Occupation	12	7.95%
Elections	10	6.62%
Prisoners	8	5.30%
Women's Election Quota	6	3.97%
Other	38	25.17%
Total	151	100.00%

Respondents identified 32 different issues that Civil Society has taken a position on, and promoted through various types of activities. The most important of those was the separation (apartheid) wall being built by the Israeli government. The actions undertaken by Civil Society were mainly demonstrations and lobbying activities to stop, to dismantle and/or change the route of the wall being built to minimize the destruction and confiscation of lands. A large number of workshops and lectures were held to educate women, youth and general public on democracy and human rights issues. Around 4% of responses indicated women's quota in elections as one of the main civil society initiatives around which many lobbying and awareness activities were undertaken. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS role in promoting democracy	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	19.34%	18.57%	20.83%
Limited	19.34%	21.43%	15.28%
Moderate	47.64%	47.86%	47.22%
Significant	13.68%	12.14%	16.67%
Do Not Know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Twenty percent of the respondents with little variance between WB and GS, indicated that Civil Society's role in promoting democracy has been insignificant. While almost half of the respondents considered CSOs role to be moderate. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- PNGO & other NGOs drafted a memorandum of principles proposing amendments to the 1995 Palestinian election law dealing with the threshold percentage, women and elections as well as the structure and integrity of elections.[113]
- Democracy and Workers Rights Center "used an emergency job creation scheme to organize workers in Gaza and encourage democracy on the shop floor. This has gone some way towards breaking the grip of the two main labor federations, which are both controlled by the political apparatus of Yasser Arafat."[114]
- "Since the earliest days of the Palestinian Authority, a varied group of Palestinians has sought to lay the practical foundation for Palestinian statehood through the construction of strong institutions with clear (and generally liberal) legal bases. These efforts have been sometimes frustrated by the patterns of governance favored by the Palestinian leadership and by the restrictions and priorities imposed by the process of negotiating a settlement with Israel. Out of this struggle a diverse coalition of Palestinian reformers has arisen. Some of the reformers are members of the elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and have sought to use their positions to build a solid legal basis for institutions such as the Palestinian judiciary and civil service. A second group of reformers consists of prominent NGO leaders, who have both cooperated and competed in proposing various reforms. A third group is made up of intellectuals, especially those associated with universities, who have developed many of their own proposals. A fourth group consists of political party activists who have provided some support for reform, though it has often been tangential to their main agendas."[115] 7 areas of reform have arisen:
  - o Constitution writing
  - o Defining the relationship between the PLO and the PNA
  - o Public finances
  - o Rule of Law and Judicial Reform
  - o Corruption
  - o The structure and practices of the security services
  - o Elections and local governance
- "Reformers have not been without impact. They have often been dominant in discussions among intellectuals, and they have exerted real influence on the formal legal framework of the Palestinian Authority. But they have had far less success in translating these achievements into actual reforms in Palestinian governance. In general, the accomplishments of the reformers have been real but limited but the patterns that have governed the Palestinian Authority since the beginning: the leadership is pliant, attempting to please all parties at once most procedures are ad hoc and unclear; those rules that are clear are still bent and even broken; and chains of command and responsibility are obscure. PA reform has often foundered precisely because of the problems reformers have sough to overcome: the weak institutionalization and legal ambiguities that afflict all PA operations."[116]

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[113] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004.
[114] "Palestinian Territories: Palestinian Civil Society." *Advocacy Net News Bulletin*. No. 3, April 2003.
[115] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.5
[116] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.7

- In 2002, 3 issues that reformers had been pushing for (law on the judiciary, reform of cabinet and signing of basic law) occurred, however, the advances in each of these were limited as they were not evenly implemented or followed[117]
- "Intellectuals, especially those associated with universities, were a third group of reformers. Birzeit University's Institute of Law, for instance, produced its own draft constitution, developed training programs for judges, and worked on compiling and disseminating collections of Palestinian law."[118]
- A strategy taken by NGO is "Influencing all legislation, laws, systems, procedures and general policies of the decision makers in general and the Palestinian National Authority and it political and professional apparatuses in particular."[119]

3.2. Transparency

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote transparency.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes transparency is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society	How widespread is corruption within CS?		
Score 0		**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Instance behaviou very freq	Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.

3.2.1. Corruption within civil society.

More than half of stakeholder respondents indicated that instances of corruption within Civil society were either frequent or very frequent. Wheras only 18% of the respondents indicated that instances of corruption were rare. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

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[117] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.9
[118] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.17
[119] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.47

- "Palestinian civil society has been badly compromised by news that one of the largest and most prominent NGOs, named LAW, has misused an estimated 40% of the $10 million dollars it has received from Western aid sources."[120]
- "…there were no actual institutionalizing operations for Palestinian non-governmental organizations, and a comprehensive development of the good governance principles did not take place and the effective management of programs and projects, all that negatively affected the social and development performance of these organizations."[121]

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs	How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A small y of CSOs (less tha ke their financial accounts publicly available.	A minority of CSOs (30% to 50%) make their financial available.	A s majo Os (5 to 65% eir financial accounts	A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly

3.2.2. Financial transparency of the CSOs.

CSO's financial accounts publicly available	OPT		GS
Yes	74.83%	77.25%	70.64%
No	22.48%	20.11%	26.61%
Do Not Know	2.68%	2.65%	2.75%

Three quarters of CSOs made their accounts public. There were no differences between the responses in the WB and GS. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency	How much does CS actively promote government and corporate transparency?		
Score 0	**Score 1**		**Score 3**
No activ o CS activity o nce in this area can be detected.	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public initiatives, however, are lacking.	demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy strong public visibility.

3.2.3. Civil Society actions to promote transparency.
- "In some ways, PA reformers made tremendous progress in fiscal affairs, but in other ways their efforts seemed futile. A more optimistic reading would focus on the policies that the

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[120] "Palestinian Territories: Palestinian Civil Society." April 2003.
[121] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38

Palestinian Authority put in place. An annual budget was prepared and published. A clear legal procedure was developed for presenting and approving this budget, and critics hammered away at PA fiscal practices, obtaining a series of concessions. In that sense, a clear institutional and legal basis was laid for making finances dependent less on personalities and ad hoc decisions and more on well-established institutions and procedures. As an example of what they had learned, reformers were able to build fairly detailed fiscal provisions into the draft constitution for statehood. Yet the main problem came in implementing the procedures that reformers had won."[122]

Government Transparency

Examples of CS actions to promote Gov. Transparency	OPT	WB	GS
None	37.56%	38.35%	36.11%
1-2 examples	29.76%	24.81%	38.89%
Several examples	2.93%	3.76%	1.39%
Many examples	1.95%	0.75%	4.17%
Do Not Know	27.80%	32.33%	19.44%

Of all respondents 38% indicated that they could think of no examples of actions, campaigns or programs to promote Government transparency in the past year. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Activity	Freq	Percentage
Workshop	11	21.15%
Demonstration	8	15.38%
Conference	7	13.46%
Other	26	50.00%
Total	52	100.00%

	Frequency	Percentage
NGOs	30	58.82%
CSOs	6	11.76%
PNGO	5	9.80%
Ngos and Gos	3	5.88%
Other	7	13.73%
Total	51	100.00%

In total there were 52 examples of Civil society actions to promote transparency and were mainly workshops, demonstrations and conferences, that were undertaken by CSOs, or joint NGO and governmental committees. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Issue	Frequency	Percentage
Transparency	22	47.83%
Corruption	9	19.57%
Rule of Law	5	10.87%
Economic	3	6.52%
Other	7	15.22%
Total	46	100.00%

The main issues tackled was Government transparency and accountability, corruption within government institutions, reform issues, and economic concerns such as price hikes, and fees. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

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[122] Brown, Nathan J. 2002. p.27

Civil Society's role	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	49.77%	48.94%	51.39%
Limited	19.25%	21.99%	13.89%
Moderate	18.78%	14.89%	26.39%
Significant	2.35%	2.13%	2.78%
Do Not Know	9.86%	12.06%	5.56%

Half of the respondents indicated that Civil Society's role is insignificant in promoting Government transparency (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Corporate transparency

Examples of CS actions to promote Corporate Transparency	OPT	WB	GS
None	72.43%	73.24%	70.83%
1-2 examples	1.87%	1.41%	2.78%
Several examples	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Many examples	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Do Not Know	25.70%	25.35%	26.39%

Not a single respondent could think of more than one or two examples of CSO activities, programs, or campaigns directed at promoting corporate transparency.

There were only three examples of civil society actions to promote corporate transparency, one of which was the use of Palestinian cement in the construction of the Separation (Apartheid) Wall. A media campaign was launched to raise awareness about the involvement of Palestinian cement companies. The second example was a coalition that was formed between CSO organizations, unions, and local communities to put pressure on the Electricity company to provide better services. The third was a campaign launched to protest corporate monopolies on household gas. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Civil Society's role	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	69.48%	70.21%	68.06%
Limited	9.86%	9.22%	11.11%
Moderate	0.94%	0.71%	1.39%
Significant	0.47%	0.00%	1.39%
Do Not Know	19.25%	19.86%	18.06%

Therefore 70% of the respondents consider Civil Society's role in promoting corporate transparency insignificant. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.3. Tolerance
This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote tolerance.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes tolerance is:

	0	1	2	3
	Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena	To what extent is CS a tolerant arena?			
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**	
CS i intol rant forces. The (narro toler	tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	na viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	

3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena

Examples of racism, desrcimination or intolerance within CS.	OPT	WB	GS
None	46.41%	47.45%	44.44%
1-2 examples	32.54%	34.31%	29.17%
Several examples	1.91%	2.92%	0.00%
Many examples	3.35%	2.19%	5.56%
Do Not Know	15.79%	13.14%	20.83%

The majority of respondents could not think of an example of racism, discrimination or intolerance. A third were able to provide one or two examples of such attitudes.
This shows a strong consensus that these attitudes do not dominate Palesitnian Civil Society. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Examples of Racist of Intolerant organizations	OPT
Politically Affiliated NGOs	32.71%
Religious org.	21.50%
Political parties	14.02%
Religious political parties	8.41%
Family org.	6.54%
CSOs	3.74%
Org. run by security forces	2.80%
Other	10.28%
Grand Total	100.00%

According to respondents political parties both religious and secular were the most discriminatory against non members. NGOs with political affiliations were also considered to be discriminatory specially in terms of employing and benefiting those who were non party members. In total there were 107 examples of intolerant civil society organizations. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance	How much does CS actively promote tolerance at a societal level?			
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**	

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	O this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and th at im s a w	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	CS is a driving force in pro act bas pub

3.3.2. CS actions to promote tolerance

CS role in promoting tolerance	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	25.70%	27.46%	22.22%
Limited	20.09%	22.54%	15.28%
Moderate	36.92%	33.80%	43.06%
Significant	15.42%	14.79%	16.67%
Do Not Know	1.87%	1.41%	2.78%

Only 15% of respondents indicated that Civil Society plays a significant role in promoting tolerance. A third of the respondents thought that CS role was moderate while the remainder of respondents thought it was either limited or insignificant**.** (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.4. Non-violence
This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote non-violence.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes non-violence is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.4.1 Non-violence within the CS arena	How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among CS actors to express their interests in the public sphere?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	
Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Some isolated groups within CS regularly use interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Some isolated groups within CS occasionally but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	There is a high level of consensus within CS non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly

3.4.1 Non-violence within the CS arena

CSOs that might resort to violence	OPT	WB	GS
Significant mass-based groups	8.04%	4.72%	13.89%
Isolated groups regularly using violence	7.04%	5.51%	9.72%
Isolated groups occasionally resorting to violence	23.12%	16.54%	34.72%
Use of violence by CS groups is extremely rare	34.67%	39.37%	26.39%
Do Not Know	27.14%	33.86%	15.28%

Around a third of respondents indicated that violence is rarely used by CS groups. However, respondents indicated that isolated groups occasionally (23%) and regularly (7%) resort to

violence. While only 8% indicated that mass based groups might resort to violence. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Exam l Society using violence	Numbe	Percent
Political Parties	13	20.97%
Hamas	11	17.74%
Familial groups	8	12.90%
Fatah	7	11.29%
Between NGOs	4	6.45%
Militarized Factions	4	6.45%
Unaffiliated groups	3	4.84%
Students	3	4.84%
Other	9	14.52%
Total	62	100%

Respondents gave examples of political parties using violence and in particular Hamas, which ranged from armed conflict, random violence to murder. Around 13% of responses indicated that family groups were also implicated in violent activities mainly murder. Examples of Fatah's involvement in violent activities made up 11.3% of the responses. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS publicly denounces violent acts[123]	OPT	WB	GS
Never	2.00%	2.22%	1.67%
Rarely	7.33%	3.33%	13.33%
Usually	23.33%	32.22%	10.00%
Always	59.33%	54.44%	66.67%
Do Not Know	8.00%	7.78%	8.33%

Sixty percent of respondents indicated that CS actors always denounce violent acts. And only 2% said that they never denounce these acts. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence	How much does CS actively promote a non-violent society?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence and social justice, social welfare, and security

CS actions to promote Peace Initiatives	OPT	WB	GS
None	41.04%	37.14%	48.61%
1-2 examples	25.47%	29.29%	18.06%

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[123] There were 66 missing values (33% of total)

Several examples	0.94%	1.43%	0.00%
Many examples	1.89%	1.43%	2.78%
Do Not Know	30.66%	30.71%	30.56%

A quarter of respondents said that they could think of examples of CS actions, campaigns, and programs to promote peace, while 30% could not answer this question.
The reason being that in the current political situation Peace or non violence has certain connotations that might not be always positive, therefore it can not be discussed without taking that into account. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CSO role in promoting Peace Initiatives	Number	Percent
Peace Coalition	19	31.15%
NGOs	15	24.59%
Sari Nussebeh Peace Initiative	5	8.20%
International Solidarity	4	6.56%
PNGO	3	4.92%
Other	15	24.59%
Total	61	100%

The main peace building activities reported by respondents were drafting peace agreements, Campaigns and organizing meeting and lectures. The three main CS actors were the Peace coalition responsible for drafting the Geneva Agreement and promoting it, the Peace initiative, which is a document prepared by Sari Nusseibeh and Avi Ayalon, and NGOs responsible for educating and raising awareness on issues of peace.
During the second Intifadah Palestinian called for the UN to send international observers to the WB and GS. The UN refused to take any action so Palestinian Civil Society organized grassroots campaigns made up of international activists to raise international awareness and take part in specific on the ground interventions such as protection of civilians, occupation monitoring and lobbying and advocacy. PNGO the Palestinian NGO Network had a major role in organizing some of these grassroots campaigns by coordinating with their European Civil Society partners. A platform was created in Europe to maintain these campaigns called the GIPP (Grassroots International for the Protection of the Palestinian People) (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS role g non violence at the socie	OPT	WB	
Insignificant	20.00%	18.88%	22.22%
Limited	19.07%	23.08%	11.11%
Moderate	40.47%	40.56%	40.28%
Significant	18.14%	15.38%	23.61%
Do Not Know	2.33%	2.10%	2.78%

There is a lack of consensus on the role of civil society in promoting non violence at the societal level, with a fifth of the responses indicating that their role was insignificant, limited or significant. A small majority of 40.5% thought that their role was moderate. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.5. Gender equity

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote gender equity.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes gender equity is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena	To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**e 3**
Women cluded from civil society leadership roles.	Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Women are under-represented i il society leade positions.	en are equitably sented as leaders and bers of CS. .

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena

Representation of women in CSO membership	**OPT**	**WB**	**GS**
Absent/Excluded	4.17%	5.59%	1.37%
Severly Under-represented	2.31%	3.50%	0.00%
Somewhat Under-represented	73.61%	73.43%	73.97%
Equitably Represented	19.44%	17.48%	23.29%
Don't know	0.46%	0.00%	1.37%

A majority of respondents, three quarters, thought that women were somewhat under represented in CSO membership. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Representation of women in CSO Leadership positions	**OPT**	**WB**	**GS**
Absent/Excluded	8.02%	9.35%	5.48%
Severly Under-represented	5.66%	7.91%	1.37%
Somewhat Under-represented	71.70%	69.06%	76.71%
Equitably Represented	13.68%	12.95%	15.07%
Don't know	0.94%	0.72%	1.37%

A simlar percentage of respondents thought that women were also somewhat underrepresented at the CSO leadership level. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

▪ In 1998, 8% of union members were women; 26% of college/university student councils[124]

CSO forces that are explicitly sexist	**O**	**WB**	**G**
Significant	10.05%	10.95%	8.33%
Limited	28.71%	27.74%	30.56%
Extremely Limited	48.33%	46.72%	51.39%

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[124] Aghabekian, Vasen RN., PhD. June 1999.

Do Not Know	12.92%	14.60%	9.72%

Only 10% of respondents said that there were significant CSO forces that were explicitly sexist and or discriminatory against women. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Actor	Frequency	Percentage
Religious Org.	19	33.33%
Local Councils	9	15.79%
Political Parties	6	10.53%
Religious political parties	4	7.02%
CSOs	4	7.02%
Private sector	3	5.26%
Community	3	5.26%
Other	9	15.79%
Total	**57**	100.00%

When respondents were asked to provide examples, they indicated that religious organizations were among the most sexist of CSOs, followed by local councils and political parties. The main areas of unfair treatment were:

Issue	Frequency	Percentage
Employment	4	21.05%
No representation or leadership positions	4	21.05%
No focus on women's rights	2	10.53%
Violence against women	2	10.53%
Other	7	36.84%
Total	**19**	100.00%

CSO denounces sexist actions by other CSO actors	OPT	WB	GS
Never	8.96%	2.84%	21.13%
Rarely	18.87%	18.44%	19.72%
Usually	30.19%	34.04%	22.54%
Always	28.30%	26.24%	32.39%
Do Not Know	13.68%	18.44%	4.23%

There was no consensus regarding CSOs role in denouncing sexist or unfair treatment of women by other CSO actors. Almost 20% indicated that CSOs rarely interfere in such situations. An equal percentage of GS respondents throught that CSOs never interfere. While 60% of respondents thought that they usually or always denounce these actions. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs	How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**

A small minority (less than 20%).	A minority (20%-50%)	A small majority (51% - 65%)	A large majority (more than 65%)

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs

CSO Policies to ensure gender equity	OPT	WB	GS
Yes	68.38%	59.44%	85.87%
No	29.78%	39.44%	10.87%
Do Not Know	1.84%	1.11%	3.26%

Of the total respondents 68% indicated that CSOs have policies in place to ensure gender equity. It is worth noting that the presence of policies however, does not ensure implementation of gender equity in CSOs. The figure is higher than what might be expected specially when compared to the responses on women's membership and leadership in CSOs. This may be a result of misinterpretation of the question in terms of actual written policies vs. ad hoc practices. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity	How much does CS actively promote gender equity at the societal level?		
Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this support and / or strong public visibility.

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity

Examples of CS actions to promote gender equity	OPT	WB	GS
None	23.92%	17.52%	36.11%
1-2 examples	42.58%	44.53%	38.89%
Several examples	2.87%	3.65%	1.39%
Many examples	6.22%	5.11%	8.33%
Do Not Know	24.40%	29.20%	15.28%

Sixty five percent of respondents could think of zero to two examples at most of CS actions to promote gender equity. A quarter of the respondents said that they did not know. Thus less than ten percent stated that they knew of several or many examples. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CSO Actor	Frequency	Percent
Women's Org	48	60.76%
NGO	26	32.91%
Other	5	6.33%
Total	79	100.00%

The main actors to promoting gender equity were women organizations and NGOs while the rest of CSO actors amounted to 6% of the examples. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Activity	Frequency	Percent
Workshop	23	27.71%
Campaign	17	20.48%
General Activities	16	19.28%
Lobbying	10	12.05%
Meeting/Lecture	8	9.64%
Demonstration	6	7.23%
Other	3	3.61%
Total	**83**	100.00%

Promoting gender equity has been through conducting workshops and organizing campaigns which amounted to 48% of all activities, which are generally directed at women. Lobbying and active involvement in policy setting and legal reform accounts for only 12% of activities. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Issue Area	Frequency	Percent
Gender/Social Role	27	33.75%
Election Quota	14	17.50%
Women's participation	11	13.75%
Women's Day	7	8.75%
Violence against women	6	7.50%
Equality	3	3.75%
Laws	3	3.75%
Early marriage	3	3.75%
Other	6	7.50%
Total	**80**	100.00%

Most of the examples provided by respondents on actions promoting gender equity were gender and social role workshops directed at women. The only issue pursued by women organizations and NGOs, through lobbying and advocacy activities, was women's quota in municipality and legislative council elections. Many campaigns and awareness activities were directed at women to increase their participation in elections both as candidates and voters. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS role in promoting gender equality at the societal level	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	28.17%	20.57%	43.06%
Limited	17.37%	19.15%	13.89%
Moderate	31.92%	35.46%	25.00%
Significant	15.49%	17.73%	11.11%
Do Not Know	7.04%	7.09%	6.94%

There is a lack of consensus among respondents on the role of Civil Society in promoting in gender equality

at the societal level. An equal proportion of respondents think that their role is either insignificant or moderate. A large proportion, (43%) of GS respondents, believe that their role is insignificant. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- PNGO & other NGOs drafted a memorandum of principles proposing amendments to the 1995 Palestinian election law dealing with the threshold percentage, **women** and elections as well as the structure and integrity of elections.[125]
- "Historically, the charitable nature of Palestinian women's organizations distanced them from embarking on any sort of challenge of gender-bias. Their role was seen within the same traditional social welfare charitable nature. Through the years, women's organizations viewed their struggle as part of the national aspiration towards independence and that social equality was intertwined with political independence. Only in the later 80's and more so in the post Oslo period did Palestinian women organizations perceive the utmost necessity for a social agenda parallel and of equal importance to the political agenda."[126]
- "Examples of effort in this area include the wok of the women's technical committees and other women groups such as the union of working women committees and the women committees for social work and others in lobbying and pressuring legislative council members for laws affecting women. Also, the Palestinian model parliament was a step towards lobbying and consciousness awareness of women rights and a way of effecting the policy making machinery. Women groups have also been working on increasing women's representation in different local councils and municipalities. Their work was guided by the need to not only increase the number of women in politics but also to toster [sic] their quality participation and its effectiveness. Topics such as quotas and electoral systems have been areas Palestinian women's groups have been working on."[127]
- "The creation of women coalitions to effect policies and strategies during this vulnerable political social and economic development and state reconstruction period. A good model is the Palestinian coalition for women's health. Established in 1995 as a professional platform consisting of women practitioners working in the field of women's health, it plays an important role in promoting women's health (from conception to death) through campaigns, research, training, information exchanges, and advocacy for policy formulation on women's health. Thus, it plays a very important role in the struggle for sustainable and equitable human development."[128]

3.6. Poverty eradication
This sub-dimension examines to what extent the civil society promotes poverty eradication.

The extent to which civil society promotes poverty eradication is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty	To what extent does CS actively seek to eradicate poverty?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**

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[125] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004.
[126] Aghabekian, Vasen RN., PhD. June 1999.
[127] Aghabekian, Vasen RN., PhD. June 1999.
[128] Aghabekian, Vasen RN., PhD. June 1999.

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are	n the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty

Examples of CS actions to eradicate poverty	OPT	WB	GS
None	25.12%	25.19%	25.00%
1-2 examples	48.79%	48.89%	48.61%
Several examples	1.45%	1.48%	1.39%
Many examples	6.28%	2.22%	13.89%
Do Not Know	18.36%	22.22%	11.11%

Around half of the respondents could think of one to two examples of CS involvement in poverty eradication. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Organization (Who)	Frequency	Percentage
PPAP	34	24.46%
NGOs	34	24.46%
CSOs	26	18.71%
UNRWA	8	5.76%
UNDP	8	5.76%
Religious Org.	8	5.76%
Labor Unions	8	5.76%
Women's orgs	7	5.04%
Other	6	4.32%
Total	139	

UNDP undertook a Poverty Assessment process in all regions of the WB and GS. During regional meetings Poverty eradication committees were formed in each governorate that included various CS actors, and governmental organizations and ministries. The result of the program had been a Report on needs assessment of poverty and priority setting. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations) During the second intifadah and the tight closure imposed on the WB and GS, UNDP initiated a work for food program in collaboration with local councils, ngos, and ministries. Unemployed workers who were unable to reach their former workplaces inside Israel were given daily jobs in return for food aid.

From 2001 through 2003 various areas in the WB were under continuous closure and/or curfews during which food and financial aid was distributed to residents mainly in urban and refugee camps. Food packages were mainly distributed by international aid organizations. Religious organizations such Al Zakat provided financial support to poor families.

Activity	Frequency	Percentage
General activities	21	15.56%
Work for food	15	11.11%
Employment-generation	13	9.63%
Workshops	10	7.41%
Food Aid	9	6.67%
Priority setting	9	6.67%
In-kind support	8	5.93%
Poverty Eradication day	7	5.19%
Research	6	4.44%
Meetings/lectures	5	3.70%
Campaigning on unemployment	5	3.70%
Demonstrations	5	3.70%
Financial aid (students)	4	2.96%
Fundraising	4	2.96%
Emergency activities	3	2.22%
Other	11	8.15%
Total	**135**	100.00%

Only ten percent of poverty eradication activities cited by respondents were employment generation projects undertaken by UNDP or Palestinian NGOs such as PARC, Faten and others. The respondents did not mention certain large poverty eradication programs such as those undertaken by UNRWA and Welfare Association. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS role in poverty eradication	OPT	WB	GS
Insignificant	44.19%	42.96%	46.58%
Limited	23.72%	26.76%	17.81%
Moderate	21.86%	22.54%	20.55%
Significant	7.91%	6.34%	10.96%
Do Not Know	2.33%	1.41%	4.11%

Most respondents 45% said that they thought CS role in poverty eradication was insignificant, with no differences between the WB and GS. With less than ten percent saying that they thought CS role was significant. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

This is due to a structural problem causing poverty rather than a transitional situation. Unemployment figures in the WB and GS have been over 60% since Israel imposed its closure of the OPT. The political and violent situation during the past three years have prevented any establishment of real solutions to the employment problem. Invasions, bombing, closures and curfews created a situation of instability that prevented any real planning for economic development in the OPT. The high risk and danger associated with doing business has also prevented investors both local and expatriates from starting new enterprises since the second intifadah started in 2000.

3.7. Environmental sustainability
This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote environmental sustainability.

The extent to which civil society practices and promotes environmental sustainability is:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment	How much does CS actively seek to sustain the environment?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Only a few CS activities in this area can be visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	rce in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment

Examples of CS actions to promote the environment	OPT	WB	GS
None	44.39%	49.65%	34.25%
1-2 examples	30.84%	26.95%	38.36%
Several examples	2.80%	3.55%	1.37%
Many examples	3.27%	0.71%	8.22%
Do Not Know	18.69%	19.15%	17.81%

Less than six percent of respondents said that they could think of several or many examples of CS actions, campaigns or programs during the last year to protect the environment.

Actor	Frequency	Percentage
NGOs	48	52.17%
CSOs	15	16.30%
Municipality	8	8.70%
UNDP	4	4.35%
PENGON	3	3.26%
CHF	3	3.26%
WEDO	3	3.26%
Other	8	8.70%
Total	**92**	100.00%

Most activities to protect the environment were implemented by NGOs. These were mainly awareness campaigns and cleaning days. Youth were the main target of these activities. Beautification of cities and villages were also among the most common examples. These activities were undertaken by municipalities, local councils, youth groups, and local committees. There were some activities such as demonstrations and lobbying activities to protest Israeli pollution of the Palestinian environment either from illegal factories on settlements in the WB and GS that were getting rid of its chemical waste in nearby Palestinian agricultural lands, or from waste and sewage water produced by the settlements themselves. Landfill dumps were also created for waste from inside Israel very close to Palestinian urban centres without prior approval from the Palestinians.

Issue	Frequency	Percentage
Environmental Protection	36	40.91%
Quality of life	8	9.09%
Clean Water/ Conservation/ Reuse/ well rehabilitation	7	7.95%
Promoting Agriculture/ Trees	6	6.82%
Polution/Waste from Israeli factories, settlements and inside Israel	6	6.82%
Environment Day	5	5.68%
Polution	4	4.55%
Other	16	18.18%
Total	**88**	**100.00%**

Although the bulk of activities to protect the environment revolve around awareness, education and one time cleaning days, 8% and 7% of the respondents mentioned respectively water related projects, and planting trees/ promoting agriculture as two examples of NGOs involvement in the environment. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

CS role environm	OPT	WB	
Insignificant	59.53%	64.08%	50.68%
Limited	18.60%	19.72%	16.44%
Moderate	15.81%	13.38%	20.55%
Significant	2.33%	0.70%	5.48%
Do Not Know	3.72%	2.11%	6.85%

Most respondents around 60% in the OPT thought that CS role in protecting the environment was insignificant.

3.8 Social Justice
This sub-dimension examines to what extent the civil society promotes social justice within the society.

The extent to which civil society promotes social justice:

0	1	2	3
Very low	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

3.8.1 Discrimination	To what extent does CS work to combat discrimination (on the basis of sex, religion, disability, political affiliation, geographical origin, tribal/family, refugee...etc.)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
activity of any consequence in this ar Some CS actions serve to reinforce discrimination.	Only a few CS activities detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	A number of CS activities detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	CS is a driving force in activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

3.8.1 Discrimination

3.8.2 Social Justice/ Welfare	To what extent does CS work to promote social welfare?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. S	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance as a whole.	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	promoting social justice and welfare. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

3.8.2 Social Welfare

3.8.3 Quality of Life	To what extent does CS work to promote quality of life issues?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reduce quality of life.	nly a few CS activities in this area can be visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	A number of activitie in this area can be support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	promoting a better quality of enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

3.8.3 Quality of Life

IMPACT

4.1. Influencing public policy
This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy.

The extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Insignificant	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

4.1.1. – 4.1.2. Human Rights & Social Policy Impact Case Studies	How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.1.1. – 4.1.2. Human Rights & Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Level of CS Activity in Influencing Social Public Policy: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Inactive	Somewhat Active	Active	Very Active	Don't Know
OPT	9.26%	48.61%	31.02%	8.80%	2.31%
	9.79%	48.95%	29.37%	9.09%	2.80%
GS	8.22%	47.95%	34.25%	8.22%	1.37%

There is a pretty large consensus on the level of CS activity regarding Social issues, if "somewhat active" and active criteria are grouped together then the total is 80% of all respondents. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

	No Effect	Limited Effect	Moderate Effect	Important Effects	Don't Know
	13.15%	46.48%	24.88%	11.74%	3.76%
	16.20%	45.07%	26.06%	9.15%	3.52%
GS	7.04%	49.30%	22.54%	16.90%	4.23%

Of the total respondents more than 60% indicated that the level of CS success was limited to moderate. These responses are inline with the previous question regarding the level of activity of CS actors in social issues. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Environmental Policy

Level of CS Activity in Influencing Environmental Public Policy: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Inactive	Somewhat Active	Active	Very Active	Don't Know
OPT	38.43%	42.13%	12.50%	2.78%	4.17%
WB	43.36%	41.96%	6.99%	4.20%	3.50%
GS	28.77%	42.47%	23.29%	0.00%	5.48%

Only 12.5% of respondents said that Civil Society actors were active in environmental issues, with a four times higher percentage (23.3%) of GS respondents than WB 7 %.(Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Influencing Environmental Public Policy: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	No Effect	Limited Effect	Moderate Effect	Important Effects	Don't Know
OPT	38.03%	40.38%	11.27%	4.69%	5.63%
WB	43.97%	37.59%	9.22%	2.84%	6.38%
GS	26.39%	45.83%	15.28%	8.33%	4.17%

Most respondents said that CS actors had no to limited effect on environmental public policy. Again, this corresponds to stakeholder answers in the previous question regarding level of CS activity. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Special Needs and Disability Policy

Level of CS Activity in Influencing Special Needs Policy: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Inactive	Somewhat Active	Active	Very Active	Don't Know
OPT	11.57%	40.74%	33.80%	10.65%	3.24%
WB	14.69%	38.46%	36.36%	6.99%	3.50%
GS	5.48%	45.21%	28.77%	17.81%	2.74%

Respondents in GS said that CS actors were very active in influencing policies related to disability and people with special needs (17.8%). However most of the respondents stated that CS actors were only somewhat active. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

A third of GS respondents thought that CS actors have had important effects on disability and special needs public policy. When compared with the activity levels of CS actors, it may be concluded that a limited level of activity is perceived by GS respondents as achieving important effects.

On the whole CS actors are perceived to have limited to moderate success in affecting public policy on these issues. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Political Public Policy

**Level of CS Success in Political Public Campaigning:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

	OPT	WB	GS
Unsuccessful	20.00%	22.54%	15.07%
Somewhat Successful	39.53%	38.03%	42.47%
Successful	25.12%	23.24%	28.77%
Very Successful	10.23%	11.27%	8.22%
Don't Know	5.12%	4.93%	5.48%

Around 40% of respondents indicated that they thought that political public campaigns undertaken by CS were somewhat successful. Another 25% thought it was successful vs. 20% that thought it wasn't. Only 10% thought that CS was very successful in this area. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

**Level of CS Activity in Influencing Politics:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

	OPT	WB	GS
Inactive	21.86%	22.54%	20.55%
Somewhat Active	26.05%	21.83%	34.25%
Active	33.49%	34.51%	31.51%
Very Active	17.21%	19.01%	13.70%
Don't Know	1.40%	2.11%	0.00%

There was not much of a consensus among respondents on the level of CS actors' influencing on politics. Only 17% of the respondents thought that CS actors were very active, with another third rating them as active, and a quarter of respondents saying that they were somewhat active. One fifth of the respondents thought that CS actors were actually inactive when it came to influencing public policy on political matters. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Influencing Political Public Policy: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	No Effect	Limited Effect	Moderate Effect	Important Effects	Don't Know
OPT	26.17%	29.44%	23.36%	17.76%	3.27%
WB	33.10%	23.94%	23.94%	14.79%	4.23%
GS	12.50%	40.28%	22.22%	23.61%	1.39%

Although the same percentage of respondents that thought CS actors were active in the political issues thought that they were also having important effects in that area. The majority of respondents said that CS actors had no or limited effect. Forty percent of respondents in GS said that their effect was limited. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

All issues

Level of CS Activity in Influencing Social Policy: Percentage of OPT Respondents

Legend: Inactive, Somewhat Active, Active, Very Active, Don't Know

	Social	Environmental	Special Needs	Political
Inactive	9.26%	38.43%	11.57%	21.86%
Somewhat Active	48.61%	42.13%	40.74%	26.05%
Active	31.02%	12.50%	33.80%	33.49%
Very Active	8.80%	2.78%	10.65%	17.21%
Don't Know	2.31%	4.17%	3.24%	1.40%

The highest percentage of Inactive rating was on the level of CS involvement in the Environment, followed by the political issue. Concurrently CS actors were considered the most active in the political matter. This shows diverging views among respondents on this issue. CS actors were rated somewhat active on their involvement in social and disability issues. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Influencing Public Policy: Percentage of OPT Respondents

Legend: No Effect, Limited Effect, Moderate Effect, Important Effects, Don't Know

Social: 13.15%, 46.48%, 24.88%, 11.74%, 3.76%
Environmental: 38.03%, 40.38%, 11.27%, 4.69%, 5.63%
Special Needs: 14.95%, 36.92%, 27.57%, 15.89%, 4.67%
Political: 26.17%, 29.44%, 23.36%, 17.76%, 3.27%

Both graphs for the level of activity and corresponding level of success of CS actors in influencing public policy are very similar. With a slight discrepancy in the political issue graph where there was a larger percentage of respondents indicating that CS actors were active in the political issue while their influence was negligible to limited. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Law Amendment Campaigning: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Unsuccessful: 16.28%, 14.08%, 20.55%
Somewhat Successful: 30.23%, 31.69%, 27.40%
Successful: 32.09%, 33.10%, 30.14%
Very Successful: 3.26%, 4.93%, 0.00%
Don't Know: 18.14%, 16.20%, 21.92%

A majority of respondents indicated that CS actors have been somewhat successful to successful in campaigning for the amendment of laws in the OPT. However, 18% of the respondents indicated that they did not know what the level of success was. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.1.3. Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study	How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components.	Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.2. Holding state & private corporations accountable

This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society is active and successful in responding to social needs.

The extent to which civil society is active and successful in holding state and private corporations accountable:

0	*1*	*2*	*3*
Insignificant	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

4.2.1. Holding state accountable	How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.2.1. Holding state accountable

Level of CS Activity in Holding the State Accountable: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: ■ OPT ■ WB ■ GS

	Inactive	Somewhat Active	Active	Very Active	Don't Know
OPT	26.39%	47.69%	18.52%	1.85%	5.56%
WB	27.97%	45.45%	17.48%	2.10%	6.99%
GS	23.29%	52.05%	20.55%	1.37%	2.74%

There is a slight difference between the level of activity of CS actors in holding the state accountable vs. the level of their success in doing so. This might indicate that CS actors are exerting more effort with fewer effects than would be expected. Either CS efforts are being wasted on unnecessary activities, or it could just reflect the difficulty of holding the state accountable. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Holding the State Accountable: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Unsuccessful	Somewhat Successful	Successful	Very Successful	Don't Know
OPT	34.11%	43.93%	14.49%	1.87%	5.61%
WB	39.01%	41.13%	12.06%	0.71%	7.09%
GS	24.66%	49.32%	19.18%	4.11%	2.74%

In general the majority of respondents thought that CS actors were unsuccessful to somewhat successful in holding the state accountable. (OPT 78%, WB 80%, GS 79%) (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable	How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable

Level of CS Activity in Holding Private Corporations Accountable: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Inactive	Somewhat Active	Active	Very Active	Don't Know
OPT	72.69%	11.57%	1.85%	0.00%	13.89%
WB	74.13%	9.79%	0.00%	0.00%	16.08%
GS	69.86%	15.07%	5.48%	0.00%	9.59%

This graph speaks for itself. Zero percent of respondents thought that CS actors were very active in holding Private Corporations accountable. Almost three quarters of respondents thought that CS actors were completely inactive in this arena. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

## 4.3. Responding to social interests

This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society is active and successful in responding to social needs.

The extent to which civil society is active and successful in meeting social needs:

0	1	2	3
Insignificant	Limited	Moderate	Significant

4.3.1 Responsiveness	How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.

4.3.1 Responsiveness

Can You Think of an Example of CS Lobbying for Public Services?: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Yes	No	Don't Know
OPT	42.45%	41.04%	16.51%
WB	41.73%	38.13%	20.14%
GS	43.84%	46.58%	9.59%

An equal percentage of respondents indicated that they could or could not give an example of CS lobbying for a public service (around 42% of respondents thought that CS actors were responsive to public service needs). Of those that could the following institutions were identified as targets of lobbying activities. The ministry of local government and the ministry of education being among the two most concerned public institutions. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Lobbying Target	Total	Percent
PNA	17	50.00%
Ministry of Local Government	4	11.76%
Ministry of Education	3	8.82%
Municipalities	3	8.82%
Other	7	20.59%
Grand Total	34	100.00%

Service	Total	Percent

Employment opportunities	9	11.39%
Roads	8	10.13%
Electricity	7	8.86%
Water Network	6	7.59%
Teacher Rights	5	6.33%
Disabled rights & Services	3	3.80%
Health services	3	3.80%
Infrastructure	3	3.80%
Schools	3	3.80%
Sewage Network	3	3.80%
Other	29	36.71%
Grand Total	79	100.00%

Public services were prioritized by respondents including general infrastructure services such as roads, electricity, and connection to water and sewage network (34%). General pressure was put on the government to provide employment opportunities to unemployed and fresh graduates, as well as raising the salaries of teachers. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Examples of responsiveness
▪ The Jerusalem Committee, a PNGO subcommittee organized emergency committees to meet needs including:
Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights, International Solidarity, Media, Emergency Fund[129]
▪ PNGO initiated a emergency program to address the War on Iraq and its possible consequences[130]

4.3.2 Public Trust	What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
A small minority (< 25%)	A large minority (25% - 50%)	A small majority (51% – 75%)	A large majority (> 75%)

4.3.2 Public Trust

Only two institutions received over 10 % of the respondent's indicating that they had "a great deal" of trust in them; religious organizations with 27.9% and the judicial system with 11.5%. For GS respondents many more types of institutions received more than 10% of the respondents indicating that they had a great deal of trust in them. (Community Sampling Survey)

Respondents had **"a great deal"** of trust					
OPT		**WB**		**GS**	
Religious Orgs	27.89%	Religious Orgs	27.11%	Religious Orgs	30.21%
Judicial System	11.46%	Judicial System	11.50%	NGOs	12.79%
				Security Forces	12.50%
				Political Leaders	11.70%
				Judicial system	11.34%
				Police	11.00%

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[129] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004
[130] "PNGO Narrative Report 2003" http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2003.htm

The ranking which received the highest proportion of respondents across the board was "quite a lot".In fact no institution received less than 25% of responses in these category. However there was considerable variation between the regions. (Community Sampling Survey)

Respondents had **"quite a lot"** of trust in the following institutions					
OPT		**WB**		**GS**	
Professional Associations	51.38%	Professional Associations	53.66%	Printed Press	59.14%
Religious Orgs.	49.47%	Large Private Sector	53.23%	Police	52.00%
Police	48.33%	NGOs	50.18%	PLC	49.47%
Judicial system	48.18%	Religious Orgs.	49.65%	Religious Orgs.	48.96%
PLC	46.83%	Judicial system	49.48%	Television/Radio	45.00%
NGOs	46.83%	Police	47.06%	Professional Associations	44.44%
PNA	44.70%	PNA	46.21%	Judicial system	44.33%
Large Private Sector	44.31%	PLC	45.94%	PNA	40.21%
Printed Press	41.73%	Labor Unions	41.11%	Security Forces	38.54%
Television/Radio	39.85%	Large Social Movements	40.09%	Political Parties	36.56%
Security Forces	37.83%	Television/Radio	38.10%	NGOs	36.05%
Labor Unions	37.60%	Security Forces	37.59%	Labor Unions	27.84%
Large Social Movements	36.64%	Printed Press	36.11%	Large Social Movements	24.62%
Political Parties	33.89%	Political Parties	32.96%	Political Leaders	24.47%
Political Leaders	26.29%	Political Leaders	26.91%	Large Private Sector	15.00%

Overall respondents had a high degree of trust in the various institutions. Certain striking differences were noted in the ranking between the WB and GS most notably that for the "large private sector companies" which was ranked second in the WB and last in the GS. The media including TV/Radio and the printed press was ranked in the lower half in the WB, whereas the printed press was ranked highest in the GS. NGOs were ranked third in the WB vs. 11th in the GS, this does support previous results which indicated that GS respondents did not feel that NGOs provided services in their communities. The last conclusion from the results of this ranking is the low level of trust in political parties and political leaders in both the WB and GS, with political parties getting a slightly higher percentage of respondents' trust. (Community Sampling Survey)

Respondents "**did not have very much**" trust in the following institutions:					
OPT		**WB**		**GS**	
Printed Press	48.03%	Printed Press	53.47%	Large Private Sector	55.00%
Television/Radio	45.69%	Television/Radio	49.32%	Large Social Movements	49.23%
Political Parties	43.89%	Political Parties	45.69%	Professional Associations	39.51%
Political Leaders	42.55%	Political Leaders	45.09%	Political Parties	38.71%
Large Social Movements	41.44%	Labor Unions	41.11%	Labor Unions	38.14%
Labor Unions	40.33%	Large Social Movements	39.21%	NGOs	37.21%
Large Private Sector	34.69%	Security Forces	34.04%	Political Leaders	35.11%
Professional Associations	34.25%	Professional Associations	32.52%	Television/Radio	35.00%
Security Forces	34.13%	Police	32.18%	Security Forces	34.38%
NGOs	30.03%	PLC	30.74%	PNA	31.96%
Police	29.82%	Large Private Sector	28.52%	Printed Press	31.18%
PLC	29.10%	NGOs	27.80%	PLC	24.21%
PNA	28.42%	PNA	27.24%	Police	23.00%
Judicial system	23.18%	Judicial system	24.04%	Judicial system	20.62%
Religious Orgs.	16.84%	Religious Orgs.	16.90%	Religious Orgs.	16.67%

The judicial system and the religious organizations were consistently ranked lowest indicating that respondents had a fair degree of trust in these two types of institutions both in the WB and GS. Large private sector companies were ranked the highest among instutions that GS respondents did not have very much trust in. For the WB respondents the media ranked highest among the institutions that respondents did not have very much trust in, a view which was not shared by GS respondents. (Community Sampling Survey)

Respondents had **"no"** trust in the following institutions					
OPT		**WB**		**GS**	
Political Leaders	25.20%	Political Leaders	24.00%	Labor Unions	30.93%
PLC	20.63%	Security Forces	20.57%	Political Leaders	28.72%
PNA	19.90%	PLC	20.49%	Large Private Sector	27.50%
Political Parties	19.72%	PNA	20.34%	Judicial system	23.71%
Security Forces	19.05%	Political Parties	19.10%	Large Social Movements	23.08%
Labor Unions	18.80%	Police	16.61%	Political Parties	21.51%
Large Private Sector	17.78%	Large Social Movements	16.30%	PLC	21.05%
Large Social Movements	17.81%	NGOs	16.25%	PNA	18.56%
Judicial system	17.19%	Judicial system	14.98%	Security Forces	14.58%
Police	15.94%	Large Private Sector	14.83%	Police	14.00%
NGOs	15.70%	Labor Unions	14.44%	NGOs	13.95%
Television/Radio	10.15%	Professional Associations	10.16%	Television/Radio	12.00%

In the WB the first six ranked institutions by respondents who considered them to be untrustworthy were governmental or political institutions. Even though the media was ranked highest in the previous category, they were not considered as institutions that could not be trusted in the WB. The judicial system which received high levels of trust from GS respondents was ranked fourth by the rest of the respondents who had no faith in it.
GS respondents lacked the most trust in labor unions, which WB respondents did not agree with.
The second ranked institution that WB respondents did not have any trust in was the security forces, which was ranked 9th by GS respondents. (Community Sampling Survey)

When calculating the CSO trust index, a value of **3.09** was reached on a scale of 1 to 4, 1 being quite a lot of trust and 4 being no trust at all.

- Public Opinion poll administered to 1,361 Palestinians 18 and over (WB 860, GS 501)[131]:
  83.3% expressed satisfaction with the performance of Palestinian local societies and organizations

4.4. Empowering citizens

4.4.1 Informing/ educating citizens	How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

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[131] "Results of Palestinian Public Opinion Polls No. 3" November 2003.

4.4.1 Informing/ educating citizens

Level of CS Activity in Public Information/ Education: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Inactive	4.88%	2.47%	9.52%
Somewhat Active	24.39%	17.28%	38.10%
Active	47.97%	56.79%	30.95%
Very Active	20.33%	19.75%	21.43%
Don't Know	2.44%	3.70%	0.00%

Level of CS Success in Public Information/ Education: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Unsuccessful	5.09%	2.80%	9.59%
Somewhat Successful	35.65%	34.97%	36.99%
Successful	47.22%	53.15%	35.62%
Very Successful	8.80%	5.59%	15.07%
Don't Know	3.24%	3.50%	2.74%

Although 20% of respondents indicated that CS actors were very active in public education only 8.8% indicated that they thought CS were very successful. The rest of the responses seem consistent between the level of activity and the level of success CS had.

In general respondents thought that CS actors were somewhat active to active (72%), and their level of success was somewhat successful to successful (83%). (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of CS Success in Public Campaigning: Percentage of OPT Respondents

Legend: Unsuccessful, Somewhat Successful, Successful, Very Successful, Don't Know

- Local Elections: 5.56%, 23.15%, 41.20%, 20.37%, 9.72%
- Amendment: 16.28%, 30.23%, 32.09%, 3.26%, 18.14%
- Gender Discrimination: 16.74%, 34.42%, 33.02%, 7.44%, 8.37%
- Political: 20.00%, 39.53%, 25.12%, 10.23%, 5.12%

Although around half the respondents have indicated that CS actors have been successful in public education and information, a varied response was received on their success in various types of public campaigning, with the level of success ranging from 25 to 41 %.(Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action	How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action

Level of CS Activity in Building the Capacity of Local Communities: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

- Inactive: 7.01%, 7.80%, 5.48%
- Somewhat Active: 57.01%, 56.03%, 58.90%
- Active: 27.10%, 27.66%, 26.03%
- Very Active: 2.34%, 2.13%, 2.74%
- Don't Know: 6.54%, 6.38%, 6.85%

Level of CS Success in Building the Capacity of Local Communities: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

|	Unsuccessful	Somewhat Successful	Successful	Very Successful	Don't Know
OPT	11.43%	47.62%	30.00%	1.90%	9.05%
WB	11.59%	49.28%	26.81%	1.45%	10.87%
GS	11.11%	44.44%	36.11%	2.78%	5.56%

Only 2% of respondents described CS actors as being either very active or very successful in building the capacity of local communities, with most of them choosing somewhat active and somewhat successful to describe the level of their efforts and its results. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people	How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people

Level of CS Success in Local Elections Public Campaigning: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Unsuccessful	Somewhat Successful	Successful	Very Successful	Don't Know
OPT	5.56%	23.15%	41.20%	20.37%	9.72%
WB	4.20%	23.08%	41.96%	21.68%	9.09%
GS	8.22%	23.29%	39.73%	17.81%	10.96%

A majority of OPT respondents said that CS actors were successful (42%) to very successful (20.4%) in campaigning for local elections.

Raising people's awareness on elections and democratic processes is an initial step to empowering marginalized people to take part in decision making and self government. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- Projects for handicapped received 11.4% of donor funding from 1995-1998 = $28 million[132]
- Based on 2000 survey of NGOs[133]
    - 137 NGOs (66% of sample) concentrated work on protecting social and economic rights for women, children and individuals with special needs
        - Women = 62= 45%
        - Children = 45=33%
        - Individuals with special needs = 30 = 22%
- "…the vision of the non-governmental organizations included in our sample and according to their number, incorporated the following elements… Defending the rights of the vulnerable and the marginalized and guaranteeing their interests and their political, economic, social and legal rights etc. This vision is vital and substantial as a fundamental provision for the concepts of citizenship and the citizen, especially after the creation o the Palestinian National Authority and the importance of organizing the relationship between the authority and the Palestinian citizens. Organizing this relationship will only take place through the implementation of a number of laws, legislations and procedures that correspond with the interests, priorities and needs of the vulnerable sectors."[134]

4.4.4. Empowering women	How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.4.4. Empowering women

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[132] Hanafi, Sari. "Profile of Donor Assistance to Palestinian NGOs: Survey and Database." Welfare Association. June 3, 1999.

[133] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.32

[134] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.35

Level of CS Success in Public Campaigning to Eliminate Gender Discrimination: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Unsuccessful	Somewhat Successful	Successful	Very Successful	Don't Know
OPT	16.74%	34.42%	33.02%	7.44%	8.37%
WB	16.20%	40.85%	30.99%	7.04%	4.93%
GS	17.81%	21.92%	36.99%	8.22%	15.07%

A third of the respondents thought that CS actors were somewhat successful in public campaigning to eliminate gender discrimination, another third of the respondents thought that they were successful. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

- Projects for women received 7.2% of donor funding from 1995-1998 = $18 million, but the absorption capacity was low[135]
- Arab Women Union Society in Nablus has existed for more than 80 years, providing services to empower women[136]
- Examples of civil society action targeting women:
    o UPMRC reproductive health work in Gaza
    o Women's Counseling and Legal Aid Center's "Samou Tent" for women's dialogue and empowerment
    o UNRWA's support for micro-enterprise in Gaza[137]
- "…62 non-governmental organizations, which is around (45%) of the total organizations work in protecting social and economic rights of marginalized sectors and concentrate their work in empowering the Palestinian woman and improving her future conditions specifically regarding equality with men, raising women's awareness concerning her social and economic rights, and finally bringing about laws, regulations and legislation appropriate with the Palestinian women's priorities and needs. This vision further includes empowering the capacity of women organizations through a vast number of projects and programs in order for it to become an effective tool in securing and guaranteeing and protecting women's social and economic rights."[138]
- "…the weak participation of the Palestinian women in the entire national, social and development operations will disable the Palestinian society from attaining the civil condition, hence, accomplishing the social and national liberation process. Thus, the Palestinian non-governmental organizations face major obstacles in integrating women in developing

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[135] Hanafi, Sari. June 1999.

[136] "Arab Women Union Society, Nablus Palestine 1921-2004: 80 Years on a Glimpse on the Continuous Granting." 2004.

[137] "Palestinian Civil Society Under Seige; From Small Families to Small Business: Empowering Women." 2001.

[138] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August 2000. p. 34

operations, also, attempts are always confronted with major resentment and denial, which undermines the effectiveness of the different development projects and programs."[139]

4.4.5. Building social capital	To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of CS compare to those of non-members?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.

4.4.5. Building social capital

Level of trust	CSO Member	Non-Member	Total
Most people can be trusted	21.43%	26.52%	23.79%
You can't be too careful	78.57%	73.48%	76.21%
Total	100%	100%	100%

According to the trust index CSO members have lower levels of trust than those who are non-members. (Community Sampling Survey)

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods	How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods

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[139] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.39

Activity	Frequency	Percentage
General activities	21	15.56%
Work for food	15	11.11%
Employment-generation	13	9.63%
Workshops	10	7.41%
Food Aid	9	6.67%
Priority setting	9	6.67%
In-kind support	8	5.93%
Poverty Eradication day	7	5.19%
Research	6	4.44%
Meetings/lectures	5	3.70%
Campaigning on unemployment	5	3.70%
Demonstrations	5	3.70%
Financial aid (students)	4	2.96%
Fundraising	4	2.96%
Emergency activities	3	2.22%
Other	11	8.15%
Total	**135**	100.00%

Only ten percent of poverty eradication activities cited by respondents were employment generation projects undertaken by UNDP or Palestinian NGOs such as PARC, Faten and others. (Community Sampling Survey)

Service	Total	Percent
Employment opportunities	9	11.39%
Roads	8	10.13%
Electricity	7	8.86%
Water Network	6	7.59%
Teacher Rights	5	6.33%
Disabled rights & Services	3	3.80%
Health services	3	3.80%
Infrastructure	3	3.80%
Schools	3	3.80%
Sewage Network	3	3.80%
Other	29	36.71%
Grand Total	79	100.00%

However 11.4% of respondents thought that NGOs were active in lobbying for employment opportunities. General pressure was put on the government to provide employment opportunities to unemployed and fresh graduates, as well as raising the salaries of teachers. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.5. Meeting Societal Needs
This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially the needs of the poor and other marginalized groups.

The extent to which civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of traditionally marginalised groups, is:

0	1	2	3
Insignificant	*Limited*	*Moderate*	*Significant*

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision	How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	**CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.**	**Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.**	**Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.**

4.5.1. Lobbying for state service provisions.

Of those that answered yes to the question of whether they could think of an example of CS lobbying for a public service a large percentage 31 and 37 thought that they were somewhat successful to successful, respectively. There was a difference between GS and WB respondents' rating of "very successful" with 20% of GS vs. 11.4% of WB. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Level of Success of CS pressure for Public Services	OPT	WB	GS
Successful	37.14%	38.46%	35.48%
Very Successful	11.43%	5.13%	19.35%

Forty percent of respondents thought that CS efforts were generally successful to very successful in pressuring the Government to provide public services. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly	How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	**CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.**	**Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.**	**Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.**

4.5.2. Meeting societal needs directly.

Can You Think of an Example of CS Providing Public Services?: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

|	Yes	No	Don't Know
OPT	71.56%	18.96%	9.48%
WB	72.46%	18.12%	9.42%
GS	69.86%	20.55%	9.59%

Only 19% of respondents could not think of an example of CS actors providing public services to the population. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Target Group	Frequency	Percentage
General Population	57	36.08%
Poor communities/People	39	24.68%
Women	32	20.25%
Disabled/Special Needs	9	5.70%
Youth	4	2.53%
Other	9	5.70%
Do Not Know	8	5.06%
Total	**158**	100.00%

A third of respondents thought that public services were directed at the general population while 25% thought that the main target was poor communities and a further 20% saying that women were the main target. Only 5% of the respondents indicated that the disabled those with special needs were targeted by CS actors.
There is strong consensus among respondents that CS actors have been successful in providing services directly to the population (63%). (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

**Level of CS Role in Directly Meeting Societal Needs:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	Insignificant	Limited	Moderate	Significant	Don't Know
OPT	19.91%	28.24%	43.06%	8.33%	0.46%
WB	18.88%	26.57%	42.66%	11.19%	0.70%
GS	21.92%	31.51%	43.84%	2.74%	0.00%

However, 20% of respondents evaluated CS role as being insignificant in meeting societal needs. With only 8.3% evaluating their role as significant with a large discrepancy between the WB and GS (11% vs.2.7%)
CS actors' success in providing direct services to the population does not reflect a significant role in meeting these overall needs as evaluated by stakeholder respondents. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

**Can You Remember Organizations Helping Your Community in the Past Year?:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

|	Yes	No
OPT	60.67%	39.33%
WB	71.33%	28.67%
GS	28.13%	71.88%

Results for the GS are exactly the opposite of those for the WB. Wheras 71% of WB respondents indicated that they do remember an organization helping their community in the past year, the same percentage of GS respondents indicated that they did not. (Community Sampling Survey)

▪ The Jerusalem Committee, a PNGO subcommittee organized emergency committees to meet needs including:

- o Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights, International Solidarity, Media, Emergency Fund[140]
- ▪ "Since the construction of the wall, there have been many predictions of collapse of isolated health facilities. However despite access problems, the ability to maintain service provision through the public and NGO sectors has been admirable."[141]
- ▪ Change in donor priorities towards public policy, civic education and democracy diminished role of NGO emergency & relief work. "This effect was clear among charitable organizations that did not respond adequately to the new developments…This policy resulted in ignoring the urgent and relief programs aimed at resisting the occupation, which in turn negatively reflected on meeting the basic needs of the Palestinian society and on the level of funding among non-governmental organizations."[142]

4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups	To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CSOs are less effective than the state.	**CSOs are as effective as the state.**	**CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.**	**CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.**

4.5.3. Meeting the needs of marginalized groups.

Which Orgs Provide Better Services for Marginalized People?: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

When asked about which organizations they consider to provide the better services for marginalized people there were significant differences between respondents from the WB and GS. Both sets of respondents indicated that they considered international agencies to be the better providers of services for marginalized people. However only 10.6% of GS respondents indicated that they thought NGOs were the better providers vs. 29.8% who thought that the PNA was a better providers. WB respondents provided an opposite assessment 35.32% chose NGOs as better service providers vs. 13.6% who chose the PNA. (Community Sampling Survey)

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[140] "PNGO Narrative Report 2002." Http://www.pngo.net/reports/PNGO_Narrative_report2002.htm Accessed 4-6-2004
[141] Jubran, Joan. August, 2005.
[142] Abdul-Hadi, Izzat. August, 2000. p.38

In Past Year, Which Institutions Most Helpfu?: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

| Category	OPT	WB	GS
Voluntary Org	1.35%	1.39%	1.20%
International Agency	26.76%	22.30%	42.17%
NGO	16.22%	18.47%	8.43%
PNA Institution	12.16%	8.71%	24.10%
Did Not Turn to Any Org	43.51%	49.13%	24.10%

Although 70% of GS respondents indicated that they could not remember an organization helping their community, only a quarter did not turn to any organization for help. A quarter received help from a PNA institution while a further 42% were helped by an international agency. For the WB respondents half of them did not turn to any organization for help, and only 8.7% indicated that they were helped by a PNA institution, whereas most of the respondents who received help indicated that they got it from either an international agency (22.3%) or from an NGO (18.5%). (Community Sampling Survey)

4.5.4 Opposing the military occupation	To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in opposing/resisting occupation?		
Score 0	**Score 1**	**Score 2**	**Score 3**
CSOs are less effective than the state.	**CSOs are as effective as the state.**	**CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.**	**CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.**

4.5.4. Opposing the military occupation

Level of CS Activity in Opposing the Occupation and/or Changing its Policies: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Inactive	6.48%	6.29%	6.85%
Somewhat Active	36.11%	37.76%	32.88%
Active	37.96%	40.56%	32.88%
Very Active	18.06%	14.69%	24.66%
Don't Know	1.39%	0.70%	2.74%

Less than 7% of respondents indicated that CS actors were inactive in resisting the occupation.

Level of CS Success in in Opposing the Occupation and/or Changing its Policies: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

Category	OPT	WB	GS
Unsuccessful	26.64%	31.21%	17.81%
Somewhat Successful	37.38%	42.55%	27.40%
Successful	26.17%	20.57%	36.99%
Very Successful	7.01%	3.55%	13.70%
Don't Know	2.80%	2.13%	4.11%

However, 27% of respondents indicated that they were unsuccessful. Once again this is an indication that the obstacles faced by CS actors in changing political realities especially when faced with a military occupation by Israel.

GS respondents were once again more optimistic with 37% of them saying that they thought CS actions were successful. This might be explained by the recent withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip. However, this view might change in the next few months depending on the actual consequences of this withdrawal. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Examples of CSO resistance activities	Total	Percent
Resisting Apartheid Wall	38	34.55%
Achieving Gaza Withdrawal	14	12.73%
General Resistance	9	8.18%
Exposing Violations Internationally	8	7.27%
Achieving ICJ Ruling	7	6.36%
Easing of freedom of movement	6	5.45%
Organizing International Solidarity	6	5.45%
Educating Palestinians	4	3.64%
Other	18	16.36%
Grand Total	110	100.00%

Specific examples of CS actors engaging in the resistance of military occupation focused on their role in fighting the apartheid wall. The withdrawal from GS was also cited as a result of CS involvement in resistance during the past thirty years. The ICJ ruling in 2004 demanding Israel to stop construction on the separation wall was also attributed to CS advocacy and lobbying activities locally and internationally. (Regional Stakeholder Consultations)

Media Review Report

1. **Introduction**
   1.1. Strong relationship between the media and civil society is significant and important component of democratic transition within the Palestinian context.
   1.2. Since Oslo there has been a significant increase in media in Palestine due to the lifting of restrictions that were previously imposed by the Israelis. Two main newspapers were established, as well as a number of local radios and private TVs.
   1.3. There is a new law for media which is a flexible one and allows for the establishment of different media institutions. However, the law is being revised and its unclear whether the outcome will be for the benefit of free expression.
   1.4. Investigative reports, critical coverage of certain events and issues. Which will contribute to the development of civil society. No sufficient resources, no incentives, and no real understanding of development and wider concept of their role and influence.
   1.5. Lack of training to act as journalists.
   1.6. The relationship between the media and civil society is very weak. This is due to:
       1.6.1. Perception of the media of NGOs and civil society vs a vis accountability and transparency. (influenced by the general opinion of NGOs cooptation by donors, and corruption and aligned with external interests, and don't adhere to a national agenda.)
       1.6.2. NGOs are under the impression that Palesitnian media is not professional and is coopted by the Palestinina authority and is mainly political driven. And their role in promoting civil society is weak.
       1.6.3. lack of a structured consulatative process between media and Civil society. And an absence of trust and mutual understanding of different relevant roles in promoting and strenghthening democracy and public liberties and state building processes.
       1.6.4. No understanding of complimentary roles between both sides.
       1.6.5. Civil society has been accused of not defending journalists and freedom of speech when censored or harassed by the Palestinian Authority.
       1.6.6. Civil society uses the media to promote their image and to cover news of their activities rather than a more fundamental role of policy development, advocacy, awareness building as well as monitoring critiquing civil society's role in maintaining and defending the rights of Palestinian society.
   1.7. In spite of the above mentioned challenges and obstacles it has been noticed that there is an actual effort from both sides to improve the relationship based on a mutual vision understanding and strategies of the importance of the relationship between both of them in order to contribute substantially to statehood building and civil society strengthening. This has been illustrated through different meetings conducted recently between representatives from both sides. And based on verified data of our own empirical research.
   1.8. Internal issues are marginalized and more there's more emphasis on the political aspects with less interest in People's lives and problems.

The 1995 Palestinian Press Law states, "no security agency has any right to question, interrogate, detain, incarcerate or arrest a journalist on matters pertaining to his work." The law does not provide for formal censorship. However, Article 37 prohibits the publication of articles that may cause harm to national unity.

The Ministry of Information licenses the media. The General Intelligence Directorate has established a Bureau of Press Information to accredit and monitor foreign media. The Voice of Palestine Radio and two television stations are government-controlled, but many private media and research organizations maintain active presences in print and online. Of particular interest is the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), which continues the valuable polling efforts of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) also conducts regular polls and issues the Palestine Report, an excellent weekly news summary that reports on the activities of civil society.

1.9. Objective

As stated in the Media Review user guide, the review of the media had two general purposes:

    a) Provide information on specific civil society activities/actors which are reported in the media so that the review can inform the scoring of each of the indicators.

    b) Establish whether and how civil society is represented in the media.

1.10. Methodology

1.10.1. Media sources,

Media Name	Type	Region
Al Quds Newspaper	Print	National
Al Ayyam Newspaper	Print	National
Palestine Radio	Radio	National
Palestine TV	TV	National
Nablus TV	TV	Nablus
An Najah Radio	Radio	Nablus
Ajyal Radio	Radio	Ramallah
Amwaj Radio	Radio	Ramallah
Wattan TV	TV	Ramallah
Bethlehem 2000	TV	Bethlehem
Almahed	TV	Bethlehem
Youth Voice Radio	Radio	Gaza

Al Quds newspaper is the most widely read in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it contains more number of papers than Al Ayyam, and covers most of the news, events in the OPT, has been since 1967 the main printed media source.

Al Ayyam, is a more intellectual type of newspaper established by a prominent journalist following the Oslo agreements, and tends to focus more on articles, opinions, translations from the Israeli media, and occasionally articles from arab and international newspapers.

Palestine Radio, which is the national radio station established by the Palestinian Authority is the most listened to radio station, with varied types of programs and regular news broadcasts.

1.10.2. Review period

Media review started in October and ended in February. All media was reviewed for four months except for Palestine TV, and Youth Voice radio that were reviewed for three months by our media reviewer from Gaza. In Bethlehem after starting out with one TV station and

one radio station, it appeared that the radio station did not cover any civil society news and was mainly an entertainment one. Therefore after one month media reviewer in Bethlehem switched to Al Mahed TV.

1.10.3. Approach to media data collection

1.10.3.1. Media reviewers

Seven media reviewers were recruited, two were Bisan staff who volunteered to review media in Bethlehem and Nablus. Three others were students at Birzeit University majoring in media studies, and a fourth from Al Najah University, a reviewer involved in civil society was recruited from Gaza.

1.10.3.2. Training

Two training sessions were organized for the media reviewers. The first took place with four of the media reviewers early October. A second training was organized a week later for two additional reviewers who could not make it to the first training.

The training consisted of a general presentation of CSI project, its objectives and main outcomes. Then there was a discussion on civil society and its definitions. Various organizations were cited as examples and then categorized according to the definitions in the media review methodology. The second part of the training consisted of

The media reviewer in Gaza was trained through three long phone calls. The same training was divided into three sections and the papers and notes where faxed to Gaza and then discussed on the phone.

Excercises were done in the same way, where the media reviewer filled out the data sheet for three news items in one of the newspapers. The method of data entry and classification where then discussed on the phone.

1.10.3.3. Monitoring and followup

During the first month a meeting was scheduled ten days after the first media review training.A meeting was scheduled every month to discuss progress and issues. Media reviewers would have questions regarding certain media items, how to classify them based on topic and what types of civil society organizations to chose. Some of these questions would be answered on the phone. During each meeting one or two news items would be photocopied from one of the newspapers and media reviewers would be asked to analyze and fill out the media review sheet. Responses would then be compared and discussed. The objective of this exercise was to try to reach a uniform method of classifying and organizing data.

1.10.4. Data analysis

2. Research Findings

2.1. Main features of civil society reporting in the media

This section explores the quantity and visibility of media reporting on civil society. You should describe:

1. **Frequency of reporting**: Describe the number of media items for the different *medium* (query *Percentage Medium*) and, if you monitored different medium types (TV, radio, print) also for *medium type* (query *Percentage MediumType*)[143].

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[143] As only a small number of NCOs monitored TV and Radio, the remainder of the guide only refers to *medium*. In case you have monitored TV, Radio as well as newspapers, please always also cross-tab with *medium type*, for those instances when the guide indicates a cross-tab with *medium*.

Query Percentage Medium Type

Medium Type	Count of Medium Type	%
TV	254	15.66%
Radio	498	30.70%
Print	870	53.64%
Total	1622	100.00%

The highest number of media items came from newspapers (print) over half, less than a third from the radio and only 16% from the Television stations.

Query Percentage Meduim

Medium	Count Of Medium	%
AL Ayyam newspaper	462	28.48%
AL-Quds newspaper	408	25.15%
Palestine Radio	213	13.13%
Nablus TV	102	6.29%
Najah Radio	96	5.92%
Ajyal Radio	90	5.55%
Youth Voice Radio	88	5.43%
Palestine TV	73	4.50%
Wattan TV	38	2.34%
Al Mahed TV	28	1.73%
Bethlehem TV	13	0.80%
Amwaj Radio	11	0.68%
Total	1622	100.00%

Al Ayyam newspaper had a higher share of news items than Al Quds newspaper even though Al Quds has a wider readership and contains a larger number of pages.

Although Watan TV which is a television station owned by a number of civil society members and is expected to devote a share of its programs and coverage to civil society issues contributed to less than 3% of the total number of news items.

Nablus TV, Najah Radio, Ajyal Radio, Youth Voice Radio and Palestine TV contributed more or less the same percentage of media items during the period of monitoring.

Palestine radio however seemed to have the highest percentage of coverage.

2. **Placement within media**: Describe the prominence media reports on civil society receive in the different *mediums* using *Prom Points* (query *Percentage PromPoints*) and *Page/Item Number* (query *Percentage ItemNo*).

Prom Pts	Count Of Prom Pts	%
	0	0.00%
1	86	5.30%
2	86	5.30%
3	90	5.55%
Op/Ed	4	0.25%
	1622	

Prom points are given to media items, if they appear on the first, second or third page of a newspaper, or if they are the first, second, or third items in a radio or television program. Opinion/editorial prom points are only given to media items that take this format in the printed media.

An equal number of media items related to civil society received 1, 2, or 3 prom points. Out of the total number of media items, around 17% received prom points. While only four items out of 1622 were in the opinion/ editorial section.

3. **Forms of reporting**: Describe the distribution of articles per news item *type* (query *Percentage Type*). Also, cross-tab the *type* with *medium* (query *Count type_medium*) to examine potential 'reporting type' preferences of the different media sources.

2.2. Thematic focus

This section describes the thematic areas covered by the media in reporting on civil society issues. You should describe:

2.2.1. Main themes:

- Describe the coverage of different *topics* in the media (queries *Percentage Topic1* and *Percentage Topic2)*. Please note that it is advised to aggregate the list of more than 30 topics into a smaller number of categories (e.g. politics, economy, social issues, civil society; cultural issues; etc.). CIVICUS will be happy to assist you in developing a smaller category system which fits your country context and data structure.

Topic 1	Count of Topic 1	%
National Politics	384	23.52%
Education/ Training	159	9.74%
Military Occupation	141	8.63%
Local Government	132	8.08%
Advocacy	101	6.18%
Labor, Unemployment	87	5.33%
Health	81	4.96%
Human Rights	65	3.98%
Civil Society	51	3.12%
Gender Issues	44	2.69%
Business	42	2.57%
Poverty	37	2.27%
Other	309	18.92 %
Total	**1633**	**100%**

National Politics is considered the main topic for many of the news items monitor, with a little less than a quarter of all news items monitored falling into that category. The occupation remains a main subject for around 8.6% of news items regarding Civil society. With proverty getting less than 3% of media coverage

Topic 2	Count of Topic 2	%
Business	330	20.42%
Other	149	9.22%
Civil Society	123	7.61%

Human Rights	114	7.05%
National Politics	114	7.05%
Local Government	89	5.51%
Military Occupation	63	3.90%
Gender Issues	60	3.71%
Justice System	59	3.65%
Advocacy	58	3.59%
Education/ Training	46	2.85%
Crime	44	2.72%
Other	367	22.71%
Total	**1616**	**100%**

- Describe the combination of main *topics* with different secondary *topics* (query *Count topic1_topic2*). Also, cross-tab *topic* with *medium* (query *Count topic1_medium*) to describe the topic structure for the different media sources, as well as with *Prom Points* (query *Count topic1_prompoints*) to explore the different prominence of topics within the different mediums.

2.2.2. Geographic focus:
- Describe the distribution of international, national, provincial/regional and local news on civil society using the *origin* variable (query *Percentage Origin*). Cross-tab the *origin* with *medium* (query *Count origin_medium*) to explore potential differences among the different media sources as well as with *topic* (query *Count origin_topic1*) to detect thematic differences.

Origin	CountOfOrigin	%
International	35	2.31%
National	694	36.39%
Provincial/ Regional	42	2.67%
Local	831	58.63%

The majority of responses were at local level even though half of the media reviewed was national media, while less than 3% of the news covered the international or regional level.
The low level of regional news covered is indicative of the geographic fragmentation of the Palestinian Territories.

2.3. Civil Society Actors & Issues
This section examines the reporting on different types of CSOs as well as the different civil society issues. You should describe:

2.3.1. Reporting on CSO Types:
- Describe the frequency of reporting for different *CSO types* in the items (query *Percentage CSOType*). Cross-tab *CSO type* with *medium* (query *Count CSOType_medium*), *topic* (query *Count CSOType_Topic1*), *origin* (query *Count CSOtype_origin*), prominence (query *Count CSOtype_prompoint)* to describe differences in reporting in greater detail.

CSOTypeCode	Count of CSO Type	%

Advocacy CSOs	274	20.48%
Political parties	181	13.53%
Service CSOs	152	11.36%
Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups	86	6.43%
Women's associations	73	5.46%
Student and youth associations	69	5.16%
Non-profit media	67	5.01%
CSO networks/federations/support organisations/single issue coalitions	60	4.48%
CSOs active in education, training & research	57	4.26%
Others	319	23.87%
Total	1338	100.00%

The CSO types most covered by the media are advocacy CSOs, followed by political parties and Service CSOs.

2.3.2. Civil Society Issues:
▪ The CSI indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions provide a basic description of the prominence of different issues in the media's reporting on civil society issues. Describe the frequency of reporting per dimension (query *Percentage Dimensions*) and cross-tab with *medium* (query *Count Dimensions_medium*), topic (query *Count Dimensions_topic1*), origin (query *Count Dimensions_origin*).

Medium	Structure	Environment	Values	Impact
AL Ayyam newspaper	597	626	422	729
AL-Quds newspaper	667	755	377	970
Youth Voice Radio	79	222	65	218
Nablus TV	117	170	60	116
Palestine TV	56	200	66	174
Ajyal Radio	90	104	70	93
Amwaj TV	15	12	7	34
Wattan TV	45	71	37	68
Almahed TV	149	36	23	38
Bethlehem TV	78	15	18	23
Najah Radio	117	130	44	143
Total	2010	2341	1189	2606
Percentage	24.67%	28.74%	14.60%	31.99%

The news items have been classified according to the different dimensions covered: Structure, environment, values and impact of civil society. Its interesting to note that the large percentage of responses have been classified as impact where as values of civil society were only covered in 14.6% of all news items.

- For each sub-dimension, describe the frequency of reporting for each indicator (queries *Count all Indicators, Count Indicator per Indicator*) and cross-tab with *medium* (query *Count Indicator_medium*).

SubDim	CountOfIndicCode	%
1.1.	462	5.2%
1.2.	213	2.4%
1.3.	122	1.4%
1.4.	839	9.4%
1.5.	409	4.6%
1.6.	189	2.1%
2.1.	1535	17.1%
2.2.	402	4.5%
2.3	108	1.2%
2.4.	246	2.7%
2.5.	117	1.3%
2.6.	284	3.2%
2.7.	36	0.4%
3.1.	425	4.7%
3.2.	203	2.3%
3.3.	138	1.5%
3.4.	256	2.9%
3.5.	167	1.9%
3.6.	125	1.4%
3.7.	33	0.4%
4.1.	711	7.9%
4.2.	143	1.6%
4.3.	384	4.3%
4.4.	1033	11.5%
4.5.	374	4.2%
Total	8954	100.0%

2.4. Civil Society's image in the media

This section examines how civil society is portrayed in the media.

- Describe the representation of civil society in the monitored items (Query *Percentage repCSO)*. Apart from reporting the percentages, you should also provide the average score (query *average repCSO*).

Representing CSO	Total	%
Negative	54	3.31%
Neutral	295	18.06%
Positive	1284	78.63%
Total	1633	100%

The image of Civil Society represented in the media is overwhelmingly positive with over three quarters of news items reviewed indicated that the image of civil society was a positive one. Only three percent of the news items indicated that Civil Society had a negative image in the media. The low percentage indicates that media is generally promoting civil society but is not however providing any critical analysis or in depth study of their work and values.

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ANNEX 1
COMMUNITY SAMPLING SURVEY
RESPONDENTS' PROFILE

Sampling Distribution

Locality	Village/Camp/Neighborhood	Number of Questionnaires
Jenin	Ti'innik	3
Jenin	Silat al Harithiya	31
Jenin	As Sa'aida	1
Jenin	Rummana	10
Jenin	Zububa	7
Jenin	'Anin	11
Jenin	Jenin Camp	38
Tulkarem	Baqa ash Sharqiya	13
Tulkarem	Nazlat 'Isa	8
Ramallah	Ramallah	8
Jericho	Furush Beit Dajan	3
Jericho	Al Jiftlik	13
Jericho	Az Zubeidat	4
Bethlehem	Ad Duheisha Camp	30
Hebron	Old City	64
Hebron	As Samu'	54
Hebron	Haribat an Nabi	1
Hebron	Imneizil	2
Hebron	Khirbet Ghuwein al Fauqa	1
Total West Bank		**302**
Gaza	Gaza city (Daraj neighborhood)	51
Rafah	Rafah and Rafah Camp	20
Beit Hanoun	Beit Hanun	29
Total Gaza Strip		**100**

Type of Locality

Type of Locality:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	City	Village	Camp
OPT	30.60%	47.51%	21.89%
WB	23.84%	53.64%	22.52%
GS	51.00%	29.00%	20.00%

Monthly household income level in NIS

Income Level (New Israeli Shekel):
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	No Income	<500	500-1000	1000-3000	3000-5000	>5000
OPT	0.00%	13.97%	35.66%	39.65%	7.98%	2.74%
WB	0.00%	14.57%	29.80%	43.38%	8.61%	3.64%
GS	0.00%	12.12%	53.54%	28.28%	6.06%	0.00%

Distribution of respondents among male and female

Respondent Sex:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	Female	Male
OPT	50.75%	49.25%
WB	50.67%	49.33%
GS	51.00%	49.00%

Respondents Profile

Respondents' Profile
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Refugee	34%	28%	53%
Returnee	1%	1%	0%
Peasant	33%	44%	0.02
City-Dweller	26%	23%	0.35
Other	6%	4%	0.1

Type of dwelling

Type of Home:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Temporary shelter	0.50%	0.67%	0.00%
Apartment in building	17.29%	10.37%	38.00%
Separate house	56.14%	55.52%	58.00%
Old house	18.80%	23.75%	4.00%
Deluxe apartment	4.51%	6.02%	0.00%
Villa	1.50%	2.01%	0.00%
Student dorms	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Communal housing	1.25%	1.67%	0.00%

Type of Locality

Type of Locality: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

	OPT	WB	GS
Village/ Rural	26.64%	34.75%	10.96%
Small town	11.21%	11.35%	10.96%
Refugee Camp	18.22%	12.06%	30.14%
City	43.93%	41.84%	47.95%

In the West Bank 35% of stakeholders interviewed came from rural areas, 11.3% from small towns, 12% from refugee camps, while 42% were from cities.
In the Gaza Strip 10% were from rural areas or villages, 30% were from a refugee camp and 48% were from a city/town.

Sex of Respondents

**Sex of Respondents: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

	OPT	WB	GS
Female	31.31%	37.59%	19.18%
Male	68.69%	62.41%	80.82%

Thirty one percent of those interviewed were female while 70% were male.

Income Level of Respondents

**Respondents' Income Level:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

| Category	OPT	WB	GS
Less than 500	2.56%	3.94%	0.00%
500>1000	5.64%	5.51%	5.88%
1000>3000	44.62%	42.52%	48.53%
3000>5000	27.69%	28.35%	26.47%
More than 5000	18.46%	18.90%	17.65%
Don't Know	1.03%	0.79%	1.47%

Eight percent of those interviewed had income of less than a thousand while the main bulk had an income of between 1000-3000 NIS. Almost half of those interviewed had an income that exceeded 3000 NIS.

Education Level of Respondents

**Level of Respondents Education:
Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents**

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

| Category	OPT	WB	GS
Elementary	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Middle	0.47%	0.71%	0.00%
High school	7.04%	9.29%	2.74%
University or equivalent	92.49%	90.00%	97.26%

Only 7% of those interviewed had a high school degree only. 93% had a university degree or equivalent.

Age of Respondents

Age of Respondents: Percentage of OPT, WB and GS Respondents

Legend: OPT, WB, GS

	Less than 21	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	More than 60
OPT	0.00%	14.42%	40.00%	32.09%	9.77%	3.72%
WB	0.00%	16.20%	39.44%	30.99%	9.15%	4.23%
GS	0.00%	10.96%	41.10%	34.25%	10.96%	2.74%

Most of those interviewed were between the ages of 31-40 (40%), there were no interviewees below 21years of age, 32% were between 41-50 and 10% were above 50.

Region of Respondents

Region of Respondents: Percentage of All OPT Respondents

- Middle and South GS 16%
- North WB 16%
- Middle WB 31%
- South WB 19%
- North GS 18%

The interviews were more or less distributed evenly between the five regions divided by this study. The middle of the WB had a higher percentage because it contained the Ramallah and Jerusalem areas which are central for Civil Society activities, as well as government, universities and media.